Shulchan Arukh · Orach Chayim
In-depth pilpul
The sugya of Shabbat 36b – 38b,
the positions of Chananya and the Sages on the required degree of cooking,
the chakira on גרופה וקטומה,
the conditions of חזרה in the Mechaber and in the Rama
Subject: Shulchan Arukh, Orach Chayim, siman 253 · 5 seifim
Talmudic basis: Shabbat 36b – 38b · Rambam, Hilkhot Shabbat ch. 3
Editor: Rav Yossef Haim Samama · DAAT
📑 Table of contents
- Introduction to the sugya — the mishna of כִּירָה (Shabbat 36b) and the question the Talmud leaves open
- The machloket of Chananya and the Sages — the degree of cooking that puts an end to the concern
- How the halakha is decided — Mechaber, Rama, the Alter Rebbe, and an ordinal that reverses
- Chakira on the decree שמא יחתה — a real concern, or a closed decree
- Chakira on גרופה וקטומה — a sign, or heat actually reduced
- The gader of מצטמק ויפה לו — objective or subjective
- The Rishonim on the כופח and on “our ovens”
- The conditions of חזרה — the five conditions and where each comes from
- עודה בידו, דעתו להחזירה — why these two conditions, and who holds what
- Cooking after cooking in liquid — seif 4 and the cross-reference to siman 318
- Warming on top of a hot pot on Shabbat — seif 5 and הטמנה
- Modern practical nafka minot — hotplate, Shabbat oven, slow cooker
📜 The text of the Shulchan Arukh — the frame of the five seifim
The siman has five seifim. The first governs שהייה — leaving a pot before Shabbat on a fire that will stay lit; the second חזרה — taking it off on Shabbat and putting it back; the third a particular case of the early morning; the fourth adding hot water to a pot that is reducing; the fifth setting a dish on top of a hot pot to warm it. Here are the siman’s heading and the frame of the first two seifim, from which everything else follows.
« דיני כירה ותנור ליתן עליה קדירה בערב שבת. ובו ה סעיפים » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג, כותרת הסימן)
« אם הוסקה בגפת שהיא פסולת של זתים או בעצים אסור ליתן עליה תבשיל מבע״י להשהותו עליה אלא א״כ נתבשל כל צרכו והוא מצטמק … ורע לו דליכא למיחש שמא יחתה או שהוא חי שלא נתבשל כלל דכיון שהוא חי מסיח דעתו ממנו עד למחר ובכל הלילה יכול להתבשל בלא חיתוי אבל אם נתבשל קצת ולא נתבשל כל צרכו ואפי׳ נתבשל כל צרכו והוא מצטמק ויפה לו חיישינן שמא יחתה ואסור להשהותו עליה » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:א)
« כירה שהיא גרופה וקטומה ונטל הקדירה מעליה אפילו בשבת מותר להחזירה כל זמן שהיא רותחת » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:ב)
1. Introduction to the sugya — the mishna of כִּירָה (Shabbat 36b)
The whole of siman 253 is the working-out of a single mishna, and of a question the Talmud puts to it without settling it. The mishna opens the chapter כִּירָה:
It distinguishes two fuels — straw and brushwood, which burn out quickly, against olive pulp and logs, which hold and make embers — and then twice reports a dispute between the schools of Shammai and Hillel: first on what may be set on the fire, then on taking off and putting back.
« בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: נוֹטְלִין, אֲבָל לֹא מַחֲזִירִין. וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: אַף מַחֲזִירִין » (שבת ל״ו:)
What the gemara asks, and does not settle. The decisive words of the mishna are לֹא יִתֵּן — “he shall not set”. But set what, and when? The gemara lays out the alternative:
« הַאי ״לֹא יִתֵּן״ — לֹא יַחֲזִיר הוּא, אֲבָל לְשַׁהוֹת — מְשַׁהִין, אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ גָּרוּף וְאֵינוֹ קָטוּם » (שבת ל״ו:)
In other words: either the mishna speaks only of putting back, and leaving in place would be permitted even on a stove neither raked nor covered — in which case it follows Chananya; or it already speaks of leaving, and one must rake or cover from the outset. The Mishna Berura sums up the outcome in four words:
« ולא איפשיטא האי בעיא » (משנה ברורה רנ״ג, פתיחה)
The question was never resolved, and it is out of that non-resolution that the two opinions of seif 1 are born.
The underlying question: what exactly is the prohibition of שהייה?
- First way: a prohibition on the act of leaving food to cook over Shabbat — the cooking would carry on to the man’s account.
- Second way: no intrinsic prohibition, but a rabbinic decree — the concern that he may stir the coals to hasten the cooking.
The foundational texts say the second. The Rambam:
« תַּבְשִׁיל שֶׁלֹּא בָּשֵׁל כָּל צָרְכּוֹ וְחַמִּין שֶׁלֹּא הוּחַמּוּ כָּל צָרְכָּן אוֹ תַּבְשִׁיל שֶׁבָּשֵׁל כָּל צָרְכּוֹ וְכָל זְמַן שֶׁמִּצְטַמֵּק הוּא יָפֶה לוֹ אֵין מַשְהִין אוֹתוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הָאֵשׁ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֻנַּח מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם גְּזֵרָה שֶׁמָּא יַחְתֶּה בַּגֶּחָלִים » (רמב״ם הלכות שבת ג׳:ד)
And the Alter Rebbe spells out the feared act:
« שֶׁמָּא יַחְתֶּה … וִיהַפֵּךְ הַגֶּחָלִים בְּמַחְתָּה בְּשַׁבָּת לִגְמוֹר בִּשּׁוּלוֹ » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:א)
Nafka mina: if the prohibition is only a decree resting on a concern, what becomes of it where the concern has no object — an appliance with no embers and no accessible control? That is exactly the question of section 4, and it is not settled here.
2. The machloket of Chananya and the Sages — the degree of cooking
The baraita the gemara cites in Chananya’s name is the other pole of the sugya:
A word on the benchmark. מאכל בן דרוסאי is the rough cooking of a bandit who will not wait. The Mishna Berura puts a figure on it:
« אם התבשיל כבר נתבשל כמאכל בן דרוסאי הוא כחצי בישול » (משנה ברורה רנ״ג, פתיחה) — and in brackets it notes a further opinion placing it at a third of the cooking.
The two positions:
- The Sages (the anonymous mishna): as long as the dish is not fully cooked, one does not leave it on a stove that has been neither raked nor covered. The risk of stirring runs until cooking is complete.
- Chananya: from the stage of מאכל בן דרוסאי the dish is edible; the man turns his mind away from it — the Mechaber uses, for a neighbouring case, the expression מסיח דעתו ממנו — and the risk ceases to be real.
And it explicitly ties each of the two opinions of the Shulchan Arukh to its holders: « והן השתי דעות שהובאו בשו״ע בסימן זה דעה א׳ היא דעת הרי״ף והרמב״ם והי״א שמביא המחבר בסוף ס״א הוא דעת רש״י ותוספות הנ״ל » (משנה ברורה רנ״ג, פתיחה)
So: the Rif and the Rambam are on the side of the Sages — the first opinion, the more demanding one; Rashi and Tosafot are on Chananya’s side, and they are the ones the Mechaber brings as וי״א at the end of seif 1.
Chakira: what exactly is the dispute about?
- First way — how far stirring extends: for Chananya one only stirs up to the stage of מאכל בן דרוסאי, because beyond it a man has no active interest in the pot; for the Sages, stirring remains conceivable as long as a gain in quality is still possible.
- Second way — when the mind turns away: for Chananya it begins as soon as the dish is edible; for the Sages only when nothing more can be gained from heat, that is, at the stage of מִצְטַמֵּק וְרַע לוֹ.
The two ways often coincide, but not always: the first measures a possibility of acting, the second a state of mind. It is the same duality that will reappear, transposed, in the chakira on גרופה וקטומה.
3. How the halakha is decided — from the Mechaber to the Rama
| Position | What is ruled | Textual support |
|---|---|---|
| The Mechaber (seif 1) | Like the Sages in the first instance: full cooking with מִצְטַמֵּק וְרַע לוֹ, or else an entirely raw dish | « אם הוסקה בגפת שהיא פסולת של זתים או בעצים אסור ליתן עליה תבשיל מבע״י להשהותו עליה אלא א״כ נתבשל כל צרכו והוא מצטמק … ורע לו דליכא למיחש שמא יחתה או שהוא חי שלא נתבשל כלל דכיון שהוא חי מסיח דעתו ממנו עד למחר ובכל הלילה יכול להתבשל בלא חיתוי » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:א) |
| The Mechaber (end of seif 1) | Then brings the lenient opinion as וי״א | « וי״א שכל שנתבשל כמאכל בן דרוסאי … או שנתבשל כל צרכו ומצטמק ויפה לו מות׳ להשהותו על גבי כירה » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:א) |
| The Rama | The custom follows the lenient opinion | « ונהגו להקל כסברא האחרונה » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:א) |
| The Alter Rebbe | Same practical result, but in his work the lenient view is the first opinion and the demanding one comes as וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים | « וּכְבָר נִתְפַּשֵּׁט הַמִּנְהָג לְהָקֵל כִּסְבָרָא הָרִאשׁוֹנָה » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:ט) |
An ordinal that reverses, and what it teaches. The Rama writes « ונהגו להקל כסברא האחרונה » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:א) — “like the last opinion”.
The Alter Rebbe writes « וּכְבָר נִתְפַּשֵּׁט הַמִּנְהָג לְהָקֵל כִּסְבָרָא הָרִאשׁוֹנָה » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:ט) — “like the first opinion”.
Both point to the same leniency; what differs is the order of presentation. The Alter Rebbe opens his siman with Chananya’s position:
« אִם כְּשֶׁמַּגִּיעַ הַלַּיְלָה אֵין הַתַּבְשִׁיל מְבֻשָּׁל עֲדַיִן כְּמַאֲכַל בֶּן דְּרוּסָאִי » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:א)
and brings the demanding opinion only in seif 9:
« וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים שֶׁאֲפִלּוּ תַּבְשִׁיל שֶׁנִּתְבַּשֵּׁל כְּמַאֲכַל בֶּן דְּרוּסָאִי » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:ט)
The lesson is one of method: a reference of the kind “like the first opinion” is never read outside the work that writes it. Carried from one book to another, it points to the opposite.
As for Sephardic practice, it follows the Mechaber’s first ruling and requires full cooking. Sephardic Acharonim discuss how far this extends; this page does not cite them and decides nothing in their place — the practical line belongs to level 4.
4. Chakira on the decree שמא יחתה
The underlying chakira on the decree:
- First way — a real concern: the decree measures an actual risk; where the risk materially disappears, the reason for the decree disappears with it.
- Second way — a closed decree: the Sages instituted a prohibition on the situation — a pot on a source of heat during Shabbat — and not on the risk case by case. The prohibition stands even where there is nothing to stir.
Nafka mina: appliances with no embers and no accessible control.
- First way: no embers, nothing to stir — there would be ground to permit even a dish that has not reached מאכל בן דרוסאי.
- Second way: the decree is structural — any pot set on a source of heat during Shabbat falls under the rule if the dish has not reached the threshold.
Two observations hold the conclusion back. First, the Shulchan Arukh forbids שהייה next to an oven even raked and covered:
« ותנור אפי׳ אם הוסק בקש או גבבא אסור אפילו לסמוך לו אפילו אם גרוף וקטום » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:א) — proof that the absence of embers does not by itself lift the rule.
Second, the Alter Rebbe grounds the leniency of קְטִימָה not on the material disappearance of the embers but on what the man has made known:
« דְּכֵיוָן שֶׁגִּלָּה דַעְתּוֹ מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהַגֶּחָלִים — שׁוּב אֵין לָחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא יַחְתֶּה בְּשַׁבָּת » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:א)
How modern appliances are treated belongs to contemporary poskim, who relate them to the case of גרופה וקטומה; this page does not put its own ruling in their place.
5. Chakira on גרופה וקטומה
The Mechaber defines the two acts without commenting on their logic:
« אא״כ גרף דהיינו שהוציא ממנה כל הגחלים או קטם דהיינו שכסה הגחלים באפר למעט חומם » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:א)
Raking removes the embers; covering with ash, the text says, reduces their heat. The lamdan’s question is which of the two effects is the one sought.
Chakira: what is the gader of גרופה וקטומה?
- First way — a sign: raking or covering is a declarative act. The man shows he is done with the fire; from then on, even if embers remain, the concern falls away.
- Second way — a reality: covering with ash actually reduces the heat; there is no longer enough fire for active cooking.
And the two acts do not stand at the same rank. Raking, which removes the embers, satisfies both ways at once — it is a sign and it reduces the fire. Covering with ash holds only by the first: it declares, but it leaves the embers under the ash. That is why the chakira turns entirely on קטומה, and it is on that that the two witnesses cited below bear. We set this down as a consequence of the texts cited, not as the ruling of a named authority.
A layer of ash, however thin, suffices — and he gives the reason, which is the reason of a sign: « דְּכֵיוָן שֶׁגִּלָּה דַעְתּוֹ מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם שֶׁאֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ לְהַגֶּחָלִים — שׁוּב אֵין לָחוּשׁ שֶׁמָּא יַחְתֶּה בְּשַׁבָּת » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:א)
He goes so far as to write that embers which flare up again of themselves change nothing, and that: « וְהַגֶּחָלִים שֶׁעָמְמוּ הֲרֵי הֵן כִּקְטוּמָה » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:א)
And he gives a wholly material reason: « מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהַגּוֹרֵף אֵינוֹ גּוֹרֵף אֶלָּא רֹב הָאֵשׁ וְעַצְמָהּ. וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לִגְרֹף כָּל הָאֵשׁ עַד שֶׁלֹּא תִּשָּׁאֵר נִיצוֹץ אַחַת » (רמב״ם הלכות שבת ג׳:ו)
One never rakes more than the bulk of the fire, and a spark remains. If raking counted as a sign, that residual spark would be of no consequence; that it is decisive shows the Rambam is weighing fire here, not a gesture. This reading is an inference from his reasoning, not a formulation he himself writes: the Rambam does not set the two ways against each other explicitly, and we shall not make him say so.
Nafka mina: on the first way, an appliance whose construction forbids any adjustment carries its sign in its very structure. On the second, one must first measure whether the actual heat still suffices for active cooking. The two ways may reach the same practical result, but they do not ask the same question — and it is the question asked that decides the borderline cases.
6. The gader of מצטמק ויפה לו and of its opposite
Chakira:
- First way — objective: a property of the dish itself. Some foods gain by reducing, others are spoiled; the criterion is in the pot.
- Second way — subjective: the criterion is in the man. One likes his dish reduced, another does not.
And for its opposite: « דְּהַיְנוּ שֶׁרַע לוֹ לְאָדָם וְעָצֵב הוּא בְּזֶה שֶׁהַתַּבְשִׁיל מִצְטַמֵּק » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:י)
Both glosses use a verb of feeling — to rejoice, to be saddened — and not a property of the food.
What holds one back from making this a general conclusion. The Mechaber himself writes מצטמק ויפה לו without saying whose it is, and so does the Rambam:
« תַּבְשִׁיל שֶׁלֹּא בָּשֵׁל כָּל צָרְכּוֹ וְחַמִּין שֶׁלֹּא הוּחַמּוּ כָּל צָרְכָּן אוֹ תַּבְשִׁיל שֶׁבָּשֵׁל כָּל צָרְכּוֹ וְכָל זְמַן שֶׁמִּצְטַמֵּק הוּא יָפֶה לוֹ אֵין מַשְהִין אוֹתוֹ עַל גַּבֵּי הָאֵשׁ בְּשַׁבָּת אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁהֻנַּח מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם גְּזֵרָה שֶׁמָּא יַחְתֶּה בַּגֶּחָלִים » (רמב״ם הלכות שבת ג׳:ד)
Nothing in these two formulations compels the subjective reading; they merely allow it. And the case of the indifferent man — the one to whom reduction is neither here nor there — is settled by none of the texts cited here. The question remains open, and this page does not answer it.
7. The Rishonim on the כופח and on “our ovens”
Three vessels, not two. The Mechaber distinguishes them:
« וכופח שהו׳ מקו׳ שפיתת קדיר׳ אחת אם הוסק בקש או גבבא דינו ככירה בגפת או בעצים דינו כתנור » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:א)
The כירה holds two pots, the כופח one, and the תנור encloses the heat. The כופח is an intermediate case: it follows the כירה for straw, the תנור for logs.
| Position | The oven of the Talmud | “Our ovens”, open at the side |
|---|---|---|
| Rashi, as reported by the Taz | The most stringent: « פירש״י מתוך שקצר למעלה ורחב למטה נקלט חומו לתוכו טפי מכירה » (ט״ז או״ח רנ״ג ס״ק ה׳) | — |
| The Rambam | Forbidden even raked or covered: « אֲבָל הַתַּנּוּר אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁגָּרַף הָאֵשׁ אוֹ כִּסָּה בְּאֵפֶר אוֹ שֶׁהִסִּיקוּהוּ בְּקַשׁ אוֹ בִגְבָבָא אֵין מַשְׁהִין בְּתוֹכוֹ וְלֹא עַל גַּבָּיו וְלֹא סוֹמְכִין לוֹ » (רמב״ם הלכות שבת ג׳:ה) | — |
| The Mechaber (seif 1) | « ותנור אפי׳ אם הוסק בקש או גבבא אסור אפילו לסמוך לו אפילו אם גרוף וקטום » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:א) | — |
| The Rama (seif 1) | — | « והתנורים שלנו דינם ככירה » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:א); Sefaria carries this gloss’s sources in the margin: ר״ן ר״פ כירה וכל בו וכן משמע מפירש״י |
| The Taz | — | « אבל תנורים שלנו שפתוחים מן הצד הם ככירה כמ״ש ב״י » (ט״ז או״ח רנ״ג ס״ק ט״ז) |
| The Alter Rebbe (seif 7) | — | « וְהַתַּנּוּרִים שֶׁלָּנוּ שֶׁפִּתְחָם מִן הַצַּד — אֵין הַבְלָם … חַם כָּל כָּךְ כְּהֶבֶל הַתַּנּוּר שֶׁבִּימֵיהֶם, וְלֹא כְּהֶבֶל הַכֻּפָּח, הוֹאִיל וְהֵן רְחָבִים יוֹתֵר מִשְּׁפִיתַת קְדֵרָה אַחַת, וּלְפִיכָךְ הֲרֵי דִּינָם שָׁוֶה לְכִירָה לְכָל דָּבָר » (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:ז) |
Yesod: what separates the כירה from the תנור is not the shape of the vessel but how concentrated the heat is. Rashi, in the Taz, says it by geometry: an oven narrow at the top and wide at the bottom holds its heat better than a stove. The Alter Rebbe says it by width: our ovens, open at the side and wider than the space of a single pot, no longer concentrate heat as the Talmud’s oven did — hence their alignment with the כירה. Since the criterion is heat and not the name, it carries over to modern appliances; that is the carrying-over attempted in section 12.
8. The conditions of חזרה — the five conditions
Mind the attribution. The sentence above is the Mechaber’s. The two best-known conditions, by contrast, are glosses of the Rama, which Sefaria marks as coming from the Tur:
« ועודה בידו … ולא הניחה על גבי קרקע » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:ב)
and « ודעתו להחזירה » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:ב). Confusing them with the Mechaber’s text is the commonest attribution error on this seif.
| Condition | Who writes it | Reason |
|---|---|---|
| 1. גרופה וקטומה | Mechaber, seif 2 | To rule out stirring, as for שהייה |
| 2. רותחת — still boiling | Mechaber, seif 2 | This is a return, not a fresh cooking |
| 3. עודה בידו — it never left his hand | Rama, from the Tur | The link with the first placement is not broken |
| 4. דעתו להחזירה — he intended to put it back | Rama, from the Tur | The act qualifies as a return, not as a new placement |
| 5. On the stove, not inside it | Mechaber, seif 2 | « ודוקא על גבה אבל לתוכה אסור ובתנור אסור להחזיר אפי׳ הוא גרוף וקטום » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:ב) |
Two further points complete the table. The Rama requires the dish to be fully cooked:
« ודוקא שהתבשיל מבושל כל צרכו … ואז מותר להחזירו אפילו לכירה אחרת אבל אם לא נתבשל כל צרכו אסור אפי׳ באותה כירה » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:ב)
And the Mishna Berura warns that the Rama’s two conditions are not of the same rank as the first:
« פי׳ הא דבעינן דוקא עודה בידו גם דעתו להחזיר אבל גרוף וקטום לכו״ע בעינן » (משנה ברורה רנ״ג ס״ק ס״ג) — a raked or covered stove is required by all, whatever becomes of the rest of the debate.
9. עודה בידו, דעתו להחזירה — why these two conditions, and who holds what
The conceptual question is easy to state: when one sets the pot back, is one continuing the placement made before Shabbat, or beginning a new one? The Rama’s two conditions are the marks by which the first branch is recognised.
Setting the pot on a bed or on a bench is equivalent to setting it on the ground: the first placement is cancelled, and the return becomes an installation made on Shabbat, which the Sages never permitted.
The intention to put the pot back keeps the original placement alive; one who removes it without that intention and then changes his mind is installing afresh.
Removing the pot before nightfall cancels the first placement and makes the return an insulating done from the outset on Shabbat, which is not the case when one removes it on Shabbat itself.
The Rama’s lenient opinion, and who carries it. The Rama reports:
« וי״א דכל זה אינו אסור רק כשנטלו מן הכירה מבעוד יום ולא החזירו עד שחשכה » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:ב)
and draws the consequence:
« אבל אם לקחו משם משחשיכה אפילו הניחו על גבי קרקע מותר » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:ב)
Sefaria carries in the margin of this gloss the name of the Ran, on the chapter Kira, and that of the Kol Bo. It is therefore the Ran who is the lenient one here — and the Taz confirms it without ambiguity when explaining the Rama’s וטוב להחמיר:
« כי הר״ן כ׳ קולא זו והתו׳ והרא״ש והנמשכים אחריהם לא ס״ל כן » (ט״ז או״ח רנ״ג ס״ק י״ב)
The Mishna Berura says the same:
« כי הרבה פוסקים חולקין על הר״ן » (משנה ברורה רנ״ג ס״ק ס״ז)
This point is worth underlining because it is easy to invert: the Ran is not the one who hardens the condition about the ground, he is the one who relativises it; those who contradict him are Tosafot, the Rosh, and those who follow them.
The custom, and its reservation. The Rama concludes:
« וכן נוהגים להקל בתנורים שלנו שיש להם דין כירה וסומכים עצמם על דברי המקילין וטוב להחמיר » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:ב)
One relies on the lenient authorities with our ovens, which have the status of a כירה, and it is good to be stringent.
A practical nafka mina, noted by the Mishna Berura:
« ועיין בביאור הלכה שהבאנו הרבה מהראשונים שמקילין בעודן בידו אפילו אין דעתו להחזיר וכן מקילין בדעתו להחזיר אף שבינתים הסירן מידו ונראה שבעת הצורך יש לסמוך ע״ז » (משנה ברורה רנ״ג ס״ק נ״ו)
Many Rishonim are lenient on one or the other of the two conditions taken separately, and it appears that at need one may rely on them. How far “at need” reaches is not settled here.
10. Cooking after cooking in liquid — seif 4
The seif ends on a cross-reference the Mechaber himself puts in parentheses: « וע״ל סי׳ שי״ח » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:ד).
Chakira on the nature of seif 4:
- First way: the problem is cooking after cooking in liquid. The kettle water, however hot it was, has cooled; poured into a boiling pot, it is cooked again.
- Second way: the problem is the addition itself, which returns the pot to a state in which its cooking will be completed on Shabbat.
His concern is two vessels at unequal temperatures — one below the threshold at which the hand recoils, the other above it — cooking each other. And it is he who refers to siman 318 for the distinction between dry and liquid.
The cross-reference to siman 318. The rule is usually put in two limbs: no cooking after cooking in a dry food, cooking after cooking in a liquid one. That formulation is a formula of the study hall, not a quotation; the text itself says this:
« וה״מ שיש בו בישול אחר בישול בתבשיל שיש בו מרק אבל דבר שנתבשל כבר והוא יבש מותר לשרותו בחמין בשבת » (רמ״א או״ח שי״ח:ד)
There is cooking after cooking in a dish that has broth, whereas a food already cooked and dry may be steeped in hot water on Shabbat. Seif 4 of our siman is the practical application of that divide.
11. Warming on top of a hot pot — seif 5
Kashya: if there is no cooking after cooking in a dry food, why does the Mechaber ground the permission on אין דרך בישול בכך — “that is not the way of cooking” — rather than, more simply, on the absence of cooking after cooking?
Terutz: the example the Mechaber gives is not a dry food. He writes « כגון פנאדי״ש וכיוצא בהן לחממן » (שו״ע או״ח רנ״ג:ה) — פנאדי״ש, that is, filled pastries.
A filled pastry holds moisture, and the question of cooking after cooking in liquid does arise there. The reasoning therefore had to bear on the manner of the act and not on the substance: setting a pastry on a lid is not a way of cooking. And that is why, as soon as one buries it under cloths laid on the urn, the permission falls away, and the Mechaber concludes with ודאי אסור.
Nafka mina:
- A cold pastry set on a hot pot — the Mechaber permits it expressly.
- Burying it under cloths laid on the urn — the Mechaber forbids it expressly, and with ודאי אסור.
- A liquid, where cooking after cooking applies: the reasoning אין דרך בישול בכך does not cover it, and siman 318 governs the case.
- The Rama adds on the spot the case of the stove and that of an oven in which one baked before Shabbat; the practical line for those cases belongs to level 4.
12. Modern practical nafka minot
What follows carries the criteria above over to today’s appliances. That carrying-over is the business of contemporary poskim; what is set out here is which classical criterion governs each case, without deciding in their place.
1. The Shabbat hotplate. Governing criterion: גרופה וקטומה, section 5. Depending on whether one takes the act as a sign or as a reduction of heat, the question put to the appliance is not the same — a structure that forbids any adjustment on one side, actual heat on the other.
2. An oven on “Shabbat mode”. Governing criterion: the Rama’s gloss « והתנורים שלנו דינם ככירה » (רמ״א או״ח רנ״ג:א) and the yesod of section 7 — what counts is how concentrated the heat is, not the name of the vessel. What remains to be examined, factually, is the neutralising of the thermostat and any automatic firing.
3. The slow cooker (Crock-Pot, Instant Pot). Governing criterion: the cooking threshold of section 2. A half-cooked dish — one that has begun to cook without reaching מאכל בן דרוסאי — is the case on which seif 1 is strictest, since that is where stoking is feared. A wholly raw dish is another matter: the Mechaber permits it there, או שהוא חי שלא נתבשל כלל דכיון שהוא חי מסיח דעתו ממנו. Starting it early and the “keep warm” setting are avenues examined by contemporary poskim.
4. The tea urn. Governing criterion: water fully boiled before Shabbat is no longer being cooked. Pouring cold water into the hot vessel, by contrast, is a question of cooking, and belongs to siman 318, not to ours.
5. The vacuum flask. Governing criterion: הטמנה. A vessel that adds no heat is not a דָבָר הַמּוֹסִיף הֶבֶל; seif 4 of our siman is about adding water, and it is siman 257 that governs insulating proper — the Alter Rebbe refers there himself (שו״ע הרב רנ״ג:י).
6. Putting a pot back after taking it off. Governing criterion: the five conditions of section 8. In practice: not setting the pot down in the meantime, and having intended from the outset to put it back — bearing in mind that the Mishna Berura, in ס״ק נ״ו cited above, reports Rishonim who are lenient on one or the other of these two conditions.
7. The blech (a sheet of metal laid over the burners). Governing criterion: the same chakira as the hotplate. The sheet separates the pot from the flame and covers the controls; whether that counts as גרופה וקטומה depends on which way is taken in section 5. Contemporary poskim treat the question; this page does not settle it.
Going deeper
Level 3 — Synthesis: a structured recap, memory markers, decision trees and rules of thumb.
Level 4 — Daat HaRav: the shitah of the Alter Rebbe (Shulchan Arukh HaRav).