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DAAT · LEVEL 2 — LAMDAN

Shulchan Aruch · Orach Chayim

Hilkhot Shabbat — in-depth study
סימן שמ״ב
בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת מֻתָּר לַעֲשׂוֹת דְּבָרִים שֶׁאָסְרוּ חַזַ"ל מִשּׁוּם גְּזֵרָה
עיון, פלפול, שיטות הראשונים והאחרונים
⚡ For lamdanim and talmidei chachamim ⚡
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In-depth pilpul

Talmudic sources, the underlying chakira,
the shitos of the Rishonim on bein hashemashos — permitting shevusim for a mitzvah or under pressure

Subject:
Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim, siman שמ״ב — 1 seif
with the nosei kelim: commentaries on the Shulchan Aruch, ט״ז, מג״א, sources and notes

Mishnah Berurah: 7 ס״ק

Editing and study:
Rav Yossef Haim Samama · DAAT

📑 Table of contents

  1. Introducing the sugya — the baraisa of shevus at bein hashemashos
  2. The underlying chakira — a leniency in the decree itself, or a dispensation in a pressing hour
  3. Defining the time of bein hashemashos — the machlokes of R. Yehudah and R. Yosi
  4. The condition “a mitzvah or pressure” — the two heads of the heter
  5. The psak of the Beis Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch — the Mechaber's wording and his sources
  6. A shevus close to a melachah — is it included in the heter?
  7. The sugya of the Rishonim — shevus d'shevus and holding the techum
  8. The psak of the Acharonim — Taz, Magen Avraham, Mishnah Berurah
  9. Practical nafka minos — amirah l'akum and lighting the lamp
  10. Summary of the shitos and the direction of the halachah

📜 The text of the Shulchan Aruch — 1 seif

סעיף א. בין השמשות מותר לעשות דברים שאסרו חז״ל משום גזירה. ובו סעיף אחד:
כל הדברים שהם אסורים מדברי סופרים לא גזרו עליהם בין השמשות (וע״ל סי' רס״א וס״ס ש״ז) והוא שיהא שם דבר מצוה או דוחק כיצד מותר לו בין השמשות לעלות באילן או לשוט על פני המים להביא לולב או שופר וכן מוריד מהאילן או מוציא מהכרמלית עירוב שעשה וכן אם היה טרוד ונחפז לדבר שהוא משום שבות מותר בין השמשות ומטעם זה מותר לומר בין השמשות לעכו״ם להדליק לו נר לשבת:

1. Introducing the sugya — the baraisa of shevus at bein hashemashos

The source in the gemara

The din of this siman does not come from a baraisa of its own in Hilkhot Shabbat. It is drawn from a principle of Rabbi which the gemara in Eruvin uses to explain a mishnah about an eruv: one who placed his eruv on a tree, below ten tefachim, has a valid eruv — even though taking it down from the tree is a shevus. If that eruv is valid, it is because the shevus was never decreed upon that moment.

« וְרַבִּי הִיא, דְּאָמַר: כׇּל דָּבָר שֶׁהוּא מִשּׁוּם שְׁבוּת לֹא גָּזְרוּ עָלָיו בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת » (עירובין ל״ב ע״ב)

The mishnah in Shabbat, in the chapter Bameh madlikin, draws up two lists for that same moment — what one does not do then, and what one does — and everything here begins from their standing side by side:

« סָפֵק חֲשֵׁכָה סָפֵק אֵינוֹ חֲשֵׁכָה — אֵין מְעַשְּׂרִין אֶת הַוַּדַּאי, וְאֵין מַטְבִּילִין אֶת הַכֵּלִים, וְאֵין מַדְלִיקִין אֶת הַנֵּרוֹת. אֲבָל מְעַשְּׂרִין אֶת הַדְּמַאי, וּמְעָרְבִין, וְטוֹמְנִין אֶת הַחַמִּין » (משנה שבת ב׳:ז׳ · שבת ל״ד ע״א)

The gemara there gives the reason for the second list:

« בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת סְפֵקָא הוּא, וּסְפֵקָא דְרַבָּנַן לְקוּלָּא » (שבת ל״ד ע״א)

From all of this it emerges that bein hashemashos, being itself a doubt — day or night — did not receive the rabbinic decrees: to decree upon a doubt would be a gezeirah upon a gezeirah. But the first list of the mishnah shows at once that the matter is not unqualified: tithing the certainly-untithed, immersing vessels and lighting lamps remain forbidden at that hour, although they too are no more than shevusim. That tension carries the whole siman.

Two premises join here: (a) bein hashemashos is a doubt, day or night — and if it is still day, there is no prohibition at all; (b) rabbinic prohibitions are not of such weight that the Sages wished to uphold their word where there is both doubt and need. From the two together the heter is born: a shevus in a time of doubt — for a mitzvah or under pressure — was never forbidden to begin with.

2. The underlying chakira — a leniency in the decree, or a dispensation under pressure

Chakira. What is the nature of the heter “at bein hashemashos they did not decree” — did the decree never apply to that time at all, or does it apply, and the Sages lifted it where there is need?

From the wording of the Shulchan Aruch — והוא שיהא שם דבר מצוה או דוחק, “provided there is there a matter of mitzvah or pressure” (שו״ע או״ח שמ״ב) — the second side appears to be the right one: to lay down a condition of mitzvah or pressure is to say that without a need the decree stands at bein hashemashos too. The Beis Yosef says this in so many words, and it is this that tips the chakira one way rather than the other:

« אבל במקום דליכא דבר מצוה בין השמשות נמי גזרו משום שבות » (בית יוסף או״ח שמ״ב)

3. Defining the time of bein hashemashos — the machlokes of R. Yehudah and R. Yosi

Which “bein hashemashos” is this halachah speaking of? The tannaim disputed it in Shabbat:

R. Yehudah — from sunset, as long as the eastern face is reddening:

« מִשֶּׁתִּשְׁקַע הַחַמָּה כָּל זְמַן שֶׁפְּנֵי מִזְרָח מַאֲדִימִין » (שבת ל״ד ע״ב)

R. Yosi — bein hashemashos is the matter of the blink of an eye:

« בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת כְּהֶרֶף עַיִן, זֶה נִכְנָס וְזֶה יוֹצֵא, וְאִי אֶפְשָׁר לַעֲמוֹד עָלָיו » (שבת ל״ד ע״ב)

The gemara, in the same place, gives its length according to Rabbah in the name of Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel — three quarters of a mil:

« אֶלָּא: תְּלָתָא רִיבְעֵי מִילָא » (שבת ל״ד ע״ב)

In practice we keep stringently to R. Yehudah's position and to its span — as the Beis Yosef sets out in siman רס״א, to which the Mechaber refers here. The heter of siman שמ״ב therefore runs across that whole span, from sunset until the stars come out.

Kashya. If bein hashemashos is a doubt, why is the condition “a mitzvah or pressure” needed at all — a rabbinic doubt is resolved leniently, and that without any need?

Terutz. The rule “a rabbinic doubt is resolved leniently” applies to a doubt that has arisen in the facts, or in a din already born; here the Sages deliberately decreed upon the doubtful moment itself, so that their word not be treated lightly, and merely refrained from upholding it where there is need. It follows that the need is not what “resolves a doubt”: it is a condition written into the takanah itself — a further proof for the second side of the chakira. The Beis Yosef puts it in just these terms when he reads the mishnah of the eruv on the tree:

« משמע דדוקא לדבר מצוה הוא דלא גזרו עליו » (בית יוסף או״ח שמ״ב)

4. The condition “a mitzvah or pressure” — the two heads of the heter

The Shulchan Aruch lays down two alternative conditions, and the ways of learning have divided over how to read them:

The Mechaber's example for the mitzvah:

« כיצד מותר לו בין השמשות לעלות באילן או לשוט על פני המים להביא לולב או שופר » (שו״ע או״ח שמ״ב)

and the example of the eruv, which must be reachable at the very moment the eruv takes effect:

« וכן מוריד מהאילן או מוציא מהכרמלית עירוב שעשה » (שו״ע או״ח שמ״ב)

His example for pressure no longer speaks of a mitzvah at all, but of a man who is hurried:

« וכן אם היה טרוד ונחפז לדבר שהוא משום שבות מותר בין השמשות » (שו״ע או״ח שמ״ב)

5. The psak of the Beis Yosef and the Shulchan Aruch — the Mechaber's wording and his sources

Beis Yosef. He opens with the sugya of Eruvin ל״ב ע״ב and with the mishnah at the end of the second chapter of Shabbat, then rests the restrictive reading on the Mefarshim as the Maggid Mishneh reports them:
« וכ״כ ה״ה בפכ״ד בשם המפרשים » (בית יוסף או״ח שמ״ב)
He then cites the Rambam in two places, and the difference between the two formulations deserves attention. In Hilchos Eruvin the condition is stated as “in a place of mitzvah or in a pressing hour”:
« שכל דבר שהוא מדברי סופרים לא גזרו עליו בין השמשות במקום מצוה או בשעת הדחק » (בית יוסף או״ח שמ״ב, בשם הרמב״ם הל׳ עירובין פ״ו)
In Hilchos Shabbat the Rambam adds the negative face, which the Mechaber will not reproduce as such:
« אֲבָל אִם לֹא הָיָה שָׁם דֹּחַק וְלֹא דְּבַר מִצְוָה אָסוּר » (רמב״ם הלכות שבת פכ״ד ה״י)
The Mechaber himself copied the Hilchos Shabbat formulation into a single seif, and set into it an internal cross-reference which the printed text gives in abbreviated form, in parentheses, in the very middle of the seif: it stands between “they did not decree upon them at bein hashemashos” and the condition “provided there is there a matter of mitzvah or pressure”. That cross-reference points to siman רס״א, above, for the time of bein hashemashos itself and for tosefes Shabbat, and to the end of siman ש״ז, for amirah l'akum and the parallel shevusim. Its position in mid-sentence is why the condition, when quoted on its own, is usually read cut off from what precedes it.

A dikduk in the Mechaber's wording: he wrote אסורים מדברי סופרים, “forbidden by the words of the Sofrim” (שו״ע או״ח שמ״ב) — that is, rabbinic prohibitions alone. A biblical melachah, even at bein hashemashos, remains forbidden, and this heter does not touch it at all: if it is still day it is forbidden by the Torah, and where the doubt bears on something severe no leniency was extended.

6. A shevus close to a melachah — is it included in the heter?

The central sharpening point: was every shevus permitted at bein hashemashos, or only a shevus “far” from a melachah?

The plain sense of the baraisa covers everything that falls under the words of the Sofrim. But the Mishnah Berurah opens its commentary on the siman by warning that the word “all” is not to be taken literally, and gives the reason:

« דהם קרובים לבוא לידי מלאכה גמורה דאורייתא גזרו בהם טפי » (משנה ברורה שמ״ב ס״ק א)

Along the way it names cases in which no leniency was extended despite a mitzvah need — among them carrying pachos pachos me-arba amos, and eruvei techumin:

« וכן הרבה פוסקים סוברים דאין מערבין עירובי תחומין ביה״ש אף שהוא לצורך מצוה » (משנה ברורה שמ״ב ס״ק א)

The reason is the one it gave: in a shevus neighbouring a melachah there is concern that one will come to an actual Torah prohibition, and they did not wish to uphold the heter where stumbling lies in wait.

Nafka mina. Telling a non-Jew to light a lamp is a “far” shevus — speech alone — and it was permitted. A shevus whose very object is a safeguard close to a melachah, by contrast, remains within the doubt, and the Mishnah Berurah placed it outside the heter.

7. The sugya of the Rishonim — shevus d'shevus and holding the techum

The Rambam (Hilchos Shabbat כ״ד:י׳) — he placed the heter of bein hashemashos within the dinim of shevus themselves, and tied it to the din of the doubtful hour of nightfall and to the eruv. For him the heter is built into the very definition of shevus, and he immediately draws the restrictive consequence regarding maaser:
« לְפִיכָךְ אֵין מְעַשְּׂרִין אֶת הַוַּדַּאי בֵּין הַשְּׁמָשׁוֹת » (רמב״ם הלכות שבת פכ״ד ה״י)
The Maggid Mishneh and the Mefarshim, as the Beis Yosef reports them — it is from the mishnah of the eruv placed on the tree that they take the measure of the heter, and the reasoning runs through the techum: that mishnah deals with an eruvei techumin, and we hold that such an eruv is established only for a mitzvah.
« וקי״ל דאין מערבין אלא לדבר מצוה » (בית יוסף או״ח שמ״ב)
Since the very case from which the heter is learned is itself a case of mitzvah, the heter does not reach beyond it: this is how the Beis Yosef explains why the mishnah at the end of the second chapter of Shabbat nevertheless forbids tithing the certainly-untithed, immersing vessels and lighting.

The combination called “shevus d'shevus”: when two leniencies meet — a mere shevus, and the time of bein hashemashos, and a mitzvah need — the ground of the heter is the widest this siman offers. But an isolated shevus with no need, and a biblical melachah, find no place in it: the first lacks the condition of the seif, the second falls outside the frame of “what is forbidden by the words of the Sofrim”.

8. The psak of the Acharonim — Taz, Magen Avraham, Mishnah Berurah

The Taz (ס״ק א, on “להביא לולב”) — his whole ס״ק turns on how the condition is read, starting from a line of the Tur about one who was hurried and had to tithe his fruit. He brings the explanation of his father-in-law the Bayis Chadash, who confines the case to a Shabbat need and further requires that one be hurried:
« ומו״ח ז״ל פירש דדוקא לצורך שבת מיירי » (ט״ז או״ח שמ״ב ס״ק א)
The Taz does not rest there: from the Semag he derives that anything one is hurried over, and whose absence would cause distress, falls within the heter. He further brings a teshuvah of the Maharshal permitting amirah l'akum at bein hashemashos for a great need or a substantial loss:
« וכתב רש״ל בתשו׳ סי׳ מ״ו שלצורך גדול והפסד מרובה שרינן אמירה לעכו״ם ב״ה » (ט״ז או״ח שמ״ב ס״ק א)
And he concludes from the Rambam's wording as the Shulchan Aruch copied it: “pressure” holds even where there is no mitzvah.
« דמשמע דוחק אפי׳ בדבר הרשות » (ט״ז או״ח שמ״ב ס״ק א)
The Magen Avraham (ס״ק א) — his entire comment on this siman is a question left open, and it should be stated that way: he asks whether at bein hashemashos of motzaei Shabbat they likewise did not decree, and he does not answer it.
« צ״ע אם במ״ש ב״ה נמי לא גזרו משום שבות » (מגן אברהם או״ח שמ״ב ס״ק א)
His ground for doubting is that the departure of the day is unlike its entry: out of doubt, the sanctity of the day has not lapsed.
« דשאני אפיקי יומא מעיולי יומא דמספיקא לא פקע קדושה » (מגן אברהם או״ח שמ״ב ס״ק א)
The Mishnah Berurah (siman שמ״ב) sums up: (a) the heter holds only for a mitzvah or under pressure; (b) a shevus close to a biblical melachah was not permitted (ס״ק א); (c) on bein hashemashos of motzaei Shabbat it reports that the Beis Meir ruled that in strict law there is no difference, yet concludes stringently in practice — not for the Magen Avraham's reason, but because we are not expert in when that time begins (ס״ק ב):
« ומ״מ למעשה כתב דיש להחמיר במו״ש משום דאין אנו בקיאין בזמן ביה״ש » (משנה ברורה שמ״ב ס״ק ב)
(d) and it lays down a reservation that governs the whole seif and would be grave to miss: none of this applies to one who has already accepted Shabbat upon himself.
« ודע דכל סעיף זה לא מיירי כשקבל עליו שבת » (משנה ברורה שמ״ב ס״ק א)
On this point it refers to siman רס״א: for one who has accepted Shabbat — even while it is still day, and even because the congregation accepted it — no shevus is permitted to him by himself, even for a mitzvah, except through a non-Jew.

9. Practical nafka minos

10. Summary of the shitos and the direction of the halachah

The yesod: the Sages did not uphold their shevus decrees over the time of bein hashemashos — which is itself a doubt, day or night — where there is a mitzvah need or pressure.

For practical conduct — according to the custom of one's community and the instruction of a Rav.


Going deeper

Level 3 — Synthesis: structured recap, memory markers, decision trees and rules of thumb.
Level 4 — Daat HaRav: the shitah of the Admur HaZaken (Shulchan Aruch HaRav).

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DAAT · Rav Yossef Haim Samama

Siman שמ״ב · Level 2 — Lamdan
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