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DAAT · LEVEL 2 — LAMDAN

Shulchan Arukh · Yoreh De’ah

The things forbidden because of gilui and of danger — study and pilpul
סימן קט״ז
גילוי, בשר ודג, סכנתא חמירא מאיסורא, בל תשקצו, מסוכנת
Study, pilpul, shitos of the Rishonim and the Acharonim
⚡ For lamdanim and talmidei chachamim ⚡
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Pilpul and in-depth study

Sugyos, sources, the underlying chakira, machlokos of Rishonim and Acharonim,
nafka minos for halacha and examination of the shitos

Subject:
Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah, siman 116 (7 seifim)
with the Taz (טורי זהב), the Shach (שפתי כהן), the Nekudos HaKesef and the Pischei Teshuva

The sugya’s footing in Shas:
עבודה זרה ל׳ ע״א (gilui and snake venom) · פסחים ע״ו ע״ב (perek כיצד צולין: meat and fish, ריחא, Mar bar Rav Ashi) · פסחים קי״ב ע״א (food under the bed, רוח רעה) · מכות ט״ז ע״ב (bal teshaktzu) · ביצה ה׳ ע״א (דבר שבמנין)

Written and edited by:
Rav Yossef Haim Samama · DAAT

📑 Table of contents

  1. Entering the sugya — the preservation of life as the siman’s foundation (7 seifim)
  2. A gezeirah hanging on its reason — gilui, lapsed “since there are no more snakes”, which was never forbidden by a count (seif 1; Taz ס״ק א)
  3. The reason gone, the measure goes — a chakira set against the milk of siman 115, and the caution of the Shelah and the Gaon (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק א)
  4. Danger graver than prohibition — meat and fish, smell against actual cooking, and sixty even dry within its own kind (seifim 2 and 3; Taz ס״ק ב–ג; Shach ס״ק א)
  5. Nullifying danger in sixty — Chavos Yair, Shevus Yaakov and Chut HaShani, and the Nekudos HaKesef’s resolution (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ג)
  6. סכנתא חמירא מאיסורא — he who guards his life keeps far from it, a doubt of danger against a doubt of prohibition, and the ban on relying on a miracle (seif 5; and see חו״מ סי׳ תכ״ז)
  7. Lechatchilah and bedi’eved in the laws of danger — under the bed, raw foods and “דדשים בה רבים” (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ד–ה)
  8. בל תשקצו — a lav shebichlalus, makkas mardus and not malkus, and the Taz’s dispute with the Maharshal (seif 6; Taz ס״ק ו; Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ט)
  9. מסוכנת — the scrupulous, the ba’al nefesh, and how far a voluntary stringency reaches (seif 7; Shach ס״ק ח; Pischei Teshuva ס״ק י)
  10. Chakira and nafka mina for practice
  11. Summary tables

1. Entering the sugya — the preservation of life as the siman’s foundation

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)

The foundation: a prohibition born of danger, not of impurity

The siman’s foundation: alongside the food prohibitions that turn on tum’ah and on the forbidden object itself, the Sages forbade things because of danger or because of the soul’s revulsion. Its root is the duty to guard one’s body and one’s life; upon it the Rama built the great rule of seif 5 — סכנתא חמירא מאיסורא — and he draws the consequence at once: a doubt of danger is feared more than a doubt of prohibition. The siman therefore holds three heads: gilui (seif 1), danger in food and in conduct (seifim 2 to 5), and finally bal teshaktzu and the mesukenes (seifim 6 and 7).
« כי סכנתא חמירא מאיסורא ויש לחוש יותר לספק סכנה מלספק איסור » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)
The two fathers of concern in this siman. Two foundations must be told apart. (a) Danger — fear of harm to body and life: gilui (seif 1), meat and fish (seifim 2 and 3), sweat (seif 4), ruach ra’ah and dangerous conduct (seif 5). (b) Revulsion — food from which a person’s soul recoils (seif 6). The first is rooted in the verse of guarding oneself, the second in the verse forbidding a man to make his soul detestable. And the nafka mina between them is large: the law of danger is heavier than an ordinary prohibition, whereas bal teshaktzu, as the Taz will show, is only a לאו שבכללות, for which one does not receive malkus.
« וְנִשְׁמַרְתֶּ֥ם מְאֹ֖ד לְנַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶ֑ם » (דברים ד׳:ט״ו)
« אַל־תְּשַׁקְּצוּ֙ אֶת־נַפְשֹׁ֣תֵיכֶ֔ם » (ויקרא י״א:מ״ג)
The source in Shas and in the Rambam. Most of the dinim of this siman come from the beraisos of Avodah Zarah (the chapter of gilui) and of Pesachim, and the Rambam fixed them as halacha in Hilchos Rotzeach u’Shmiras HaNefesh (chapters 11 and 12). The Beis Yosef gathered them here, and the Rama says so himself at the head of his gloss on seif 5, where he refers to the Beis Yosef in the name of Shas. The food placed under the bed, which seif 5 forbids, is read as such in the gemara:
« אוֹכָלִין וּמַשְׁקִין תַּחַת הַמִּטָּה, אֲפִילּוּ מְחוּפִּין בִּכְלִי בַּרְזֶל — רוּחַ רָעָה שׁוֹרָה עֲלֵיהֶן » (פסחים קי״ב ע״א)
And seif 4, which the rest of this page will not take up again, holds in one line: a man’s sweat is a poison, except that of the face — and the Shach attaches to it a mnemonic drawn from the verse.
« צריך ליזהר מזיעת האדם שכל זיעת האדם סם המות חוץ מזיעת הפנים » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ד)
« וסימן לדבר בזעת אפיך תאכל לחם » (ש״ך יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ב)

2. A gezeirah hanging on its reason — the gilui that lapsed

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)

The Mechaber’s text (seif 1)

« משקים שנתגלו אסרום חכמים דחיישינן שמא שתה נחש מהם והטיל בהם ארס » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:א)

« ועכשיו שאין נחשים מצויים בינינו מותר » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:א)

Translation: liquids that were left uncovered the Sages forbade, for we fear a snake drank from them and cast its venom into them; and nowadays, when snakes are not found among us, it is permitted.

This is one of the most important foundations for understanding how gezeiros hold: when a decree lapses together with its reason, and when it does not.

The chakira — what is the gezeirah of gilui, and why did it lapse? The Sages forbade uncovered liquids out of fear of a snake’s venom. Yet the Mechaber himself writes that nowadays it is permitted, since snakes are no longer found among us. There is room to ask: does a decree of the Sages simply lapse of itself? For we hold it settled that what was forbidden by a count requires another count to permit it.
« הָוֵי דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמִנְיָן, וְכׇל דָּבָר שֶׁבְּמִנְיָן — צָרִיךְ מִנְיָן אַחֵר לְהַתִּירוֹ » (ביצה ה׳ ע״א)
The Taz’s answer (ס״ק א) — this was never forbidden by a count. The Taz says one thing, and all the rest follows from it: there is no « דבר שנאסר במנין » here, because this was forbidden only on account of snakes. A measure that bears not on the object but on a factual fear is not a prohibition standing on its own; once the fear is gone there is nothing left to permit, and no fresh count is required.
« ואין בזה משום דבר שנאסר במנין כו׳ דלא נאסר אלא מפני נחשים » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק א)
And the Taz himself refers, for the comparison, to what he wrote in siman 115 — to its séif ב, on the Semak, the comparison that follows bearing on séif א:
« ועמ״ש בסי׳ קט״ו סעיף ב׳ בשם סמ״ק » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק א)
A comparative chakira — gilui set against the milk of siman 115. In siman 115 the Sages forbade milk milked by a non-Jew with no Jew watching, for fear of an admixture of non-kosher milk:
« חלב שחלבו עובד כוכבים ואין ישראל רואהו אסור שמא עירב בו חלב טמא » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ו:א)
And there the Rama upholds the prohibition even in a case where it is known that there is no non-kosher animal in the herd:
« הוי כחלב שחלבו עובד כוכבים דאסור׳ אע״פ שאין דבר טמא בעדרו » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ו:א)
What then is the difference?
The root of the distinction — forbidden by a count, or not. What the Taz points to is not the strength of the reason but the manner in which the prohibition was laid down. The milk of siman 115 was enacted as a standing prohibition, and it holds even where its reason is no longer met — not through the force of its motive, but because one court does not undo the words of another court unless it is greater than it in wisdom and in number:
« שֶׁאֵין בֵּית דִּין יָכוֹל לְבַטֵּל דִּבְרֵי בֵית דִּין חֲבֵרוֹ עַד שֶׁיִּהְיֶה גָדוֹל מִמֶּנּוּ בְחָכְמָה וּבְמִנְיָן » (עדויות א׳:ה׳)
A measure taken by a count is therefore lifted only by another count, however far its reason may have receded; gilui was never enacted in that way, and was never more than a factual fear. Whether a decree lapses therefore depends not on its reason alone but on how it was inscribed. And it must be added, so as not to press the point harder than the source does: the Rama himself, in that very seif of siman 115, is lenient in the case where the Jew arrived only midway through the milking, and he is lenient precisely by the argument of the present time —
« עכשיו בזמן הזה שאין חלב דבר טמא מצוי כלל מותר » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ו:א)
The dividing line therefore runs inside siman 115 itself, and not between two simanim that would stand opposed as wholes.
The caution of the Shelah and the Gaon (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק א). Although the din of gilui itself has lapsed, the Pischei Teshuva reports that great men kept up caution in this matter to the present day:
« עיין בשל״ה דף ע״ט ע״ב שכתב דמ״מ שומר נפשו ירחק מזה » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק א)
« ובהנהגת החסיד הגר״א ז״ל כתוב ג״כ שהיה נזהר מאד בדבר זה » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק א)
We learn from here that even a measure that lapsed with its reason leaves standing a measure of caution wherever a side of danger remains.

3. Danger graver than prohibition — meat and fish

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)

The text of the Mechaber and the Rama (seifim 2 and 3)

« צריך ליזהר שלא לאכול בשר ודג ביחד מפני שקשה לצרעת » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ב)

« וכן אין לצלות בשר עם דג משום ריחא מיהו בדיעבד אינו אסור (ארוך כלל ל״ט דין כ״ה) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ב)

« ירחוץ ידיו בין בשר לדג ויאכל פת שרוי בנתים כדי לרחוץ פיו » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ג)

« ויש אומרים דאין לחוש לזה רק כשמבשלם יחד ואכלן אבל לאכלן זה אחר זה אין לחוש (הגהות מרדכי) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ג)

« וכן נוהגין שלא לרחוץ הפה ולא הידים ביניהם ומ״מ יש לאכול דבר ביניהם ולשתות דהוי קנוח והדחה (הגהות ש״ד סי׳ ע״ה ומביאו בגליון או״ה שם) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ג)

Translation: one must take care not to eat meat and fish together, because it leads to leprosy. (Gloss: likewise one does not roast meat with fish, on account of the smell; nevertheless, after the fact, it is not forbidden.) He should wash his hands between meat and fish, and eat soaked bread in between, in order to rinse his mouth. (Gloss: some say there is cause for concern only when they were cooked together and eaten so, but eating them one after the other calls for no concern; and such is the custom, not to rinse either the mouth or the hands between them; in any case one should eat and drink something in between, which counts as kinuach and hadachah.)

The three degrees of concern in “meat and fish”.
From the lightest to the gravest:

• ריחא alone — roasting one beside the other: forbidden lechatchilah because of the smell, but permitted bedi’eved.
• קנוח והדחה — between meat and fish, the custom is to eat and drink something in between (Rama, seif 3).
• actual cooking of the one with the other — and here the law of danger bears its full weight.

The Shach, at his ס״ק א, reports not one opinion but three, and it is worth holding them together. The first is that of the Issur veHetter, which the Rama follows:
« דלכתחלה אסור לצלות בשר עם דגים משום ריחא מילתא אבל בדיעבד שרי » (ש״ך יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק א)
But that same opinion tightens at once: if the two are close enough for the fat to run from one to the other, it is forbidden even bedi’eved.
« ואם הם סמוכים שהשומן זב מאחד לחבירו אסורים ואף דיעבד » (ש״ך יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק א)
The Maharshal is more lenient — he permits roasting fish and meat in one oven even lechatchilah — while the Be’er Sheva, on the contrary, forbids even bedi’eved:
« ופסק דאפילו בדיעבד אסורים משום ריחא מילתא » (ש״ך יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק א)
We report, and we do not decide.
Chakira — why is smell alone permitted bedi’eved, while actual cooking is forbidden even bedi’eved? In all the prohibitions of the Torah we hold that smell is not a thing, and this is the gemara’s own language in perek כיצד צולין:
« רֵיחָא בְּעָלְמָא הוּא, וְרֵיחָא לָאו מִילְּתָא הִיא » (פסחים ע״ו ע״ב)
And if so, in meat and fish — whose whole prohibition rests on danger — why, once truly cooked together, are they forbidden even bedi’eved?
The Taz’s answer (ס״ק ב and ג) — the law of danger is heavier than the law of prohibition. The Taz first draws the line: the gloss’s leniency covers smell alone.
« היינו בריחא לחוד אבל אם נתבשלו יחד אסורין אף דיעבד » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ב)
He then extends the stringency to roasting done truly one with the other, and supports it from the gemara:
« וה״ה אם נצלו כא׳ ממש זה עם זה » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ג)
« דאמר מר בר רב אשי אסרה אפילו במילחא » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ג)
The gemara’s own words, of which the Taz here gives the substance, are these:
« מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ בְּמִילְחָא נָמֵי אֲסוּרָה, מִשּׁוּם דְּקַשְׁיָא לְרֵיחָא וּלְדָבָר אַחֵר » (פסחים ע״ו ע״ב)
Mar bar Rav Ashi thus forbids even in salt — that is, outside any cooking — and it is from there that the Taz draws that the regime of danger is not measured by that of prohibition.
Nafka mina — danger requires sixty, even dry within its own kind. The Taz reports in the name of the Issur veHetter HaAruch a considerable stringency:
« דבר שיש בו משום סכנה דינו כאיסור לבטלו בס׳ ויותר חמור דאפילו ביבש במינו צריך ששים » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ב)
This is a great chiddush: in an ordinary prohibition, dry within dry and within its own kind is nullified by a majority (see siman 109); here, because of the danger, a majority does not nullify and sixty is required. And the Taz at once reports, in the name of the Darkei Moshe, an objection that goes further still:
« דהא איתא בטור דחיישינן לגילוי אפילו במאה סאה מים » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ב)
« משמע דלא מהני ס׳ דחמירא סכנתא מאיסורא » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ב)
In other words: on that reading, sixty would not even suffice. This is precisely the point the next section will take up. And for practice — ask your Rav.
Poultry fat in a fish dish (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ב). The Pischei Teshuva reports a question put to the Shevus Yaakov: does goose fat fallen into a fish dish fall under the law of danger, or does danger attach only to the meat of an animal?
« שנשאל על שומן אווז שנתערב תוך תבשיל של דגים אם יש חשש סכנה בדבר או לא » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ב)
« והשיב דאין חילוק » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ב)
We learn from here that the law of “meat and fish” applies to every kind of meat, poultry and its fat included.

4. Nullifying danger in sixty — a machlokes of the Acharonim

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)

Once it is established that danger is heavier than prohibition, the Acharonim divided over whether it is nonetheless nullified in sixty.

The root of the machlokes — is a dangerous substance nullified in sixty? (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ג)
ShitahNullification of the dangerSource
Chavos Yair (lenient)« ועיין בתשובת חוות יאיר סי׳ ס״ד שפסק להקל דבטל »פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ג
Shevus Yaakov (lenient)« וכן כתב בתשובת שבות יעקב ח״ב סוס״י ק״ד ושאין להחמיר כלל »פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ג
Chut HaShani (stringent for venom)« וכ״כ בתשובת חוט השני סי׳ ס״ז דדוקא ארס נחש אינו בטל »פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ג
How the contradiction is resolved — and it is resolved in the Nekudos HaKesef, not under our own pen. The stringency reported by the Taz (sixty would not help, since gilui is feared even in a hundred se’ah of water) seems to contradict the responsa that are lenient. The Nekudos HaKesef answer precisely on that ס״ק ב of the Taz, and in two steps. First, snake venom is another matter:
« ול״נ דלק״מ דשאני זיהרא דנחש דמקלי קלי טובא » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קט״ז)
Second, and this is the general principle: the stringency of danger over prohibition holds only in doubt, and not where sixty is actually present.
« דלא מחמרינן בסכנתא טפי מבאיסורא אלא בספקא אבל היכא דאיכא ששים דנתבטל בודאי לא מסתבר כלל לחלק בין איסור לסכנתא » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קט״ז)
These are therefore two registers and not two opposed views: doubt, where danger prevails, and established nullification, where it is not distinguished from prohibition.
What the Pischei Teshuva retains, and the order in which he says it. The Pischei Teshuva first defends the Taz’s proof and concludes that it would be forbidden even where there is sixty:
« א״ו דאף באיכא ששים אסור » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ג)
Then, for the halacha, he sides with the responsa:
« ומ״מ לדינא העיקר כהתשובות הנ״ל דבטל » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ג)
Both must be held together: the argument explains the Taz’s text, the conclusion settles the case. And the leniency bears on nullification that is established in sixty: where the count remains in doubt the rule of the ס״ק resumes, and the Chut HaShani holds the line for snake venom itself. And for practice — ask your Rav.

5. סכנתא חמירא מאיסורא — the great rule

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)

This is the heart of the siman and its most living part — the foundation of the whole conduct of caution in matters of danger to life.

The text of the Mechaber and the Rama (seif 5)

« צריך ליזהר מליתן מעות בפיו שמא יש עליהן רוק יבש של מוכי שחין » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« ולא יתן פס ידו תחת שחיו שמא נגע ידו במצורע או בסם רע » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« ולא יתן ככר לחם תחת השחי מפני הזיעה » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« ולא יתן תבשיל ולא משקים תחת המטה מפני שרוח רעה שורה עליהם » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« ולא ינעוץ סכין בתוך אתרוג או בתוך צנון שמא יפול אדם על חודה וימות » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« וכן יזהר מכל דברים המביאים לידי סכנה » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« כי סכנתא חמירא מאיסורא ויש לחוש יותר לספק סכנה מלספק איסור (ב״י בשם הש״ס) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« ולכן אסרו לילך בכל מקום סכנה כמו תחת קיר נטוי או יחידי בלילה (שם) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« וכן אסרו לשתות מים מן הנהרות בלילה או להניח פיו על קלוח המים לשתות כי דברים אלו יש בהן חשש סכנה (רמב״ם) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« ומנהג פשוט שלא לשתות מים בשעת התקופה וכן כתבו הקדמונים ואין לשנות (אבודרהם ומרדכי ס״פ כל שעה רוקח סימן ער״ה ומהרי״ל ומנהגים) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« עוד כתבו שיש לברוח מן העיר כשדבר בעיר ויש לצאת מן העיר בתחילת הדבר ולא בסופו (תשובת מהרי״ל סי׳ ל״ה) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« וכל אלו הדברים הם משום סכנה ושומר נפשו ירחק מהם » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

« ואסור לסמוך אנס או לסכן נפשו בכל כיוצא בזה ועיין בחושן משפט סימן תכ״ז » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)

Translation: one must take care not to put coins in his mouth, for the dried saliva of a person afflicted with sores may be on them; not to put the palm of his hand under his armpit, for his hand may have touched a leper or an evil drug; not to put a loaf of bread under the armpit, because of sweat; not to place a cooked dish or drinks under the bed, because an evil spirit rests upon them; and not to stick a knife into an esrog or into a radish, for a man might fall on its point and die. (Gloss: likewise he should guard himself from everything that leads to danger, for danger is graver than prohibition, and one must fear a doubt of danger more than a doubt of prohibition; therefore they forbade going to any place of danger, such as under a leaning wall or alone at night… and all these things are because of danger, and he who guards his life keeps far from them; and it is forbidden to rely on a miracle or to endanger one’s life in anything of the kind — and see Choshen Mishpat, siman 427.)

The foundation — סכנתא חמירא מאיסורא and שומר נפשו ירחק.
The great rule the Rama lays down here in the name of Shas has two heads:

• in doubt — a doubt of danger is feared more than a doubt of prohibition: where a doubt of a rabbinic prohibition is treated leniently, a doubt of danger is treated stringently.
• in distancing — he who guards his life keeps far from everything that leads to danger: a leaning wall, walking alone at night, river water at night.

And the whole has its root in the obligation of the verse:
« וְנִשְׁמַרְתֶּ֥ם מְאֹ֖ד לְנַפְשֹׁתֵיכֶ֑ם » (דברים ד׳:ט״ו)
Chakira — the prohibition of relying on a miracle. The Rama closes his gloss with these words:
« ואסור לסמוך אנס או לסכן נפשו בכל כיוצא בזה ועיין בחושן משפט סימן תכ״ז » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ה)
The foundation of this prohibition must be sought. Is it on the side of what the tradition expresses by saying that one does not rely on a miracle — and a man’s merits are then deducted? Or on the side of the very duty to guard one’s body, one who endangers himself transgressing the verse of self-preservation? The nafka mina appears where the risk is taken for a mitzvah, and it touches the parameters of the rule:
« שְׁלוּחֵי מִצְוָה אֵינָן נִיזּוֹקִין » (פסחים ח׳ ע״ב)
This page poses the chakira and does not decide it.
The Rama’s cross-reference to Choshen Mishpat 427. The Rama ends by referring elsewhere, and that reference is part of the din. Siman 427 of Choshen Mishpat is that of the parapet and of guarding the body from harm — the positive command of the ma’akeh, and the prohibition of the verse:
« וְלֹֽא־תָשִׂ֤ים דָּמִים֙ בְּבֵיתֶ֔ךָ » (דברים כ״ב:ח)
The law of danger in Yoreh De’ah therefore joins with that of Choshen Mishpat, and both rest on the same obligation of the Torah.
Application in our own time. The rule that danger is graver than prohibition, and the rule of distancing, have served the Acharonim and the poskim of the last generations as a footing for questions of health and of guarding the body; the discussion is found in the Igros Moshe, the Tzitz Eliezer and the Yabia Omer. This paragraph points to where to look: it cites no particular teshuvah here, and it decides nothing. And for practice — ask your Rav.

6. Lechatchilah and bedi’eved in the laws of danger

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)
Chakira — are the prohibitions of danger only lechatchilah, or do they hold bedi’eved as well? The dinim of seif 5 are heavier than a prohibition, and one would at first think that no leniency after the fact applies to them. But the Acharonim showed that they do not all carry the same weight: some hold even bedi’eved, others were said only lechatchilah.
The dish under the bed — permitted bedi’eved (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ד). A dish and drinks placed under the bed are forbidden, seif 5 says, because an evil spirit rests upon them. The Pischei Teshuva here reports the conclusion of the Shevus Yaakov, who establishes it from the sugya:
« והעלה דאין בזה רק אזהרה לכתחלה אבל בדיעבד אין כאן חשש איסור » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ד)
It emerges from here that the prohibition of the evil spirit is only a distancing lechatchilah, and not a prohibition attaching to the substance of the dish itself.
The Gaon — even for raw foods; and “דדשים בה רבים” (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ה). The Pischei Teshuva reports, from the Binas Adam, in the name of the Vilna Gaon, that the law of the evil spirit applies also to raw foods, and not only to a cooked dish:
« כתב בשם הגר״א ז״ל דה״ה אוכלין חיין כמו צנון » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ה)
And the Gaon adds a stringency, which the Pischei Teshuva reports as it stands — note in passing that the printed text here has ועם for ואם, a typographical error of the edition, which we copy without correcting:
« ועם עשה כן יזרקם במקום שלא ימצא אותם אדם » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ה)
There follows, upon those very words, the reason to be lenient at the present time. Whose is it? The פת״ש writes « והוא ז״ל כתב ע״ז » — and the ז״ל just before it is the Gaon’s, which would give the sentence to the Gaon, while the ע״ז, “upon this”, argues for a third party commenting. We report the ambiguity without settling it:
« דהאידנא כיון דדשים בה רבים » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ה)
And this is exactly the foundation we saw in gilui: a fear that is no longer met no longer holds the prohibition up. And for practice — ask your Rav.
The rule that emerges — three degrees in danger. From the whole sugya three degrees arise, and each has its cited source. (a) Certain danger — venom itself: the Nekudos HaKesef say it is another matter, because it “thins” exceedingly, and the Chut HaShani, reported by the Pischei Teshuva, holds that it is not nullified. (b) Remote danger — meat and fish: it is nullified in sixty according to the responsa the Pischei Teshuva follows for the halacha, and one is more stringent than in a prohibition as regards dry within its own kind, according to the Taz. (c) Distancing and conduct — the dish under the bed: lechatchilah only, and bedi’eved the Shevus Yaakov finds no concern of prohibition at all.

7. בל תשקצו — a lav shebichlalus

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)

The Mechaber’s text (seif 6)

« אסור לאכול מאכלים ומשקים שנפשו של אדם קצה בהם כגון משקים ואוכלים שנתערבו בהם קיא או צואה וליחה סרוחה וכיוצא בהם » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ו)

« וכן אסור לאכול ולשתות בכלים הצואים שנפשו של אדם קצה בהם כגון כלים של בית הכסא וכלי זכוכית שמקיזים בהם וכיוצא בהם » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ו)

« וכן לא יאכל בידים מזוהמות ועל גבי כלים מלוכלכים שכל אלו בכלל אל תשקצו את נפשותיכם » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ו)

Translation: it is forbidden to eat foods and drink liquids from which a person’s soul recoils, such as drinks and foods into which vomit, excrement, putrid discharge and the like have become mixed; likewise it is forbidden to eat and drink from soiled vessels from which a person’s soul recoils, such as the vessels of a privy and the glass vessels used for bloodletting, and the like; likewise he should not eat with soiled hands or upon filthy vessels — for all these are included in “do not make your souls detestable”.

Chakira — what is the nature of the lav of “bal teshaktzu”? The verse was said in the first place regarding the eating of creeping creatures. The gemara nevertheless extends it well beyond food:
« הַמְשַׁהֶה אֶת נְקָבָיו עוֹבֵר מִשּׁוּם ״לֹא תְשַׁקְּצוּ״ » (מכות ט״ז ע״ב)
Hence the question: is eating something repulsive a complete lav of the Torah, for which one receives malkus, or is it only a לאו שבכללות — a single lav embracing many things, for which one does not receive malkus?
The Taz’s decision (ס״ק ו) — a lav shebichlalus: makkas mardus and not malkus. The Taz begins from the Tur, which reports in the name of the Rashba the penalty actually imposed:
« בטור כ׳ בשם רשב״א בזה היו מכין אותו מכת מרדות » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ו)
He then asks why it should not be full malkus, and he answers:
« נראה משום דהוי לאו שבכללות שדברים הרבה נכללים בו וכל לאו שבכללות אין לוקין עליו » (ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ו)
One who eats something repulsive therefore does not receive the malkus of the Torah, but a makkas mardus.
The Taz and the Maharshal — and what their dispute is actually about (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ט). The Pischei Teshuva, on this seif, refers to the Taz’s astonishment at the Maharshal. It must be said exactly what is at issue: that astonishment does not bear on the parameters of revulsion, but on a practice of prohibition adopted because of danger, whose custom the Maharshal reports — and which the Taz calls into question from siman 60.
WhoWhat is saidSource
The Taz (ס״ק ו)בל תשקצו is a לאו שבכללות: makkas mardus, not malkusט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ו
The Maharshal (Yam shel Shlomo)« ומכאן נהגו לאסור הכבשים שגדל בהם מין שחין של נגע שרגילין למות בהן »ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ו
The Taz’s objection« ויש לתמוה הרי אמרינן בסי׳ ס׳ דאפי׳ אכלתה הבהמה סם המות שלה כשרה »ט״ז יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ו
The Pischei Teshuva’s reference« עט״ז סק״ו מה שתמה על מהרש״ל »פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ט
Nafka mina — between malkus and makkas mardus. If bal teshaktzu were a full lav, one would receive malkus, and a doubt in it would be settled by the stringency of a Torah doubt. If it is only a לאו שבכללות carrying a makkas mardus, greater leniency has been shown in it, and a doubt in it may be handled as a rabbinic doubt. A further nafka mina touches the sick person or a pressing need, where a rabbinic matter leaves more room for leniency. And for practice — ask your Rav.

8. מסוכנת — the scrupulous, the ba’al nefesh, and a heter drawn from a sevara

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)

The text of the Mechaber and the Rama (seif 7)

« מסוכנת אף על פי שניתרת בשחיטה המדקדקים מחמירים על עצמם שלא לאכלה » (שו״ע יו״ד קט״ז:ז)

« בהמה שהורה בה חכם מסברא ולא נמצא הדין בפירוש שהיא מותרת בעל נפש לא יאכל ממנה (גמ׳ פ׳ א״ט והג״א שם) » (רמ״א יו״ד קט״ז:ז)

Translation: an animal at the point of death, although it becomes permitted through shechitah, the scrupulous take upon themselves the stringency of not eating it. (Gloss: an animal about which a sage ruled from his own reasoning, the din not being found written explicitly as permitted — a man of soul will not eat of it.)

The foundation — a full heter, and a measure of chassidus.
The מסוכנת — an animal failing toward death — is, if it was slaughtered according to the din, permitted by the din itself. And even so:

• the מדקדקים take upon themselves not to eat of it;
• and likewise (Rama) an animal permitted by a sage’s reasoning alone, the din not being found written explicitly — a בעל נפש will not eat of it.

There is therefore no prohibition here, but a measure of caution. The Shach, at his ס״ק ח, marks its limit exactly:
« לא יאכל בעל נפש ממנה אבל אם יש לו קבלה שהיא מותרת מותר » (ש״ך יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק ח)
Where the sage has a received tradition, and not his own reasoning alone, the ba’al nefesh himself has no further reason to abstain.
Chakira — what is the status of a heter drawn from a sevara? The Rama asks the ba’al nefesh to hold back before what was permitted only by a sage’s reasoning. There is room to ask: is a sage’s reasoning not itself full hora’ah? Why would the ba’al nefesh be wary of it? One must say that where the matter has no written source but only the decision of a judgment, a side of doubt remains in it, and it is for that side that the ba’al nefesh holds back. This chakira is the page’s own; it is ascribed to no one, and it remains open.
What the Pischei Teshuva (ס״ק י) actually discusses. His entry on this seif does not divide the מדקדקים from the בעל נפש: it asks how far voluntary stringency reaches. He first reports, in the name of the Issur veHetter, that keeping away from anything unseemly is a mitzvah:
« ולהרחיק עצמו מכל דבר כיעור מצוה היא » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק י)
He then reads the Rama’s gloss: what it says is that there is no obligation, not that there is no merit.
« היינו שאין החיוב על בעל נפש להחמיר » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק י)
« אבל מ״מ אם רוצה להחמיר גם בזה מצוה היא » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק י)
And he finally reports the exactly opposite view — not directly, but through the Soles LaMincha, who has it from the Toras HaAsham:
« שוב ראיתי בסולת למנחה כלל ע״ו דין ח׳ שכתב בשם תורת האשם » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק י׳)
That view holds that a stringency adopted where the Amoraim were not stringent is a fault and not a merit:
« דמי שרוצה להחמיר לנהוג איסור בדבר שלא מצינו שהחמירו אמוראי כגון מה שנתבטל בששים או בכלי שני הוי כמו אפיקורסות ויצא שכרו בהפסדו » (פת״ש יו״ד קט״ז ס״ק י)
The Pischei Teshuva leaves the two sides facing one another. We report, and we do not decide. And for practice — ask your Rav.

9. Chakira and nafka mina for practice

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)
The chakira running through the whole siman: what is the regime of danger set against the regime of prohibition, and when does a gezeirah lapse with its reason?
Nafka mina for practice (as the sources cited above give it, each in its place):
  1. Gilui — permitted at the present time, snakes not being found among us (Mechaber, seif 1); and great men kept up caution (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק א).
  2. Meat and fish — one does not cook or eat them together; kinuach and hadachah — eating and drinking something in between (Rama, seif 3).
  3. Roasting side by side — forbidden lechatchilah, permitted bedi’eved; but forbidden even bedi’eved if the fat runs from one to the other (Shach ס״ק א).
  4. A dangerous substance — sixty even dry within its own kind (Taz ס״ק ב); for the halacha the Pischei Teshuva follows the responsa that nullify in sixty, venom itself excepted (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ג).
  5. סכנתא חמירא מאיסורא — he who guards his life keeps far from every danger, and it is forbidden to rely on a miracle (Rama, seif 5; and see חו״מ סי׳ תכ״ז).
  6. The dish under the bed — a distancing lechatchilah; bedi’eved the Shevus Yaakov finds no concern of prohibition (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ד).
  7. בל תשקצו — makkas mardus and not malkus (Taz ס״ק ו); מסוכנת — a measure of caution for the ba’al nefesh, not a prohibition (Rama, seif 7).
And for practice — ask your Rav.

10. Summary tables

↩ Detailed explanation (level 1)

Table — the dinim of the siman and their decision

SubjectThe dinSource
Gilui (uncovered liquids)Permitted at the present time — the fear gone, the measure goes: it was never enacted by a countמחבר ס״א; ט״ז ס״ק א
Meat and fish — smell (roasting)Forbidden lechatchilah, permitted bedi’eved; forbidden even bedi’eved if the fat runs from one to the otherרמ״א ס״ב; ש״ך ס״ק א
Meat and fish — actual cookingForbidden even bedi’eved; and sixty is required even in dry within its own kindמחבר ס״ב; ט״ז ס״ק ב–ג
Between meat and fishKinuach and hadachah — eating and drinking something in betweenרמ״א ס״ג
Sweat (seif 4)All human sweat is a poison, except that of the faceמחבר ס״ד; ש״ך ס״ק ב
Nullification of a dangerous substanceNullified in sixty according to the responsa the Pischei Teshuva follows; snake venom exceptedפ״ת ס״ק ג; נקודות הכסף
סכנתא חמירא מאיסוראA doubt of danger weighs more than a doubt of prohibition; he who guards his life keeps farרמ״א ס״ה; ב״י בשם הש״ס
Under the bed (ruach ra’ah)Forbidden lechatchilah; bedi’eved, the Shevus Yaakov finds no concern of prohibitionמחבר ס״ה; פ״ת ס״ק ד–ה
בל תשקצוA lav shebichlalus — makkas mardus, one does not receive malkusמחבר ס״ו; ט״ז ס״ק ו
מסוכנת / a heter drawn from a sevaraPermitted by the din; the scrupulous and the ba’al nefesh take the stringency upon themselves — except where there is a received traditionמחבר ורמ״א ס״ז; ש״ך ס״ק ח

Table — the siman’s central machlokos and chakiros

SubjectFirst sideSecond side
A gezeirah hanging on its reasonGilui — never enacted by a count, hence lapsed (Taz ס״ק א)The milk of siman 115 — upheld even with no non-kosher animal in the herd (Rama, יו״ד קט״ו:א)
Gilui at the present timeThe Mechaber — permitted (seif 1)The Shelah and the Gaon — caution (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק א)
Smell in meat and fishThe Issur veHetter and the Maharshal — permitted bedi’eved, and the Maharshal even lechatchilah in one oven (Shach ס״ק א)The Be’er Sheva — forbidden even bedi’eved (Shach ס״ק א)
Nullifying a dangerous substance in sixtyChavos Yair and Shevus Yaakov — nullified (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ג)Chut HaShani — snake venom is not nullified (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ג)
What the Taz’s dispute with the Maharshal is aboutThe Maharshal reports the custom of forbidding lambs afflicted with a sore, because of danger (Taz ס״ק ו)The Taz is astonished at it from siman 60, and the Pischei Teshuva (ס״ק ט) refers to that astonishment
Voluntary stringency where the din permitsThe Issur veHetter — keeping away from anything unseemly is a mitzvah (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק י)The Toras HaAsham — a stringency adopted where the Amoraim were not stringent is a fault (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק י)

Table — the sources of the sugya

Gemara: עבודה זרה ל׳ ע״א (gilui and snake venom) · פסחים ע״ו ע״ב (perek כיצד צולין: ריחא לאו מילתא, and Mar bar Rav Ashi) · פסחים קי״ב ע״א (food under the bed) · מכות ט״ז ע״ב (בל תשקצו) · ביצה ה׳ ע״א (דבר שבמנין)
Rishonim: רמב״ם (מאכלות אסורות; רוצח ושמירת הנפש, chapters 11 and 12) · רשב״א (reported by the Tur on seif 6) · טור · בית יוסף · איסור והיתר הארוך (כלל ל״ט, and כלל כ״ג quoted by the Taz) · הגהות מרדכי · הגהות שערי דורא
Acharonim: רמ״א · ט״ז · ש״ך · נקודות הכסף · מהרש״ל (ים של שלמה) · באר שבע · של״ה · חוות יאיר · שבות יעקב · חוט השני · הגר״א · בינת אדם · תורת האשם · פתחי תשובה

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DAAT · Rav Yossef Haim Samama
Talmid chacham · gives shiurim in halacha and chassidus
Pilpul and study on the things forbidden because of gilui and of danger · siman 116 · ⚡ level 2 — Lamdan
⚠️ This content is written for study and examination only. For any practical ruling (לְמַעֲשֶׂה) — ask your Rav.

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