Siman 117 — Lamdan level: where the ban on trading in a forbidden thing comes from
יורה דעה · סימן קי״ז
שלא לעשות סחורה מדבר איסור
חקירת יסוד האיסור · כלל הט״ז · דבר המיוחד למאכל · חֵלֶב ודם · נזדמן ושלא יתכוין
⚡ רמת הלמדן · Talmid Hakham ⚡
✦ ❖ ✦
A single seif, and beneath it a question of principle that the whole apparatus of the
siman works over: is the ban on trading a fence of the Sages, or a din of the Torah?
Subject:
שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן קי״ז · סעיף אחד
with the apparatus: ש״ך (שפתי כהן) · ט״ז (טורי זהב) · באר היטב · פתחי תשובה
Sources of the sugya:
פסחים כ״ג · בבא קמא פ״ב · משנה שביעית פ״ז מ״ג–מ״ד
Written by:
הרב יוסף חיים סממה · DAAT
📑 Table of contents
Opening the sugya — the ban on trading in what is set aside for food (a single seif)
The ḥakira on the root of the ban — a fence of the Sages (“lest he come to eat of it”) or a din of the Torah (Pesachim 23a)?
The Taz’s rule — “what the Torah permitted explicitly”, and the A’haronim who refuse it
“A thing set aside for food” — the Chakh’s definition, Rabbenu Tam’s widening, and the case of the pig
Likened to water — blood, and the limb taken from a living animal
Chelev — “it shall be put to any use” — a permission written out in the Torah itself
What comes by chance, and without intent — the hunter, the Rama’s “at once”, and collecting a debt
The ḥakira taken up again, and what follows in practice
The foundation — trading stays forbidden even where benefit is permitted
The siman holds in one sentence: anything forbidden to eat by Torah law — even those
things from which benefit remains permitted, such as nevela and most of the prohibitions — may not be
made the object of trade, so long as it is a thing set aside for food. And the difficulty rises
at once: if benefit is permitted, and there is here only a gain of money and no eating at all, where
does the ban come from? On this the Rishonim and the A’haronim part ways, and this is the
ḥakira of principle running through the whole siman.
« כל דבר שאסור מן התורה אף על פי שמותר בהנאה אם הוא דבר המיוחד למאכל אסור לעשות בו סחורה » (שולחן ערוך יו״ד קי״ז)
What the seif extends, and to whom it belongs. The seif does not stop at buying and
selling: two widenings follow it. In the text Sefaria serves, as in the printed editions, they are given
in parentheses, with their source, and set within the gloss body — that is to say they are the
Rama’s, not the Mehaber’s. The first is lending against a pledge.
« או להלוות עליו » (רמ״א יו״ד קי״ז — תרומת הדשן סימן ר׳)
The second is buying the forbidden thing in order to feed one’s non-Jewish workers.
« …לקנותו להאכילו לפועליו עובדי כוכבים אסור » (רמ״א יו״ד קי״ז — הגהות מיימוני)
These two widenings are precisely the nafka mina of the ḥakira: on one root they follow
of themselves, on the other they call for examination — and it is the Taz who works each of them, each
at its own ס״ק.
2. The ḥakira on the root of the ban — rabbinic or from the Torah
This is the ḥakira of principle, and most of the siman’s apparatus turns on it.
Where does the ban on trading come from?
First side — a fence of the Sages. The Taz reports that the Beit Yosef gives, in the
name of the Rashba, a reason of apprehension: handling continually a forbidden thing that is made to be
eaten, one will end up tasting it. The ban would then be no more than a rabbinic
distancing.
« בב״י בשם רשב״א הטעם גזירה שמא יבא לאכול מהם » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
Second side — a din of the Torah. The Taz is struck at once: the gemara of Pesachim,
in the chapter כל שעה, makes it a Torah prohibition, drawn from the word לכם.
« ותמהתי שהרי בפרק כל שעה… איתא שהוא איסור דאורייתא » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
The Taz’s answer to his own objection. The Taz does not let the two sides stand against
each other: he reads both faces in the verse itself — a permission through לכם
and a prohibition through יהיו — and concludes that the Torah handed the Sages
the drawing of the line. The Rashba’s גזרה is therefore no rabbinic invention set beside the Torah: it is
the exercise of a power the Torah entrusted to them.
« הרי הדבר מסור לחכמים שהם יבחרו מה יהיה אסור ומה יהיה מותר » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
« דנו חכמים שבכל מידי דהוא מאכל יש לחסרו שמא יבוא לאוכלו אבל דבר המיוחד למלאכה מותר » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
And a third reading, which the Taz reports without adopting. He then saw that the
Terumat HaDeshen, in the name of a gloss of Tosafot, holds the דרשה to be an אסמכתא — a support, not a
derivation: the ban would then be purely rabbinic.
« שוב ראיתי בת״ה סי׳ ר׳ שכתב בשם גליון תוספות דהך דרשא הוה אסמכתא » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
« דבאמת אינו אלא מדרבנן דאסמכתא בעלמא הוא » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
summary: it is out of this third reading that the Taz’s difficulty will be born, and out of the
difficulty his rule (section 3).
What changes according to the side one holds:
Lending against a pledge. The Terumat HaDeshen saw in it only something
unseemly; but on the Rashba’s reason as reported by the Beit Yosef — the fear he will come to
eat of it — there is here, says the Taz, an outright prohibition.
« בת״ה סי׳ ר׳ צידד בדבר ומסיק שמכוער הדבר להלוות על כותלי חזיר » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ב)
« ולפי מה שכתב ב״י בשם רשב״א שיש לחוש שיבוא לאוכלו איסור גמור יש גם בהלואה » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ב)
Buying in order to feed one’s non-Jewish workers. The Pitchei Teshuva reports that
for the Chakh and the Peri Chadash this purchase is not “a kind of trading”, and therefore does not fall
under the ban.
« אמנם לקנות כדי להאכיל לפועליו בלא״ה שרי לדעת הש״ך סק״ג דאין זה כעין סחורה וכ״ד הפר״ח סק״ב » (פת״ש יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ד)
The reach of the ban — does it aim only at one who trades as a trade, or even at a
single purchase made in order to hold the thing?
And in practice — ask your Rav.
3. The Taz’s rule — “what the Torah permitted explicitly”
This is one of the most contested passages of the siman: the Pitchei Teshuva sets against it the Chavot Yair, the Panim Meirot and a difficulty of his own, and refers to further responsa besides.
Where the rule comes from. The Taz had allowed that the ban might be merely rabbinic
(אסמכתא). He then runs into the Tosafot of Sukka, who prove their point from a verse expressly permitting
the sale of a nevela — a proof worth nothing if the ban on trading were only rabbinic. His answer
is the rule: the Sages have no power to forbid what the Torah permitted explicitly.
« ונראה לתרץ דאין כח ביד חכמים לאסור דבר שפירשה התורה בפירוש להיתר » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
« דאין כח ביד חכמים להחמיר אלא במקום שאין בו לא איסור ולא היתר מפורש מן התורה » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
summary: and this is how chelev, permitted in so many words for “any use”, escapes the ban not by
a local exception but by a rule.
The machloket over the Taz’s rule:
Position
What it holds
Source
The Taz
The Sages have no power to forbid what the Torah permitted explicitly; chelev is the case
ט״ז ס״ק א
The Chavot Yair (responsum 142)
Objects to the Taz — the rule is not absolute
פת״ש ס״ק ג
The Panim Meirot
Objects likewise to this rule of the Taz
פת״ש ס״ק ג
The Pitchei Teshuva himself
Adds a difficulty of his own, drawn from the Tosafot of Chullin 12
פת״ש ס״ק ג
The root of the disagreement. The Taz’s rule assumes that an explicit permission of the
Torah amounts to an objection lodged in advance against any future fence. The Pitchei Teshuva reports
that this has been refused, and the way he sets it out is worth reading: he first states the Taz’s
thesis, then lines up those who contest it.
« עט״ז מ״ש דדבר שהתירה התורה בהדיא א״א לומר שחכמים יאסרוהו » (פת״ש יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ג)
« שהשיג ג״כ על האי כללא דהט״ז » (פת״ש יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ג)
« גם לע״ד קשה על כלל זה מתוס׳ דחולין דף י״ב » (פת״ש יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ג)
summary: for the Taz, every explicit permission is beyond the reach of a rabbinic fence; for
those who contest him, each case must be examined on its own — and the permission of chelev is then only
a local ruling, drawn from its own verse. The Pitchei Teshuva does not decide, and neither do we.
The Chakh’s reading. The Chakh presses on the Mehaber’s words
דבר המיוחד למאכל: the ban bears only on what is ordinarily destined to be
eaten. Hence horses, donkeys and camels, whose ordinary destination is work, fall outside it — one may
trade in them, impure animals though they are.
And the Chakh refines his definition further, against an objection drawn from the Mehaber’s own wording:
what counts is the permanent destination, not the use assigned to the thing case by case.
« וי״ל דה״ק אם הוא דבר המיוחד לעולם לאכילה לאפוקי אם יחדו שלא לצורך אכילה » (ש״ך יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
Rabbenu Tam, and the case of the pig:
The thing
The din
Reason
Horse / donkey / camel
Permitted — not a thing set aside for food
Their ordinary destination is work (ש״ך ס״ק א)
Other impure animals raised for another use (Rabbenu Tam)
Permitted — raising them to smear hides with their fat, or selling them to a Jew for lighting
This is not trading by way of food (ש״ך ס״ק א)
The pig
Forbidden in every case — even for another use
“Because of what once happened” (ש״ך ס״ק א)
Rabbenu Tam’s widening, and the pig’s departure from it. The Chakh reports, through the
Beit Yosef and in the name of Tosafot, that Rabbenu Tam permits raising impure animals so long as it is
not for food.
« שאר דברים טמאים שעומדין לאכילה אם מגדלן למשוח עורות בשומנן להשתכר בהן או למוכרן לישראל שימשח בהן או להדליק מותר » (ש״ך יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
But the pig escapes this reasoning: over it the Sages forbade in every case, and the reason is no longer
the one of food.
« אבל בחזיר הכל אסור משום מעשה שהיה » (ש״ך יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
The episode the Chakh points to is the one in the gemara of Bava Kamma.
summary: two distinct regimes therefore stand side by side in the siman — that of “what is set
aside for food”, out of which fall the horses and the hides, and that of “what once happened”, which
holds the pig even where its use is not alimentary.
5. Likened to water — blood, and the limb taken from a living animal
Why should trading in blood be permitted? Blood is forbidden to eat by Torah law, and it
would seem plainly to be דבר המיוחד למאכל. The reason for the permission is a
likening written into the verse: blood is there compared to water.
summary: what has been likened to water is no longer, for this din, “food”.
What the Pitchei Teshuva reports (ס״ק א). The Peri Toar permits trading in blood for
exactly this reason; the Noda BiYehuda agrees with him; and the Chatam Sofer adds to it the limb taken
from a living animal, which is itself likened to blood.
« ע׳ בס׳ פרי תואר שמתיר את הדם לסחור בו כיון דאיתקש למים » (פת״ש יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
« וכ״כ בתשובת ח״ס סימן ק״ו והוסיף עוד דה״ה אבר מ״ה דאיתקש לדם » (פת״ש יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק א)
What this says about the ḥakira. This permission is not an objection against the ban, it
is a definition: what has been likened to water is not “food” for this din, forbidden to eat though it
is. And one sees here how the two roots behave differently: if the ban rests on the fear that one will
come to eat, blood does not enter it, since it is not eaten in that way; if it rests on the verse, a text
is needed to take it out — and that text is precisely the likening to water.
We report, and we do not decide.
The word is חֵלֶב, with a tsere — the forbidden fat of an animal, whose
eating carries karet — and not חָלָב, milk. It is the clearest case of “a thing
set aside for food”, and yet the Torah expressly permitted every use of it.
« יֵעָשֶׂה לְכׇל מְלָאכָה » (ויקרא ז׳:כ״ד)
A permission written into the text. The Mehaber gives no other reason: he writes that
chelev is the exception because it is said of it that it shall be put to any use. It is this verse that
carries the whole of section 3 — the Taz drew a general rule from it, and those who contest him see in it
only a ruling proper to chelev.
Chelev: a general rule, or a local ruling?
Position
Reach of the permission of chelev
The Taz (ס״ק א)
A rule — every explicit permission of the Torah is beyond the reach of a rabbinic fence
The Chavot Yair and the Panim Meirot (פת״ש ס״ק ג)
A local ruling — it is of chelev alone that “it shall be put to any use” is said; no general rule is drawn from it
7. What comes by chance, and without intent — the hunter and the collecting of a debt
« וְאִם נִזְדַּמְּנוּ לְצַיָּד חַיָּה וְעוֹף וְדָגִים טְמֵאִים (וכן מי שנזדמנה לו נבילה וטריפה בביתו) (טור) מֻתָּר לְמָכְרָם, וּבִלְבַד שֶׁלֹּא יִתְכַּוֵּן לְכָךְ. (הגה: וְצָרִיךְ לְמָכְרָהּ מִיָּד, וְלֹא יַמְתִּין עַד שֶׁתְּהֵא שְׁמֵנָה אֶצְלוֹ. וכן מותר לגבות דברים טמאים בחובו מן העובד כוכבים, דהוי כמציל מידם; ואסור למכור לעובד כוכבים נבילה בחזקת כשירה — ועיין בחושן המשפט סימן רכ״ח.) »
Between the chance encounter and the trading that is willed. The whole ban aims at one
who acts as a merchant, and on purpose. But one to whom a forbidden thing falls without his
having willed it — the hunter whose trade it is and whose net brings up impure animals, or one to whom a
nevela or a terefa comes in his house — may sell them, provided he does not aim at it — and the Rama
requires selling without delay besides. The line is drawn by intent.
The Taz’s precisions (ס״ק ג–ד):
The point
The din
Source
To whom is the permission of the chance case addressed?
To the hunter whose trade it is, and not to another man
ט״ז ס״ק ג
Where does the gloss “at once” belong?
On the clause of the chance case — and not where it was printed
ט״ז ס״ק ד
A rabbinic prohibition
Trading is permitted in it בכל גוונא — in whatever manner one wishes
ט״ז ס״ק ד
The Rama’s “at once”, and what the Taz makes of it. The Rama adds that one must sell
without delay, and not keep the animal at home until it grows fat — for by feeding and keeping it one
would fall back into trading that is willed.
« וצריך למכרה מיד ולא ימתין עד שתהא שמינה אצלו » (רמ״א יו״ד קי״ז)
The Taz, for his part, holds that this gloss was misplaced by the printer: it attaches to the clause of
the chance case, and not to the end of the seif. His argument is one of substance: for a rabbinic
prohibition, trading is in any event permitted in whatever manner one wishes, so that an “at once” would
carry no sense there.
« כאן שייכא הג״ה שנדפסה בסמוך וצריך למכרה מיד » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ד)
« ובטעות נדפסה שם כי באיסור דרבנן מותר לעשות סחורה בכל גוונא שירצה » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ד)
summary: this is one of the pieces of the ḥakira — the Taz holds that a condition which applies
only to a Torah prohibition presupposes that the ban on trading itself has a Torah degree.
Collecting a debt from a non-Jew — “as one who saves from their hand”. The Rama permits
taking payment of a debt in impure things: this is not a way of trading, it is the saving of one’s own
property (source: רשב״א בתשובה).
« וכן מותר לגבות דברים טמאים בחובו מן העובד כוכבים » (רמ״א יו״ד קי״ז)
« ואסור למכור לעובד כוכבים נבילה בחזקת כשירה » (רמ״א יו״ד קי״ז)
The reason for this last prohibition, says the Taz in the name of the Tur, is deception — and it holds
even towards a non-Jew.
« בטור הטעם משום גניבת דעת שאסור אפילו לעובד כוכבים » (ט״ז יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ד)
And the Pitchei Teshuva adds, without making a ruling of it, that the same would apply to cooking the
meat of a terefa that came by chance in order to sell it, for fear of a mishap.
« ונראה קצת דה״ה דאסור לבשל בשר טרפה שנזדמן כדי למכור לעובד כוכבים מפני שקשה למכור בשר חי דחיישינן לתקלה » (פת״ש יו״ד קי״ז ס״ק ז)
8. The ḥakira taken up again, and what follows in practice
The question that runs through the whole siman: what is the root of the ban on trading
in a forbidden thing, and what has been taken out of it?
The root — a fence of the Sages, “lest he come to eat of it” (Rashba, through the
Beit Yosef); a din of the Torah drawn from לכם (Pesachim 23a, the Taz’s
objection at ס״ק א); or an אסמכתא and therefore rabbinic (Terumat HaDeshen in the name of a gloss of
Tosafot, reported by the Taz at the same ס״ק).
The Taz’s rule — an explicit permission of the Torah (chelev) escapes the fence; the
Chavot Yair, the Panim Meirot and the Pitchei Teshuva himself oppose it
(פת״ש ס״ק ג).
“Set aside for food” — horses, donkeys and camels fall outside; Rabbenu Tam permits
impure animals raised for another use; the pig stays forbidden in every case
(ש״ך ס״ק א).
Likened to water — blood, and with it the limb taken from a living animal
(Peri Toar, Noda BiYehuda, Chatam Sofer; פת״ש ס״ק א).
Chance and absence of intent — permitted to the hunter whose trade it is, selling
without delay and without aiming at it; and for a rabbinic prohibition, in whatever manner one wishes
(ט״ז ס״ק ג–ד).
What follows for practice, each line set beside the entry of the apparatus that carries it:
Trading in a thing set aside for food and forbidden by the Torah → forbidden, even
where benefit from it is permitted (Mehaber, אף על פי שמותר בהנאה).
Lending against a forbidden pledge → the Terumat HaDeshen saw in it only something unseemly, the Taz
sees an outright prohibition on the Rashba’s reason (ט״ז ס״ק ב). Buying to feed
one’s non-Jewish workers → the Pitchei Teshuva reports that for the Chakh and the Peri Chadash this is
not “a kind of trading” (פת״ש ס״ק ד) — ask your Rav.
Chelev, of which the Torah permitted every use (Mehaber); and blood, likened to water
(פת״ש ס״ק א).
A thing whose prohibition is only of the Sages → the seif permits it expressly, and the Taz adds that
it is in whatever manner one wishes (ט״ז ס״ק ד).
« וכל דבר שאין איסורו אלא מדבריהם מותר לעשות בו סחורה » (שולחן ערוך יו״ד קי״ז)
What comes by chance to the hunter whose trade it is → he may sell, without delay and without aiming
at it (Mehaber and Rama; ט״ז ס״ק ג). But it is forbidden to sell a nevela to a
non-Jew by passing it off as kosher (Rama; see חושן משפט סימן רכ״ח).
Peri Toar; Noda BiYehuda; Chatam Sofer (פת״ש ס״ק א)
Horse / donkey / camel
Permitted — not a thing set aside for food
ש״ך ס״ק א
The pig
Forbidden in every case — “because of what once happened”
ש״ך ס״ק א
What comes by chance to the hunter (whose trade it is)
Permitted to sell, without delay and without aiming at it
Mehaber; Rama; ט״ז ס״ק ג–ד
Collecting a debt from a non-Jew
Permitted — “as one who saves from their hand”
רמ״א (רשב״א בתשובה)
A prohibition that is rabbinic only
Trading in it is permitted, in whatever manner one wishes
Mehaber; ט״ז ס״ק ד
Table — the central machlokos of the siman
The point
First position
Second position
The root of the ban on trading
Rashba, through the Beit Yosef — a fence of the Sages, “lest he come to eat of it”
The Taz, from Pesachim 23a — a din of the Torah, drawn from לכם
The rule “what the Torah permitted explicitly”
The Taz — the Sages have no power there
The Chavot Yair, the Panim Meirot, and the Pitchei Teshuva himself (פת״ש ס״ק ג)
Buying to feed one’s non-Jewish workers
The Rama places it within the ban (הגהות מיימוני, through the Beit Yosef)
The Chakh and the Peri Chadash — this is not “a kind of trading” (פת״ש ס״ק ד)
The reach of the permission of chelev
The Taz — a rule holding for every explicit permission
The Panim Meirot — a ruling proper to chelev
“At once” and “without aiming at it”
The Taz — these conditions attach to the clause of the chance case
For a rabbinic prohibition, trading is permitted in whatever manner one wishes
Table — the sources of the sugya
Gemara and Mishna: פסחים כ״ג ע״א (the דרשה of לכם) ·
בבא קמא פ״ב ע״ב (the episode of the pig) · משנה שביעית פ״ז מ״ג–מ״ד
(אין עושין סחורה… and the case of the hunter)