Siman קכ״ז — Is one believed to forbid another’s wine?
A statement, a silence, a denial — to discover and understand
יורה דעה · סימן קכ״ז
אִם נֶאֱמָן הָאָדָם לֶאֱסֹר יֵינוֹ שֶׁל חֲבֵרוֹ
🌱 Introductory level · מתחילים
✦ ❖ ✦
A first approach to Siman 127: the 4 seifim of the Mehaber and the glosses of the Rama, Hebrew text and fluent English translation. The four preceding simanim asked what makes wine forbidden; this one changes the ground entirely and asks who is believed when he says that it has become so. A watchman asserts, an owner denies, a third party says nothing: this is a siman about credibility, not about wine — which is why its second half leaves wine behind and lays down the general rule of the single witness in matters of prohibition.
Subject: Credibility to forbid — בידו, שתיקה כהודאה, איני מאמינך, עד אחד נאמן באיסורין Source: שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן קכ״ז
Compiled by: הרב יוסף חיים סממה DAAT · daattorah.com
📑 Plan of study
1.The text of the Mehaber: the 4 seifim, by thematic groups
2.Context: where the rule of עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן בְּאִיסּוּרִין comes from
4.The summary table: who is believed, when, and against whom
5.The Taz and the Shach: five key passages
6.The gloss of the Rama (הגה): four interventions across three seifim
7.Practical cases today: the mashgiaḥ, the employee, the retracted report
8.Synthesis and comprehension questions
1. The text of the Mehaber — the 4 seifim
Siman 127 is the shortest of the whole yayin nesekh block, and the only one that does not speak about wine. Simanim 123 to 126 asked what renders wine forbidden — which wine, which contact, which force, which mixture. This one asks who is believed to say that it happened. The question is no longer inside the barrel; it is between two men: one asserts, the other denies — or says nothing. The first two seifim deal with the concrete case of the watchman or the labourer who tells the owner that his wine has been lost; the last two leave wine behind and lay down, in one line of the Mehaber and one very long gloss of the Rama, the general rule of the single witness in matters of prohibition. The Rama intervenes four times, across three seifim; the fourth seif is the Mehaber’s alone.
Group A — The watchman who says “your wine has been made nesekh” (seifim 1-2)
Seif 1 — Three gateways to credibility, and what silence is worth
אם נאמן האדם לאסור יינו של חבירו. ובו ד׳ סעיפים: האומר לחבירו נתנסך יינך אם הוא בידו נאמן ואפילו אם אינו עתה בידו שכבר הוחזר לבעלים אם בפעם ראשון שמצאו אמר לו נתנסך יינך נאמן אפי׳ אם הבעל מכחישו אבל אם אינו בידו ולא אמר כן לבעל בפעם ראשון שראהו וא״ל אחר כך אינו נאמן אם הבעל מכחישו (תוך כדי דבור) (מרדכי פרק האומר) או אומר איני יודע אבל אם שתק שתיקה כהודאה דמיא: הגה ומלמדי׳ אותו לכתחלה שיאמר איני מאמינך ואז לכ״ע שרי דבעלים נאמנים על שלהם (טור) ואם אין הבעלים מכחישין אותו אף על פי שמכחישו אחר לא מהני (הגהת מיימוני פי״א) מאחר שהבעלים שם ושותקין אבל אם אין הבעלים שם מהני (ארוך) ויש מי שכתב דעד אחד בהכחשה לאו כלום הוא (רשב״א סי׳ תקמ״ה) ואם הבעלים אומרים איני מאמינך אע״ג דבלבו מאמין לו כבי תרי אין להחמיר (ב״י בשם מרדכי) ודוקא ביין נסך שאין לדקדק בו כל כך אבל בשאר איסורים לא מהני אם אמר איני מאמינך אם מאמין בלבו: (ארוך כלל י״ג): והוא שיאמר לו נתנסך יינך בפניך או שאמר ליה ידעת דרגלים לדבר ואם שתק ואח״כ הכחישו ואמר מה ששתקתי תחילה לא בשביל שהודיתי אלא להתיישב ולחשוב בלבי לזכור אם הוא אמת נאמן: הגה ואם לא הגיד לו בפעם ראשון שמצאו ואומר לו אח״כ ואמר אמתלא למה לא אמר לו בראשונה יש לחוש לדבריו (הגהות מרדכי פ׳ האומר) וכל מי שנאמן על דבר ועדים מכחישין אותו אף על פי שיש לו מגו שהיה נאמן לאסרו בענין שלא היו העדים מכחישין אותו מ״מ מאחר שמכחיש העדים הוה ליה מגו במקום עדים ואינו נאמן אפילו בדבר איסור מ״מ לדידיה אסור משום דשוייה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא. (כן משמע מב״י בשם תשובת הרשב״א) טבח שעשה סימן בבהמה כדרך שעושין בבהמות טריפות ואומר עליה שהיא טריפה וחוזר ואומר שכשירה היא ולא אמר כן תחלה רק שתשאר לו ליקח ממנה בשר יש מי שאומר מאחר שנותן אמתלא לדבריו נאמן ועיין לעיל סימן א׳ מדין עד אחד נאמן באיסורין ב׳ אחים אינם אלא כעד אחד לענין איסורים (תשובת הרשב״א סימן תקמ״ד) וכל הפסולי עדות כשרים לענין איסורים אם לא שחשוד לאותם דברים (ר״ן) אחד שאומר לשני שותפים נתנסך יינכם ואחד שותק והשני מכחישו לזה ששותק אסור ולשני ולכל העולם שרי. (הגהות אלפסי):
Title of the siman:whether a man is believed to forbid the wine of his fellow; four seifim. — One who says to his fellow, “your wine has been poured as a libation”: if it is in his hand — that is, if it is in his keeping — he is believed. And even if it is no longer now in his hand, having already been returned to the owners: if, the first time he met him, he told him “your wine has been poured as a libation” — he is believed, even if the owner denies it. But if it is not in his hand and he did not say so to the owner the first time he saw him, and told him afterwards — he is not believed, if the owner denies it — within the time of an utterance; Mordechai, chapter HaOmer — or if he says “I do not know”. But if he kept silent — silence is like admission.
Gloss of the Rama:and we instruct him at the outset to say “I do not believe you”, and then, in everyone’s view, it is permitted, for owners are believed about what is theirs (Tur). And if the owners do not deny him, then even if another denies him, it is of no avail (Hagahot Maimoni, ch. 11), since the owners are present and silent; but if the owners are not present, it does avail (Arokh). And some have written that a single witness who is contradicted is nothing at all (Rashba §545). And if the owners say “I do not believe you” — even though in his heart he believes him like two witnesses — one need not be stringent (Beit Yosef in the name of the Mordechai). And this applies specifically to yayin nesekh, in which one need not be so exacting; but in other prohibitions, saying “I do not believe you” is of no avail if he believes him in his heart (Arokh, klal 13).
The Mehaber continues:and this — that silence counts as admission — is when he tells him “your wine was poured as a libation in your presence”, or when he told him “you know that there are clear indications”. And if he kept silent and afterwards denied it and said: “my initial silence was not because I was admitting, but in order to compose myself and consider in my heart, so as to remember” — if it is true, he is believed.
Gloss of the Rama:and if he did not tell him the first time he met him and tells him afterwards, and gave an explanation of why he did not say so at first — one must take his words into account (Hagahot Mordechai, ch. HaOmer). And anyone who is believed about a matter and whom witnesses contradict: even though he has a migo — since he would have been believed to forbid it in a way in which the witnesses would not have contradicted him — nevertheless, once he contradicts witnesses, it is a migo in the presence of witnesses, and he is not believed, even in a matter of prohibition; nevertheless, for himself it is forbidden, because he has made it, for himself, a piece of prohibited matter (Beit Yosef in the name of a responsum of the Rashba). A butcher who made a mark on an animal in the manner done to treifot animals and says of it that it is treifa, and then retracts and says that it is kosher, and only said so at first so that meat would remain for him to take from it: some say that, since he gives an explanation for his words, he is believed; and see above, siman 1, the law of a single witness believed in matters of prohibition. Two brothers are only as one witness in matters of prohibition (responsum of the Rashba §544). And all those disqualified from testimony are fit in matters of prohibition, unless they are suspect in those very matters (Ran). One who says to two partners “your wine has been poured as a libation”, and one keeps silent while the second denies it: for the one who kept silent it is forbidden; for the second, and for the whole world, it is permitted (Hagahot Alfasi).
Three gateways open credibility, and one of them suffices.First gateway — בְּיָדוֹ: the wine is still in his keeping; whoever holds the thing is believed about it. Second gateway — immediate speech: the wine has been returned, but he spoke at the first meeting; then he is believed even against a denial. Third gateway — silence: neither custody nor immediate speech, but the owner says nothing, and שְׁתִיקָה כְּהוֹדָאָה דָּמְיָא. Outside these three — no custody, late speech, and an owner who denies or says “I do not know” — he is not believed. And the Rama at once adds the advice that defuses everything: the owner is taught to say “I do not believe you”, which, for yayin nesekh alone, is enough.
Seif 2 — The labourer who loses his wages by speaking
במה דברים אמורים כשעושה עמו בחנם או אפי׳ בשכר והוא בענין שלא יפסיד שכירותו כגון שאומר שנתנסך באונס או ששכרו דבר מועט אבל אם שכרו הרבה והוא בענין שמפסיד כל שכרו כגון שאומר שנתנסך בפשיעתו נאמן אפילו אינו עתה בידו וגם לא אמר ליה בפעם ראשון שמצאו: הגה ודוקא שאומר שנאסר היין בדרך שהוא גלוי וידוע לכל שמפסיד שכרו כגון בפשיעה שנזכר אבל אם אמר בדרך שאפשר לומר שטעה הפועל שאינו מפסיד שכרו אע״פ שמפסידו על פי הדין אינו נאמן (רבינו ירוחם):
To what does this apply?When he works with him for free, or even for wages but in a manner in which he will not lose his hire — for example, when he says that it was poured as a libation under duress, or that he hired him for a trifling amount. But if he hired him for a great deal, and it is in a manner in which he loses all his wages — for example, when he says that it was poured as a libation through his own negligence — he is believed, even if it is no longer now in his hand, and even if he did not tell him the first time he met him. Gloss of the Rama:and this only when he says that the wine became forbidden in a way that is openly and commonly known to all as causing him to lose his wages, such as the negligence just mentioned; but if he said it in a way in which one could say that the labourer was mistaken and does not lose his wages — even though he does lose them according to the law — he is not believed (Rabbenu Yeruḥam).
A fourth gateway, and it opens only through a loss. Seif 1 required custody, or immediate speech, or the other man’s silence; seif 2 dispenses with the first two — on one condition, that his words cost him something. A labourer who says “the wine was lost through my fault” thereby forfeits his entire wage: no one ruins himself for nothing. But a labourer who says the wine was lost under duress loses nothing, and falls back under the ordinary regime. The Rama presses the criterion to its exact point: what makes a man believed is not the actual loss but the visible one — if it is possible to say that he imagined he was losing nothing, he is not believed, even were the law to make him pay.
Group B — The general rule of the single witness (seifim 3-4)
Seif 3 — A single witness is believed to permit, not to forbid
עד אחד נאמן באיסורים להתיר אבל לא להחמיר: הגה מיהו יש אומרים דבדבר דאיכא לברורי כגון שאומר לו אחד בא ואראך עובד כוכבים מנסך יינך צריך לחוש לדבריו (ב״י בשם התוספות) וכל דבר שלא אתחזק לא להיתר ולא לאיסור עד אחד נאמן עליו אפילו לאסרו (אשיר״י פרק הניזקין ומרדכי פ׳ האשה רבה) וכל היכא דאתחזק דבר באיסור כגון טבל או חתיכת בשר שאינה מנוקרת אין העד נאמן עליו להתירו אלא א״כ בידו לתקנו (ג״ז שם) ואם היו בכאן ב׳ חתיכות אחת של איסור ואחת של היתר נאמן העד לומר זה היתר וזה איסור (הר״ן שם) ואדם נאמן על שלו אפי׳ היכא דאתחזק איסורא (שם באשיר״י) ועי׳ לעיל סי׳ קי״ט דין החשוד על הדבר אם מעיד עליו. ועי׳ לקמן סימן קפ״ה מי שאומר פלוני חכם הכשיר לי זה והחכם כופר. ועי׳ באבן העזר סימן קנ״ב אם אמרינן לגבי עדות שהפה שאסר הוא הפה שהתיר ואשה נאמנת בדבר איסור לומר תקנתיו (ר״ן פרק האומר וריש חולין) ודוקא בודאי איסור כגון ניקור בשר וכדומה לו אבל בספק שמא אין כאן איסור כגון שצריכה לברר דגים טמאים מטהורים (א״ו הארוך) או איסור שיש בו צדדים להקל (שם בר״ן) אין אשה נאמנת דאשה דעתה קלה להקל קטן אין לו דין עד להיות נאמן באיסורין (ריב״ש סימן רמ״ה) מ״מ בקטן חריף ובקי בדבר ואיכא רגלים לדבריו יש להחמיר אם מעיד על דבר איסור (רשב״א סי׳ כ״ד) ואם מעיד על איסור דרבנן להקל ולא אתחזק איסורא כגון בדיקת חמץ נאמן דהמנוהו רבנן בדרבנן (שם בריב״ש) אבל אם אתחזק איסורא אינו נאמן כלל:
A single witness is believed in matters of prohibition to permit, but not to be stringent.
Gloss of the Rama:however, some say that in a matter that can be verified — for example, if someone says to him “come and I will show you a non-Jew making a libation of your wine” — one must take his words into account (Beit Yosef in the name of Tosafot). And anything that has been established neither as permitted nor as forbidden — a single witness is believed about it, even to forbid it (Rabbenu Asher, ch. HaNizakin, and Mordechai, ch. HaIsha Rabba). And wherever a thing has been established as forbidden — such as tevel, or a piece of meat that has not been deveined — the witness is not believed about it to permit it, unless it is in his power to rectify it (ibid.). And if there were here two pieces, one forbidden and one permitted, the witness is believed to say “this one is permitted and that one is forbidden” (Ran, ibid.). And a man is believed about what is his own, even where the prohibition has been established (ibid., in Rabbenu Asher). And see above, siman 119, the law of one suspected in a matter, whether he may testify about it. And see below, siman 185, one who says “such-and-such a sage declared this kosher for me” and the sage denies it. And see Even haEzer, siman 152, whether we say with regard to testimony that “the mouth that forbade is the mouth that permitted”.And a woman is believed in a matter of prohibition to say “I have rectified it” (Ran, ch. HaOmer, and the beginning of Ḥullin) — and this only in a certain prohibition, such as the deveining of meat and the like; but in a doubt where perhaps there is no prohibition at all, such as when she must sort impure fish from pure ones (Issur veHeter haArokh), or a prohibition that has grounds for leniency (ibid., in the Ran) — a woman is not believed, for a woman’s mind inclines lightly to leniency. A minor has no status of witness to be believed in matters of prohibition (Rivash §245); nevertheless, with a sharp minor who is expert in the matter and where there are clear indications supporting his words, one should be stringent if he testifies about a forbidden matter (Rashba §24). And if he testifies about a rabbinic prohibition leniently, and no prohibition has been established — such as the search for ḥametz — he is believed, for the Sages trusted him in a rabbinic matter (ibid., in the Rivash). But if a prohibition has been established, he is not believed at all.
One line of the Mehaber, and one of the Rama’s foundational texts. The line: a single witness is believed to permit, not to be stringent. The gloss runs to ten lines and serves as an abridged treatise on credibility in matters of prohibition — it is what later authorities point to when they write “see Yoreh De’ah siman 127”. Everything in it is organised around one notion: the prior presumption. Nothing established (לא אתחזק): the witness is believed even to forbid. A prohibition established (אתחזק איסורא): he is not believed to permit — unless he can rectify the thing himself, or unless it is his own. The rest — the woman, the minor, the cross-references to simanim 119 and 185 — applies the same measure to other witnesses.
Seif 4 — The minor, where there is only a concern
דברים שאין בהם חזקת איסו׳ אלא חששא שמא יחליפנו עובד כוכבים או יגע בו יש מי שאומר שסומכין על הקטן מכיון שבא לכלל דעת שמירה:
Matters that carry no presumption of prohibition, but only a concern that a non-Jew might exchange them or touch them — some say that one relies on the minor, since he has reached the level of understanding required for watching.
The siman closes on the weakest case — and the most everyday. The Rama had just excluded the minor from the status of witness; the Mehaber, in a single line, reopens the door where there is no prohibition to lift but only a concern to dispel. Wine that no non-Jew has touched carries no presumption of prohibition: the question is not to permit it, the question is whether someone was watching it. For that one needs not a witness but a watchman — and a child who has reached לִכְלַל דַּעַת שְׁמִירָה can watch. Note the Mehaber’s cautious wording: יש מי שאומר, “some say” — the leniency is reported, not ruled.
2. Context — where the rule of עֵד אֶחָד נֶאֱמָן בְּאִיסּוּרִין comes from
In monetary law a single witness achieves nothing: lo yakum ed eḥad be-ish. In matters of prohibition he achieves everything — and the Gemara begins by admitting that it has no verse for this, only a piece of reasoning, drawn from a piece of fat about which one does not know whether it is ḥelev or shuman:
And when it asks why a witness is nonetheless believed about tevel, which is an established prohibition, it supplies the key to the very first word of our siman — בְּיָדוֹ:
Finally, the words the Rama will place in the owner’s mouth — “I do not believe you” — come from a scene before Mar Shmuel, in which the entire decision is referred back to what the man actually believes:
The Tur, whom the Mehaber follows closely, had already gathered these elements into a single sentence — and from him comes the explanation of the word be-yado that the Shach will recall:
האומר לחבירו נתנסך יינך אם הוא בידו כגון שנתנו בידו לשומרו נאמן
— טור יורה דעה סימן קכ״ז
The great questions of the siman
What makes a man believed? Not his being a witness — a single witness achieves nothing in law. Three circumstances do: he holds the thing, he spoke at once, or the other man kept silent.
What is a silence worth? Not an admission in the strict sense, says the Shach: rather a sign that the owner knows there are indications and is relying on the witness. Hence the condition of seif 1: the thing must have been said in his presence.
May one refuse to believe? Yes — and it is the Rama who teaches it. But for yayin nesekh only, and on condition that one does not believe it in one’s heart.
Where does the general boundary run? Through the prior presumption: nothing established, the witness is believed even to forbid; a prohibition established, he is not believed to permit — unless he can rectify it, or unless the thing is his own.
This siman deals neither with what makes wine forbidden (simanim 123-125) nor with mixture (siman 126). It deals with the statement that asserts it. That is why it leaves wine behind so quickly: already in seif 3 the subject is no longer yayin nesekh but tevel, undeveined meat, the search for ḥametz — wine was only the occasion.
3. The key concepts of this siman
בְּיָדוֹ — it is in his hand. The first gateway to credibility. The Tur explains it: that the thing was given into his hand to guard. Whoever holds the wine is believed about it, because he stands towards it as its owner would — or, according to other Rishonim cited by the Shach, because he could have rendered it forbidden himself, and therefore has a migo.
שְׁתִיקָה כְּהוֹדָאָה דָּמְיָא — silence is like admission. The third gateway. The Shach warns that this is not an admission in the strict sense: if it were, the witness’s credibility would be superfluous. Silence is an indication — it shows that the owner knows there is substance to the claim, and is relying on the man who speaks.
רַגְלַיִם לַדָּבָר — clear indications. The condition that makes silence meaningful. Seif 1 requires the witness to have said “in your presence”, or “you know that there are indications”: without that, the owner is silent simply because he knows nothing, and his silence proves nothing.
אֵינִי מַאֲמִינְךָ — “I do not believe you”. The riposte the Rama teaches a priori. It does not deny the facts: it refuses credence. It holds for yayin nesekh only, and the Rama sets its limit in the same sentence: if one believes it in one’s heart, it is of no avail for other prohibitions.
כְּבֵי תְרֵי — like two witnesses. The degree of inward belief. The Rama writes that even if the owner believes the witness like two, one need not be stringent once he has said “I do not believe you” — and it is precisely there that the Shach hesitates at length and inclines the other way.
אֲמַתְלָא — an explanation that recovers a silence or a statement. It appears twice in seif 1: the man who kept silent and explains that he was thinking; the man who spoke late and explains why. It does not erase the act, it changes how the act reads — and the Taz restricts precisely here: not every explanation is worth the same.
מִגּוֹ בִּמְקוֹם עֵדִים — a migo in the presence of witnesses. A migo makes credible the man who could have said something better. But against witnesses who contradict him it is worth nothing — even in matters of prohibition, the Rama specifies, which was not obvious.
שַׁוְיֵהּ אַנַּפְשֵׁיהּ חֲתִיכָה דְּאִיסּוּרָא — he has made it, for himself, a piece of prohibited matter. The reverse side of the preceding. One who is not believed for others is always believed for himself: his own declaration binds him, and the wine remains forbidden to him whatever the witnesses say.
אִתְּחַזַּק אִיסּוּרָא — the prohibition is established. The pivot of seif 3. Three states: nothing established — the witness is believed even to forbid; a prohibition established — he is not believed to permit; and the exception that cuts across both: if it is in his power to rectify it, or if the thing is his own.
מַפְסִיד שְׂכָרוֹ — he loses his wages. The criterion proper to seif 2. A statement that costs the one who makes it is believed without the conditions of seif 1. But the loss, says the Rama, must be plain to everyone: negligence, yes; duress, no.
דַּעַת שְׁמִירָה — the understanding required for watching. The last word of the siman. A child is not a witness, but he can be a watchman — and where there is only a concern to dispel and no prohibition to lift, that suffices, according to the view reported in seif 4.
4. The summary table — who is believed, when, and against whom
The siman never answers simply “believed” or “not believed”. Three variables cross: the position of the speaker (watchman, labourer, third party), the moment he speaks, and the other man’s response — denial, silence, or “I do not know”. Here are the four seifim laid flat.
המקרה
Situation
Ruling
Seif
אם הוא בידו
The wine is still in his keeping
נאמן — believed, even against a denial
1
בפעם ראשון שמצאו
The wine is returned, but he spoke at the first meeting
נאמן אפי׳ אם הבעל מכחישו
1
אינו בידו · אמר אחר כך
Neither custody nor immediate speech, and the owner denies
אינו נאמן
1
אומר איני יודע
The owner says “I do not know”
אינו נאמן — as a denial
1
שתק
The owner keeps silent
שתיקה כהודאה דמיא — forbidden
1
יאמר איני מאמינך
He is taught to say “I do not believe you”
Rama: לכ״ע שרי — permitted in all views
1 (Rama)
מכחישו אחר והבעלים שותקין
A third party denies, but the owner keeps silent
Rama: לא מהני — of no avail
1 (Rama)
אין הבעלים שם
A third party denies, the owner absent
Rama: מהני; and in another view a contradicted witness is nothing
1 (Rama)
בשאר איסורים · מאמין בלבו
A prohibition other than wine, believed in his heart
Rama: לא מהני — “I do not believe you” no longer helps
1 (Rama)
בפניך · ידעת דרגלים לדבר
He said “in your presence” or “you know”
Condition for silence to count as admission
1
שתקתי להתיישב ולחשוב
He kept silent, then explains he was thinking
נאמן — the silence is recovered
1
מגו במקום עדים
Witnesses contradict him, despite his migo
אינו נאמן; but לדידיה אסור
1 (Rama)
ב׳ אחים
Two brothers testify
כעד אחד — as a single witness
1 (Rama)
פסולי עדות
Persons disqualified from testimony
כשרים לענין איסורים, unless suspect in that matter
1 (Rama)
שני שותפים · אחד שותק
Two partners: one silent, the other denies
לזה ששותק אסור; permitted to the other and to all
1 (Rama)
בחנם · שכרו דבר מועט
He works for free or for a trifle
The ordinary regime of seif 1
2
נתנסך בפשיעתו
He says it happened through his negligence
נאמן, without custody or immediate speech
2
שנתנסך באונס
He says it happened under duress
אינו נאמן — he loses nothing
2
אפשר לומר שטעה הפועל
One could say the labourer was mistaken
Rama: אינו נאמן, even if he loses in law
2 (Rama)
עד אחד באיסורים
A single witness, in general
להתיר אבל לא להחמיר
3
דאיכא לברורי · בא ואראך
The matter can be verified on the spot
Rama: צריך לחוש לדבריו
3 (Rama)
לא אתחזק לא להיתר ולא לאיסור
Nothing is established
נאמן אפילו לאסרו
3 (Rama)
אתחזק איסורא · טבל
The prohibition is established
אין העד נאמן להתירו, unless בידו לתקנו
3 (Rama)
אדם נאמן על שלו
A man speaks about what is his own
נאמן even where the prohibition is established
3 (Rama)
אשה · תקנתיו
A woman says “I have rectified it”
נאמנת in a certain prohibition; not in a doubt
3 (Rama)
קטן
A minor testifies
אין לו דין עד; stringency if sharp and indications exist
3 (Rama)
איסור דרבנן להקל · בדיקת חמץ
Minor, rabbinic prohibition, nothing established
נאמן — the Sages trusted him
3 (Rama)
חששא שמא יחליפנו
No presumption of prohibition, only a concern
סומכין על הקטן if he has דעת שמירה
4
Read from top to bottom, the middle column tells the siman: it begins with a barrel of wine and ends with a rule of proof. The first fifteen lines revolve around one barrel and one conversation; the last ten do not mention wine at all. The turning point is the line עד אחד באיסורים: from there on the Shulchan Aruch has left yayin nesekh behind to lay down the measure that will govern the whole of Yoreh De’ah.
5. The Taz and the Shach — five key passages
The two great commentaries printed around the Shulchan Aruch on Yoreh De’ah are the Taz (Turei Zahav, Rabbi David haLevi Segal, 1586-1667) and the Shach (Siftei Kohen, Rabbi Shabtai haKohen, 1621-1662). On this siman the Shach writes one of his longest discussions in all of Yoreh De’ah — thirty-two entries for four seifim — because the question of credibility governs everything else in the volume.
Two key passages of the Taz
Taz s.k. 1 — “I do not believe you” does not satisfy every view
כי יש חולקין וס״ל דכל שהוא מאמין בלבו שאומר אמת אין מועיל מה שמכחישו ועל זה נאמר ויראת מאלהיך
— ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק א
For some disagree and hold that so long as he believes in his heart that the man is telling the truth, contradicting him is of no avail — and of this it is said, “and you shall fear your God”.
The Taz explains why the Rama confines his riposte to yayin nesekh alone. The formula “I do not believe you” may be a truth or an inward lie, and nothing in the world can tell which — except the man who utters it. That is exactly the domain of the verse וְיָרֵאתָ מֵאֱלֹהֶיךָ, which the Torah reserves for matters entrusted to the heart.
Taz s.k. 5 — “come and I will show you”: one must actually go
פירוש שצריך לילך עמו אבל אם הלך עמו ולא מצאו אין כאן איסור כן נראה לי פשוט
— ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ה
That is, he must go with him; but if he went with him and found nothing, there is no prohibition here — so it seems plain to me.
The Rama’s gloss on seif 3 — in a matter that can be verified, one must take his words into account — could be read as a worry that persists whatever happens. The Taz brings it back to what it is: an obligation to go and look. Verifiability is a duty of verification, not a perpetual doubt; once the check is made, the doubt falls away.
Three key passages of the Shach
Shach s.k. 10 — what silence actually proves
לאו כהודאה ממש דא״כ פשיטא וגם לא היינו צריכים לנאמנות העד
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י
It is not an admission in the strict sense — for if it were, it would be obvious, and we would also have no need of the witness’s credibility.
An argument of remarkable clarity: if silence were a true admission, the seif would have nothing to teach — the owner’s admission would suffice on its own, and the question of the witness would not even arise. From this the Shach draws, in the name of Tosafot, what silence really proves: that the owner knows there are indications, and is relying on the witness. That is why seif 1 requires that the thing be said in his presence: a silence of ignorance would prove nothing.
Shach s.k. 11 — we teach him to withhold credence, not to lie
ואין מלמדין אותו להכחישו דהיאך ילמדוהו לשקר
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״א
And we do not teach him to contradict the witness — for how could we teach him to lie?
The whole difference lies in a single word. To contradict is to assert that the facts are false — and the owner knows nothing about them: that would be teaching him to lie. To withhold credence is to say nothing about the facts and everything about the proof. The Shach adds that the instruction must precede the scene: the owner is warned before the witness speaks, so that he can answer within the time of an utterance.
Shach s.k. 23 — why the rule of seif 3 must be asymmetrical
דממ״נ היכא דלא איתחזק לא איסור ולא היתר אסור מספק בלא העד והיכא דאיתחזק היתרא אין העד נאמן לאסור
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ״ג
For either way: where nothing is established, neither prohibition nor permission, the thing is already forbidden out of doubt, without the witness; and where permission is established, the witness is not believed to forbid.
The Shach shows that the Mehaber’s formula is not an arbitrary decree but a consequence. If nothing is established, the witness has nothing to forbid: the doubt has already forbidden it. If permission is established, he cannot forbid: overturning a presumption requires two witnesses. A single witness therefore has, structurally, a place only on the side of permission. That is exactly why the Rama must go through particular cases — the verifiable matter, the matter with no presumption — in order to make room for him on the side of stringency.
6. The gloss of the Rama (הגה) — four interventions across three seifim
The Rama intervenes four times: twice in seif 1, once in seif 2, once in seif 3 — and the last is by itself longer than the other three combined. Seif 4 is the Mehaber’s alone.
On seif 1, first gloss — the riposte and its limit
The Mehaber has just said that silence counts as admission. The Rama immediately draws the practical consequence: the owner is taught not to keep silent, and to say איני מאמינך. He then maps out the contours with a jurist’s precision: what a third party’s denial is worth (nothing, if the owner is present and silent; something, if he is absent); what inward belief is worth (nothing, he says, against the Shach who will hesitate); and above all where the riposte stops — ve-davka be-yayin nesekh, in yayin nesekh alone, because one need not be so exacting there. For other prohibitions, the heart decides.
On seif 1, second gloss — when the words were badly placed
The densest of them. It deals with everything that comes after the fact: the explanation that recovers a delay, the migo that collapses before witnesses, and the rule that stands when everything else falls — דשוייה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא, he has bound himself. Then come four particular cases, each of which will be quoted a thousand times elsewhere: the butcher who retracts, the two brothers who count as one witness, those disqualified from testimony who remain fit in matters of prohibition, and the two partners one of whom keeps silent — a remarkable case, in which the very same wine is forbidden to one and permitted to the other.
On seif 2 — the loss must be visible
A single sentence, but it shifts the criterion. The Mehaber had said: if he loses his wages, he is believed. The Rama specifies: if he loses his wages in a manner open and known to all. It is no longer the objective loss that grounds credibility but the awareness of the loss — for what makes a man believed is that no one ruins himself for nothing. Where the labourer could reasonably have believed that he was losing nothing, the reasoning no longer bites.
On seif 3 — the abridged treatise on credibility
The Mehaber wrote eight words; the Rama writes a page. He sets out, methodically: the verifiable matter, the matter with no presumption, the matter with a presumption of prohibition and its exception (be-yado le-takno), the two pieces, a man about what is his own, the woman, the minor — and then three cross-references, to simanim 119 and 185 and to Even haEzer 152. It is from this gloss that the daily practice of kashrut lives: it is the default reference whenever one must decide whom to believe.
One line runs through all four glosses: the Rama never disputes the Mehaber’s rule, he organises its application. Where a refusal to believe is legitimate, on what condition a loss makes a man credible, which prior presumption governs testimony. It is work on thresholds — and, as so often in Yoreh De’ah, that is where the practical halakha is to be found.
7. Practical cases today
Case 1 — The supervisor who reports a problem with a tank
This is seif 1 in its most literal form. The mashgiaḥ has custody of the wine: he is therefore in the case of בידו, the first gateway, and is believed even against the owner of the winery. The question becomes interesting once custody has ended — the assignment finished, the tank shipped: he must then have spoken at the first opportunity. A report written weeks later, against a producer who denies it, no longer falls under seif 1 — except through the gateway of seif 2, if his statement costs him something.
Case 2 — The employee who declares that he did his job badly
Seif 2 transposed without effort: an employee who says “the pallet was badly sealed, through my fault” forfeits a bonus, a payment, sometimes his job. The Mehaber believes him for that very reason. But let him say “there was a power cut” — an אונס — and he falls back under the ordinary regime: his words cost him nothing. The Rama adds the real difficulty of the modern case: the loss must be evident to him. A worker who does not know that a clause in his contract penalises him loses nothing in his own eyes, and is therefore not believed.
Case 3 — “I do not believe you”: how far does the Rama’s advice reach?
The Rama teaches the formula, but he himself sets its boundary: it holds for yayin nesekh, not for other prohibitions. In other words, it is not a universal technique for disposing of an inconvenient report. The Taz explains why: the moment one believes it in one’s heart, the verse וְיָרֵאתָ מֵאֱלֹהֶיךָ resumes its force. And the Shach recalls, at entry 11, what is never taught: to contradict. Withholding credence is licit; lying about the facts is not.
Case 4 — The retracted report, and the explanation that accompanies it
Someone reports a problem, then goes back on it. Seif 1 supplies the criterion: an explanation that makes the first statement intelligible in another way — אמתלא. It gives two opposed examples: the man who kept silent and explains that he was thinking is believed; the butcher who marked the animal and then retracted is reported only as a “some say”, and the Taz notes at entry 3 that he himself wrote in siman 1 that one does not rule that way. Retain the underlying rule: a bare retraction is worth nothing; an explained retraction is examined.
Case 5 — Two people, two answers, one product
The last case in the gloss on seif 1 is strikingly modern: two partners, one stock, one report. One keeps silent, the other denies. Result: the product is forbidden to the one who kept silent, and permitted to his partner — and to everyone else. There is nothing contradictory in this: credibility is not a property of the fact, it is a relation between persons. The silence bound the man who was silent, not his neighbour. This is exactly the logic of שויא אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא.
Case 6 — The woman, the minor, and ordinary supervision
The last two seifim answer one another. The Rama excludes the minor from the status of witness; the Mehaber, in seif 4, accepts him as a watchman, wherever there is no prohibition to lift but only a concern to dispel — a child old enough to watch can watch. The same distinction illuminates the rule about a woman: she is believed to say “I have rectified it” in a certain prohibition, not in the doubtful cases the Rama lists. In both instances the question is not the person but what she or he is being asked to establish.
8. Synthesis of Siman 127
In one sentence: a man who asserts that another’s wine has become forbidden is believed only on three conditions — that he has custody of it, that he said so on the spot, or that the owner keeps silent; seif 2 adds a fourth, that his words cost him his wages; and seifim 3 and 4 leave wine behind to lay down the general measure: a single witness is believed to permit, not to forbid — except where nothing has yet been established.
Memory table
The question
The criterion
Where
Who is believed at the outset?
The one who has the thing בידו, in his keeping
seif 1
And if he has returned it?
He must have spoken at the first meeting
seif 1
What is silence worth?
שתיקה כהודאה דמיא — but an indication, not an admission
seif 1
On what condition?
That he said בפניך or ידעת דרגלים לדבר
seif 1
May one refuse to believe?
איני מאמינך — in yayin nesekh only
seif 1 (Rama)
And against witnesses?
מגו במקום עדים is worth nothing; but לדידיה אסור
seif 1 (Rama)
Is an employee believed?
Yes if he loses all his wages by his statement
seif 2
Actual loss or visible loss?
Rama: גלוי וידוע לכל — the loss must be visible
seif 2 (Rama)
The general rule?
עד אחד נאמן באיסורים להתיר אבל לא להחמיר
seif 3
If nothing is established?
The witness is believed even to forbid
seif 3 (Rama)
If a prohibition is established?
Not believed to permit — unless בידו לתקנו
seif 3 (Rama)
And about one’s own?
אדם נאמן על שלו, even then
seif 3 (Rama)
Can a child serve?
Not as a witness; yes as a watchman
seifim 3-4
Comprehension questions
Seif 1 lists three situations in which the watchman is believed. Name them, and say which one disappears once the wine has been returned to its owner.
Why does the Mehaber require that the witness said בפניך or ידעת דרגלים לדבר for silence to count as admission? Which argument of the Shach (s.k. 10) explains it?
The Rama teaches the owner to say “I do not believe you”. Why does the Shach stress that he is not taught to contradict?
Seif 2 dispenses the labourer from two of the conditions of seif 1. Which ones, and why does the loss of wages suffice to replace them?
The Rama, on seif 2, excludes the case where the labourer could have thought he was losing nothing. What does this reveal about the exact ground of that labourer’s credibility?
Show, using Shach s.k. 23, that the rule of seif 3 is not a decree but a consequence.
The Rama, on seif 3, believes a single witness even to forbid in one case. Which one, and how does it not contradict the Mehaber’s line?
Seif 3 denies the minor the status of witness, and seif 4 relies on him. Explain why there is no contradiction.
Going further
If you wish to go deeper into this siman:
📚 Level 2 — Lamdan: the pilpul — the dispute among the Rishonim about the ground of be-yado (migo or the status of a watchman), the ḥakira on the nature of שתיקה כהודאה, and the Shach’s difficulty about a single witness against a party to the case
✨ Level 3 — Synthesis: the comparative tables (the gateways of credibility, prior presumptions, admissible witnesses) and rapid review of the 4 seifim