A prohibited substance mixed into permitted food, and how it is nullified — iyun and pilpul
סימן צ״ח
ביטול בששים, מין במינו ומין בשאינו מינו, ששים נגד הכל, ס״א לביצה ונ״ט לכחל
עיון, פלפול, שיטות הראשונים והאחרונים
⚡ For students and talmidei chakhamim ⚡
✦ ❖ ✦
Pilpul and in-depth study
Sugyos, sources, the underlying chakira, the disputes of the Rishonim and Acharonim,
the nafka minos for practice and the examination of the shitos
The subject:
Shulchan Arukh Yoreh De‘ah, siman 98 (nine seifim)
with its commentaries: Shakh (Siftei Kohen), Taz (Turei Zahav), Pri Megadim, Pischei Teshuva
The foundation of the sugya in Shas:
Chullin 97b–98a (ta‘am ke-ikkar, the kefeila, nullification in sixty) · Beitza 3b–4a (the egg, davar she-beminyan) · Chullin 97b–99b (the measures of nullification, the ke‘hal, the thigh)
Written and edited by:
הרב יוסף חיים סממה · DAAT
📑 Table of contents
Introduction to the sugya — a prohibited substance mixed into permitted food, a different species, and the kefeila’s tasting (seif 1)
The foundation of nullification — same species: majority by Torah law; different species: ta‘am ke-ikkar (Taz ס״ק ג)
Kefeila · nosen ta‘am lifgam · destined to improve — why we no longer rely on it, and tasting by a Jew (seif 1)
The mixture spilled · the name and not the taste · set aside what is not its species (seif 2)
A doubt arising from deficient discernment — “the view of fools”, and it is not a rabbinic doubt (seif 3)
Sixty against the whole — absorption by fire and the thickness of a peel in salting, and the duty to remove (seif 4)
“The piece becomes neveila” and vessels — why a vessel does not become neveila; old/new, earthenware (seif 5)
The measures of nullification — half a kezayis, sixty-one for the egg, fifty-nine for the ke‘hal (seifim 6–8)
What is never nullified, and what joins to nullify — giving taste while forbidden in itself, and joining (seifim 8–9)
« דין איסור שנתערב בהיתר ואופן ביטולו. ובו ט׳ סעיפים: איסור שנתערב בהיתר מין בשאינו מינו כגון חלב שנתערב בבשר יטעמנו עובד כוכבים אם אומר שאין בו טעם חלב או שאומר שיש בו טעם אלא שהוא פגום מותר והוא שלא יהא סופו להשביח וצריך שלא ידע שסומכין עליו ואם אין שם עובד כוכבים לטועמו משערינן בס׳ וכן אם הוא מין במינו כיון דליכא למיקם אטעמא משערים בס׳ (ואין נוהגים עכשיו לסמוך אעובד כוכבים ומשערינן הכל בס׳) (באגור ותשובת מהר״מ פדואה סימן ע״ט ושאר אחרונים): » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:1)
Translation. Heading: “The law of a prohibited substance mixed into permitted food and the manner of its nullification. And it contains nine seifim.” — A prohibited substance mixed into permitted food, of a different species — for example cheilev (the forbidden fat) mixed into meat: let a non-Jew taste it. If he says there is no taste of cheilev in it, or if he says there is a taste but that it is spoiled — it is permitted. And this, provided that the prohibited substance is not destined to improve afterwards, and he must not know that we are relying on him. And if there is no non-Jew there to taste it — we estimate in sixty. Likewise if it is its own species: since there is no way of settling the matter by taste, we estimate in sixty. Rama’s gloss: and nowadays we do not have the practice of relying on a non-Jew, and we estimate everything in sixty.
1. Introduction to the sugya — a prohibition that fell into permitted food
The foundation — the two ways of clarifying: tasting and measuring
This is the foundation of the siman, and all the laws of mixtures depend on it: a prohibited substance that fell
into permitted food. Since what the prohibition imparts depends on its taste, there are two ways of
establishing it. In a species different from its own — such as cheilev that fell into meat, where
the two tastes are distinguishable from one another — one can settle the matter by taste, and therefore the Shulchan
Arukh writes that the non-Jew tastes it: if there is no taste of the prohibition, or there is one but it is spoiled,
it is permitted. But in its own species — where the two tastes are not distinguishable — there is no
way of settling the matter by taste, and one estimates in sixty at once. And when there is no
non-Jew to taste, even in a different species one estimates in sixty.
« יטעמנו עובד כוכבים אם אומר שאין בו טעם חלב » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:1)
« או שאומר שיש בו טעם אלא שהוא פגום מותר » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:1)
Cheilev is tarba and not meat — the Shakh (ס״ק א). The Shakh asks why the Mechaber takes
precisely “cheilev mixed into meat” as his example of a different species: it is because the word is to be
read cheilev with a tzeire, that is the tarba, the forbidden fat, whose taste is not that of meat.
The two are therefore distinguishable and are two species. The Shakh adds that the Ra’avan wrote in a responsum that
the taste of cheilev and the taste of meat are the same — and he concludes that this must be speaking of fatty meat.
« דעת הט״ו דטעם חלב ובשר אינו שוה » (ש״ך יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק א)
« אבל ראב״ן כ׳ בתשובה בסי׳ ב׳ ובסוף עבודת כוכבים דחלב ובשר טעמם שוה » (ש״ך יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק א)
The Rama’s ruling (gloss). In practice the heter of the kefeila has lapsed in our day, and
everything — both in its own species and in a different species — is judged by the single measure of
sixty. This is the decisive difference between the plain sense of the Mechaber, who distinguishes two ways
of clarifying, and the instruction given for our generation, which measures everything by sixty.
« ואין נוהגים עכשיו לסמוך אעובד כוכבים ומשערינן הכל בס׳ » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:1)
2. The foundation of nullification — its own species and a different species
This is the heart of the siman and the underlying chakira of the whole doctrine of mixtures, and it is here that the Taz (ס״ק ג) puts all his weight.
The chakira — what is the root of the sixty, and why do its own species and a different species part ways?
Why, regarding its own species, does the Mechaber write that we estimate in sixty because there is no way of
settling the matter by taste, whereas in a different species the clarification is primarily by tasting, and we
estimate in sixty only in the absence of a non-Jew? Are these two distinct measures of sixty? It appears, on
the contrary, that their foundations are exactly opposite.
The Taz’s foundation (ס״ק ג) — two opposite roots.
The Taz explains the great distinction:
• Its own species — by Torah law the prohibition is nullified by mere majority, as the verse says
“אחרי רבים להטות”, for there is no perceptible taste to forbid it; it is the Sages who required
sixty here. Therefore, when a doubt arises (such as the mixture having spilled), we stand
before a rabbinic doubt and rule leniently.
• A different species — taste is as the substance itself, by Torah law, and sixty are required
by Torah law to nullify that taste; therefore, when a doubt arises, we rule stringently.
« מין שנתערב במינו מן התורה בטל ברוב בעלמא שנאמר אחרי רבים להטות אלא דרבנן אצרכו בה ששים » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ג)
« אבל במין באינו מינו צריך ששים מן התורה כיון שמרגישין בהיתר טעם האיסור ע״כ במקום ספק אזלינן לחומרא » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ג)
« וספיקא דאורייתא לחומרא » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ה)
Ta‘am ke-ikkar — its source, and how far it reaches (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ה). The Pischei Teshuva
recalls that the rule that taste is as the substance is derived from the מִשְׁרַת of grapes (Nazir),
where the Torah forbade the taste, or from the vessels of the nations that must be purged by fire.
And he brings, in the name of the Noda BiYehuda, the view of those who hold that taste is as the substance by Torah
law only in prohibitions that carry lashes — such as cheilev — but not in a prohibition whose transgression
carries no lashes. The nafka mina is considerable for the doubt itself: leniency or stringency.
« דהא דטעם כעיקר דאורייתא ילפינן ממשרת או מגיעולי עובדי כוכבים » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ה)
« דוקא באיסורים דכוותייהו שהם לאווין שיש בהם מלקות אבל לא בלאו שאין בו מלקות » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ה)
The root of the nafka mina. The Shakh states the same structure as the Taz and draws the consequence
in the same terms: since, in its own species, nullification is by majority from the Torah and the sixty are only
rabbinic, every doubt that arises there is ruled leniently; whereas in a different species, where the taste forbids
by Torah law and the sixty are by Torah law, the doubt is ruled stringently. The whole sugya is built on this
foundation: seif 2 (the spilled mixture) is its immediate application — same species spilled → if the permitted
part was the majority, it is permitted; different species spilled → forbidden even if the permitted part was the
majority.
The heter of the kefeila and its conditions (seif 1)
The heter of relying on tasting, in a different species, rests on three conditions laid down by the Mechaber:
(a) that the non-Jew say there is no taste, or that there is a taste but a spoiled
one — for what gives taste to the detriment does not forbid; (b) that the prohibition not be
destined to improve — for if it will improve, it is spoiled now and will improve tomorrow and then
forbid, and one does not rely on a spoiling that does not hold; (c) that he not know that we are
relying on him — lest he lie. With all three together, the kefeila is believed to permit even with less than sixty:
the clarification here is by taste and not by measure.
« והוא שלא יהא סופו להשביח » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:1)
« וצריך שלא ידע שסומכין עליו » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:1)
Chakira — is a Jew believed to taste? (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ג). The entire heter is stated regarding
a non-Jewish kefeila; the Acharonim discussed the case of an expert Jew tasting it himself. The
Pischei Teshuva brings the Bechor Shor, who hesitates and holds that there is no room for leniency, and the Pri
Megadim, who distinguishes: for a mere lick on the tongue only an expert knows, whereas for tasting a dish everyone
knows, and a Jew is believed. The question does not close here: the Shakh (ס״ק ה) reads the Rama’s gloss as
excluding only the non-Jew, and maintains that we do rely on a Jew’s tasting.
And in practice — ask your Rav.
« אבל אטעימת ישראל סמכינן במין בשאינו מינו דהתירא » (ש״ך יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ה)
Why the kefeila lapsed in our day (Rama). The Rishonim and Acharonim gave the reason for the
disappearance of this heter: we are no longer expert in tastes, no professional non-Jew is to be found whom one
could trust, and there is concern that he err or lie. It was therefore established to measure everywhere in sixty
and no longer to rely at all on a non-Jew’s tasting. Such is the Rama’s ruling throughout the laws of mixtures
(and see siman 92).
« ואין נוהגים עכשיו לסמוך אעובד כוכבים ומשערינן הכל בס׳ » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:1)
4. The mixture spilled · the name and not the taste · setting aside what is not its species
« אם נתערב מין במינו ונשפך בענין שאין יכולין לעמוד עליו לשערו אם נודע שהיה רובו היתר מותר ואם לא נודע שהיה רובו היתר אסור: הגה ולענין מין במינו אזלינן בתר שמא אם הוא שוה הוי מין במינו אבל לא אזלינן בתר טעמא אם הוא שוה או לא (ב״י בשם האגור וכן הוא בהגהת ש״ד סי׳ ל״ט): אבל אם נתערב בשאינו מינו ונשפך בענין שאין יכולין לעמוד עליו לשערו אפי׳ נודע שהיה רובו היתר אסור ואם נתערב במינו ובשאינו מינו ונשפך בענין שאין יכולין לעמוד עליו לשערו ונודע שהיה רובו היתר ממינו רואין את שאינו מינו כאילו אינו והשאר מינו רבה עליו ומבטלו: » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:2)
Translation. If the prohibition became mixed with its own species and the mixture spilled, so that one can no longer settle upon it to estimate it: if it is known that the majority was permitted — it is permitted; and if it is not known that the majority was permitted — it is forbidden. Rama’s gloss: and as to what counts as “its own species”, we follow the name: if it is the same, it is its own species; but we do not follow the taste, whether it is the same or not. — But if it became mixed with a different species and the mixture spilled so that one can no longer settle upon it to estimate it, even if it is known that the majority was permitted, it is forbidden. And if it became mixed with its own species and with a different species and the mixture spilled so that one can no longer settle upon it to estimate it, and it is known that the majority of its own species was permitted — we regard what is not its own species as though it were not there, and the remainder, which is its own species, prevails over it and nullifies it.
The foundation — the spilled mixture is the nafka mina of seif 2.
“Spilled” is nothing other than the doubt: it is no longer possible to measure. And according to the Taz’s
foundation recalled above:
• Its own species, spilled → its nullification is by Torah law through majority, the sixty being
only rabbinic; the doubt is ruled leniently → if the permitted part was the majority, it is permitted.
• A different species, spilled → its taste forbids by Torah law; the doubt is ruled
stringently → even if the permitted part was the majority, it is forbidden.
The whole of seif 2 is therefore the direct application of the underlying chakira set out at Taz ס״ק ג.
The name and not the taste — what is “its own species”? (Rama, Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ד)
The definition
The example and the nafka mina
The source
We follow the name
If both bear the same name — it is its own species, though their tastes differ
רמ״א ס״ב
Poultry meat and animal meat
Both are “meat” — its own species (and we do not follow the taste, which differs)
פ״ת ס״ק ד ; תיבת גמא
Blood and cheilev
Distinct names — a different species; and the Pri Megadim, in his Teivas Gomeh, holds that their tastes are
not the same either
פ״ת ס״ק ד
« ולענין מין במינו אזלינן בתר שמא אם הוא שוה הוי מין במינו אבל לא אזלינן בתר טעמא » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:2)
Setting aside what is not its species — the Rashba’s mechanism (Taz ס״ק ה). When the prohibition
became mixed both with its own species and with a different species and the whole spilled, the Rashba (in Toras
HaBayis) teaches to set aside what is not its own species as though it were not there: what remains — its own
species, permitted food — prevails over it and nullifies it. The Taz defends this mechanism at length: since, by
Torah law, its own species is nullified by majority, the prohibition may be treated as non-existent, ; what then subsisted was only a rabbinic prohibition — for rabbinically a majority does not suffice, sixty are required (כי מדרבנן לא סגי ברוב) — and it is that remainder which the spilled mixture allows us to treat leniently. This is the reverse of the usual “set aside its own species” of the
gemara: here one sets aside what is not its species, and in the direction of leniency. But the Shakh
(ס״ק ח) contests the comparison and leaves the prohibition standing on what is not its species; the Pischei Teshuva
(ס״ק ז) sums up the two positions and brings the Chasam Sofer, who does not see room for leniency against the Shakh.
And in practice — ask your Rav.
« אם נתערב במינו ואינו מינו סלק את שאינו מינו כאלו אינו ומינו רבה עליו ומבטלו » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ה)
« אבל הכא איך נאמר רואין את שאינו מינו כאלו אינו סוף סוף השתא נ״ט בשאינו מינו » (ש״ך יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ח)
« דהש״ך אוסר את שאינו מינו והט״ז מתיר » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ז)
5. A doubt arising from deficient discernment — it is before us, and it is not a rabbinic doubt
This is one of the sharpest novelties of the siman, and it turns entirely on the reading the Taz and the Shakh give to the clause by which the Mechaber sets this case apart from the previous one.
The Mechaber’s text (seif 3)
« במה דברים אמורים בשנשפך אבל איסור שנתערב בהיתר והוא לפנינו ואי אפשר לעמוד על שיעורו אף על פי שהוא מאיסורים של דבריהם אסור: » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:3)
Translation. In what case was this said? Where the mixture spilled. But a prohibition mixed into permitted food that is before us, and whose measure it is impossible to establish — even though it belongs to the prohibitions that are of their words, it is forbidden.
The chakira — why do we not say here that a rabbinic doubt is ruled leniently? Granted for the
spilled mixture, which has gone from the world: it is judged as a doubt. But here the prohibition is before
us, and it is only that we do not know how to measure it! Why not be lenient on account of doubt — all the
more so in a rabbinic prohibition? Yet it seems to be a full doubt: are there sixty, or not?
The Taz’s answer (ס״ק ו) — “the view of fools”, a doubt arising from deficient discernment. The Taz
explains it in the name of the Mordechai (chapter ha-Socher), and then in the name of the Rashba as quoted
by the Beis Yosef: this is no doubt at all, but a doubt born of a deficiency in discernment — the lack is
in us, not in the thing. The thing itself is settled: either there are sixty or there are not, and the reality is
fixed before us. A doubt whose whole source is the shortness of our grasp is “the view of fools”, and it does not
bring the prohibition down to the status of a doubt. The Taz adds a precision that gives his answer its edge: what
strips this doubt of its name is that another would resolve it — this one is not expert, another would be.
Where the deficiency belongs to an entire generation, it would again be a doubt.
« במרדכי פ׳ השוכר נתן טעם דדעת שוטים אינו כלום » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ו)
« שאין זה כספיקא דרבנן דספק הבא ממיעוט הכרה אינו ספק דאם אין זה בקי ומכיר אחר יכיר והיינו באפשר למיקם עלה דמילתא » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ו)
The boundary of doubt — “one could have settled it” and “it does not commonly occur” (Shakh ס״ק ט, Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ח).
The Shakh gives the same reason as the Taz, and then brings the Ran’s reason, which is not the same: were we lenient
in a matter impossible to establish, all prohibitions would become doubtful and each man would measure by his own
eye — the Sages therefore came to make their measures uniform. The Pischei Teshuva then brings the Emunas Shmuel:
where a child or a non-Jew put blood into a pot of meat, the one in doubt had no duty to know, and such a thing
does not commonly occur; it is then like the spilled mixture, and one is lenient. But the Emunas Shmuel
himself did not decide the matter: he wrote it in theory and not for practice.
And in practice — ask your Rav.
« דספק התלוי בחסרון ידיעה לא מיקרי ספק דדעת שוטים הוא זה » (ש״ך יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ט)
« משום דבדבר שא״א לעמוד עליו אי אזלינן לקולא יהיו כל האיסורים בספק » (ש״ך יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ט)
« איסור שנתבשל עם היתר אפי׳ מכירו והוא שלם וזרקו צריך ששים כנגד כל האיסור מפני שאין אנו יודעים כמה יצא ממנו לפיכך המבשל בקדירת איסור שהיא בת יומא או תוחב כף של איסור בהיתר צריך ס׳ כנגד כל הקדירה וכנגד כל מה שתחב מהכף שאין אנו יודעין כמה בלעו בין שהם של חרס או עץ או מתכת: הגה ובלבד שבלעו ע״י רתיחת אש שאז הבליעה הולכת בכל הכלי אבל על ידי רתיחת מליחה אינו נבלע בכלי רק כדי קליפה וא״צ לשער רק כדי קליפה (מרדכי פכ״ה ובארוך כלל כ״ד) וע״ל סימן ס״ט: ויש מי שמחמיר בכף של מתכת להצריך ס׳ כנגד כולו אפי׳ לא הכניס אלא מקצת משום דחם מקצתו חם כולו: הגה ונוהגין כסברא הראשונה וכל איסור שמבטלים בששים אם מכירו צריך להסירו משם אף על גב דכבר נתבטל טעמו בששים ולכן אם נפל חלב לתוך התבשיל ונתבטל טעמו בששים צריך ליתן שם מים צוננים וטבע החלב להקפיא ולצוף למעלה על המים ויסירנו משם דמאחר דאפשר להסירו הוי כאילו מכירו וצריך להסירו משם (הגהות מרדכי בחולין ובארוך כלל כ״ג) איסור שנתבטל בקדירה והסירוהו משם ונפל לקדירה אחרת צריך לחזור ולבטלו בששים נגד כולו וכן לעולם אבל אם נפל לקדירה הראשונה ב׳ פעמים אין צריך רק ששים (פעם) אחת כנגדו (בארוך כלל כ״ד דין ב׳) ועיין לעיל סימן צ״ד: » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:4)
Translation. A prohibited substance cooked together with permitted food — even if one recognises it, and it is whole, and one threw it out — requires sixty against the whole of the prohibited substance, because we do not know how much came out of it. Therefore one who cooks in a forbidden pot that was used within twenty-four hours, or who inserts a forbidden spoon into permitted food, needs sixty against the whole pot and against all that he inserted of the spoon, for we do not know how much they absorbed — whether they are of earthenware, wood or metal. Rama’s gloss: and this is provided that they absorbed through the seething of fire, for then the absorption goes through the whole vessel; but through the heat of salting, only the thickness of a peel is absorbed into the vessel, and one need only estimate against the thickness of a peel — and see below, siman 69. — And there is one who is stringent regarding a metal spoon, requiring sixty against the whole of it even if he inserted only part, because “when part of it is hot, all of it is hot”. Rama’s gloss: and the practice follows the first view. And any prohibition that is nullified in sixty, if one recognises it, must be removed from there, even though its taste has already been nullified in sixty. Therefore, if cheilev fell into the dish and its taste was nullified in sixty, one must put cold water there — for the nature of cheilev is to congeal and float upon the water — and he shall remove it from there; for since it is possible to remove it, it is as though he recognised it and he must remove it from there. A prohibition that was nullified in a pot and was removed from there, and then fell into another pot, must again be nullified in sixty against its whole, and so on forever; but if it fell twice into the first pot, only sixty once against it are required — and see above, siman 94.
The foundation — why sixty against the whole, and not against what came out.
The root of this stringency is stated by the Mechaber himself: we do not know how much came out and was absorbed.
It is a doubt born of deficient discernment, as in seif 3 — we therefore measure against the
whole body of the prohibition, on the assumption that all of it may have been exuded. From this,
two regimes of absorption:
• Absorption by fire (cooking) — it goes through the whole thickness of the vessel → one measures
against the whole pot and against all that was inserted of the spoon.
• Absorption by salting — it reaches only the thickness of a peel → one measures against that peel
alone (and see siman 69).
« מפני שאין אנו יודעים כמה יצא ממנו » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:4)
« צריך ס׳ כנגד כל הקדירה וכנגד כל מה שתחב מהכף שאין אנו יודעין כמה בלעו » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:4)
« אינו נבלע בכלי רק כדי קליפה » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:4)
“When part of it is hot, all of it is hot” — the metal spoon:
The view
A metal spoon partly inserted
The source
The first view (and such is the practice)
One measures against what was inserted only — we do not say that the whole is hot
מחבר ס״ד ; רמ״א — “ונוהגין כסברא הראשונה”
“There is one who is stringent”
When part is hot the whole is hot — one measures against the whole spoon, though only part was inserted
מחבר ס״ד
« משום דחם מקצתו חם כולו » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:4)
The duty to remove — the cheilev congealed by cold water (Taz ס״ק ז, Shakh ס״ק ט״ז). Even after the
taste has been nullified in sixty, any prohibition that one recognises must be removed: what can be removed
is not truly “nullified”. One therefore pours cold water, the cheilev congeals and floats, and one takes it away.
The Acharonim debated whether this remedy also helps with less than sixty, to save the dish: the
Hagahos Issur ve-Heter, in the name of the Mordechai, wrote so, and the Bayis Chadash ruled that way after the fact.
The Taz flatly refuses this leniency — the taste came out before the cheilev rose, and removing it afterwards
changes nothing — and the Shakh likewise writes that where there are not sixty, cold water is of no avail.
And in practice — ask your Rav.
« אלא פשוט דלא אמרינן תקנה זו דיצוף החלב למעלה אלא לחומרא בדאיכא ס׳ » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ז)
« משמע דהיכא דליכא ס׳ לא מהני נתינת מים צוננים » (ש״ך יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ט״ז)
Nafka mina — the prohibition that falls again (end of seif 4). A prohibition nullified in sixty,
removed, and then falling into another pot, again requires sixty against its whole, and so on
forever. But if it falls twice into the same pot, sixty once are enough: there is here only one
prohibition returning to its place (and see siman 94).
And in practice — ask your Rav.
« וכל איסור שמבטלים בששים אם מכירו צריך להסירו משם » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:4)
« אין צריך רק ששים (פעם) אחת כנגדו » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:4)
7. “The piece becomes neveila” and vessels — why a vessel does not become neveila
« אם ידוע כמה הוא האיסור כגון כף חדשה או שאינה בת יומא שניער בה ובלעה כזית חלב ואחר כך ניער בה קדרה של בשר אין צריך אלא ס׳ לבטל הכזית שבלעה (ולא אמרינן גבי כלי חתיכה נעשית נבילה אפילו אם ניערו בו איסור) אבל כף ישנה ובת יומא משערין בכולה (דכל מה שבלע נעשה איסור ולא ידעינן כמה בלע) (שם) ויש מי שאומר שגם בזו אין צריך אלא ס׳ לבטל הכזית שבלע: הגה והסברא ראשונה עיקר כמו שנתבאר לעיל גבי טיפת חלב שנפלה על הקדרה ויש שאינן מחלקין בין כף ישן לחדש רק בין כלי חרס לשאר כלים (מרדכי פ׳ ג״ה) ואומרים דבכלי חרס דאי אפשר להפריד האיסור על ידי הגעלה אמרינן הכלי נעשה נבילה אבל לא בשאר כלים וטוב לחוש לחומרא וע״ל סימן צ״ב: » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:5)
Translation. If it is known how much the prohibition is — for example a new spoon, or one not used within twenty-four hours, with which one stirred and which absorbed a kezayis of cheilev, and with which one then stirred a pot of meat — only sixty are needed to nullify the kezayis it absorbed. Rama’s gloss: and we do not say, regarding a vessel, that “the piece becomes neveila”, even if one stirred a prohibited substance in it. — But an old spoon used within twenty-four hours: one estimates against the whole of it (for all that it absorbed has become forbidden and we do not know how much it absorbed). And there is one who says that in this case too only sixty are needed to nullify the kezayis it absorbed. Rama’s gloss: and the first view is the main one, as was explained above regarding the drop of milk that fell on the pot. And there are those who do not distinguish between an old spoon and a new one, but between an earthenware vessel and other vessels, and who say that in an earthenware vessel, where the prohibition cannot be separated out by hag‘ala, we say that the vessel becomes neveila — but not in other vessels; and it is well to be stringent. And see below, siman 92.
The foundation — why a vessel does not become neveila.
We say that a piece “becomes neveila” of a food that absorbed a prohibition: it becomes entirely a body of
prohibition. But a vessel is not eaten, and its name does not rest upon it so as to forbid it
entirely; only what is absorbed in it is forbidden. Therefore, when we know how much it absorbed —
a new spoon, or one not of the day, that absorbed a kezayis — sixty against that kezayis suffice, and the whole
spoon is not neveila. The Shakh says it in the plainest terms: with regard to a vessel, the rule of “the piece
becomes neveila” does not apply according to anyone.
« אין צריך אלא ס׳ לבטל הכזית שבלעה » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:5)
« ולא אמרינן גבי כלי חתיכה נעשית נבילה אפילו אם ניערו בו איסור » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:5)
The root of the dispute — old/new, or earthenware/other vessels:
The view
When the vessel “becomes neveila”
The source
The Beis Yosef (the Mechaber)
It depends on age and the day: old and of the day (we do not know how much it absorbed →
against the whole) as against new or not of the day (we know → against the kezayis)
מחבר ס״ה ; ב״י
The Mordechai and the Rama
No distinction of old/new, but earthenware (from which the prohibition cannot be separated by
hag‘ala) becomes neveila, and other vessels do not — “and it is well to be stringent”
רמ״א ס״ה ; מרדכי
« ויש שאינן מחלקין בין כף ישן לחדש רק בין כלי חרס לשאר כלים » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:5)
« דבכלי חרס דאי אפשר להפריד האיסור על ידי הגעלה אמרינן הכלי נעשה נבילה אבל לא בשאר כלים וטוב לחוש לחומרא » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:5)
The Taz’s long analysis (ס״ק ח). The Taz dwells on this dispute, and derives it from a difference in
the reading of the Tur between the Toras Chatas and the Beis Yosef. For the Beis Yosef the matter turns on
knowing the measure: “new” does not mean literally new, but not of the day — for then, at the moment of absorption,
there was no prohibition and nothing could become neveila. For the Mordechai the matter turns on the possibility of
expelling what is absorbed: an earthenware vessel, which cannot be purged by hag‘ala, is like a body of
prohibition fixed within it, which other vessels are not. And all of this is a law peculiar to vessels, which the
Beis Yosef derives from what was explained in siman 92 regarding the drop of milk that fell on the wall of the pot.
And in practice — ask your Rav.
8. The measures of nullification — half a kezayis, sixty-one for the egg, fifty-nine for the ke‘hal
The text of the Mechaber and the Rama (seifim 6 to 8)
סעיף ו׳ — « כחצי זית של איסור שנתערב בהיתר צריך ששים חצאי זיתי היתר לבטלו: » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:ו)
סעיף ז׳ — « ביצה שיש בה אפרוח או טיפת דם שנתבשלה עם אחרות צריך ששים ואחת לבטל פליטתה: » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:ז)
סעיף ח׳ — « כחל מתבטל בתשעה וחמשים: הגה כל האיסורים הנוהגין בזמן הזה כולם מתבטלים בששים מלבד חמץ בפסח ויין נסך כאשר נתבאר בהלכותיהם (טור) ובלבד שהאיסור אינו נותן טעם בקדירה אבל אם נותן טעם באותה קדירה והוא אסור מצד עצמו אפילו באלף לא בטיל כל זמן שמרגישין טעמו ולכן מלח ותבלין מדברים דעבידי לטעמא אם אסורים מחמת עצמן אינן בטילים בששים (בארוך כלל כ״ה עיין ס״ק כ״ז וע״ל סוף סימן ק״ה): » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:ח)
Translation.Seif 6: half a kezayis of a prohibited substance mixed into permitted food
requires sixty half-kezeisim of permitted food to nullify it. — Seif 7: an egg containing a chick,
or a drop of blood, cooked together with others, requires sixty-one to nullify what it exudes. —
Seif 8: the ke‘hal (the udder) is nullified in fifty-nine. Rama’s gloss: all the
prohibitions in force nowadays are nullified in sixty, apart from chametz on Pesach and yayin nesech, as has been
explained in their laws; and provided that the prohibition does not give taste in the pot. But if it gives taste in
that pot and is forbidden in itself, it is not nullified even in a thousand, as long as its taste is perceived.
Therefore salt and spices, which are of those things made to give taste, if they are forbidden in themselves, are
not nullified in sixty.
The foundation — why the measures change (60, 61, 59).
The base measure is sixty, but it varies with what enters the count:
• Half a kezayis — sixty half-kezeisim are required. The Taz (ס״ק ט) gives the reason: this holds
even for a rabbinic prohibition, for “one may not make light of a rabbinic measure”. The Shakh (ס״ק כ״ג) gives
another reason, which does not pass through the Sages: half a measure too is forbidden by Torah law, only one is
not flogged for it.
• The egg — sixty-one — the prohibited item itself is counted among the eggs; so that it not
nullify itself, sixty others besides it are needed — that is, sixty-one. The Shakh (ס״ק כ״ד) specifies
what exactly this count is about: about what the egg exudes, and not about the egg itself, which, if not
recognised, is a beriya once it contains a chick — and a beriya is never nullified.
• The ke‘hal — fifty-nine — the udder is not in itself a body of prohibition: the milk it holds is
that of the animal itself. It therefore enters the count of the permitted, and fifty-nine others besides it,
together with itself, make the sixty. The Shakh (ס״ק כ״ה) refers to siman 90, where the laws of the ke‘hal belong.
Half a kezayis — “one may not make light of a rabbinic measure” (Taz ס״ק ט). The Taz explains why
sixty half-kezeisim are required even for half a kezayis, which is not the full measure of a prohibition: so that we
not come to make light of the measures of the Sages. And although there is no full kezayis here — since the taste of
the prohibition spreads in proportion to its quantity, sixty are needed against what there is, half against half.
The same holds for every rabbinic prohibition: one is not lenient about its measure.
The egg in the count. The Taz (ס״ק י) does not develop the reason for the sixty-one here: he refers
to siman 86, seif 5, where it was set out. The point the Shakh (ס״ק כ״ד) insists on is that the seif speaks of
“to nullify what it exudes” — and that the egg itself, if not recognised, belongs to another regime, that of the
beriya, which is treated at the beginning of siman 100. This is the link between the law of what is counted and the
law of nullification treated here.
9. What is never nullified, and what joins to nullify
What is never nullified (seif 8) and the fat (Taz ס״ק י״א)
סעיף ח׳ (הגה) — « אבל אם נותן טעם באותה קדירה והוא אסור מצד עצמו אפילו באלף לא בטיל כל זמן שמרגישין טעמו » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:ח)
« ולכן מלח ותבלין מדברים דעבידי לטעמא אם אסורים מחמת עצמן אינן בטילים בששים » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:ח)
סעיף ט׳ — « קדירה שיש בה נ״ט זיתים היתר ונפלו בה ב׳ זיתים א׳ של דם וא׳ של חלב כל א׳ מצטרף עם הנ״ט של היתר לבטל חבירו וכן כ״ט זיתים של היתר שנפל בהם כזית חלב ובקדרה אחרת היו שלשים של היתר ונפל לתוכו כזית של דם ונתערבו בשוגג מותר. (וכ״ש בב׳ זיתים אחד של גבינה ואחד של בשר דכל אחד מבטל חבירו) (בארוך כלל ארבעה ועשרים): » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:ט)
Translation.Seif 8, Rama’s gloss: but if the prohibition gives taste in that pot and is
forbidden in itself, it is not nullified even in a thousand, as long as its taste is perceived; therefore salt and
spices, which are of those things made to give taste, if they are forbidden in themselves, are not nullified in
sixty. — Seif 9: a pot containing fifty-nine kezeisim of permitted food, into which two kezeisim
fell, one of blood and one of cheilev: each joins with the fifty-nine of permitted food to nullify its fellow.
Likewise twenty-nine kezeisim of permitted food into which a kezayis of cheilev fell, and in another pot thirty of
permitted food into which a kezayis of blood fell, and the two became mixed inadvertently — it is permitted.
Rama’s gloss: and all the more so with two kezeisim, one of cheese and one of meat, for each nullifies its
fellow.
The Taz’s chakira (ס״ק י״א) — fat is made for taste, so why is it nullified in sixty? The Taz raises
the difficulty: if a thing made to give taste is not nullified even in a thousand, why should the
fat of a forbidden animal that fell into a dish be nullified in sixty — is it not itself made for
taste? And how does it differ from an egg laid on Yom Tov, concerning which it is ruled in Orach Chayim, siman 513,
that sixty do not help? He answers first that sixty indeed do not help once the taste is perceived, and
that where it is not perceived we assume it gives none. He then brings the Issur ve-Heter, and this is his settled
answer: only a sharp substance — salt, spices — is called “made for taste”, and not fat, which does
enhance the dish but is not felt as strongly; this is why the Rama himself concluded with “salt and spices”.
« צ״ע לענין שומן של איסור שנפל למאכל אמאי יהיה בטל בששים הא לטעמא עביד » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק י״א)
« משמע דלא מקרי טעם בזה אלא דבר חריף ולא שומן » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק י״א)
Are wine and vinegar “made for taste”? (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ט). The Pischei Teshuva brings the words
of the Acharonim on the definition of “what is never nullified”: the Minchas Yaakov implies that wine and vinegar
too are not called “made for taste”. The question is therefore whether the rule covers only what seasons in the
strict sense, or anything that imparts a marked taste — and the nafka mina bears in particular on mixtures of yayin
nesech. See also the end of siman 105 on the definitions of “an important thing” and of “made for taste”.
Joining to nullify — the rules of the Chavos Daas (Pischei Teshuva ס״ק י). The rule of joining in
seif 9 — each prohibition joining with the permitted food to nullify the other — rests, as the Shakh (ס״ק ל״ג)
writes in the name of the Rosh, on a simple reason: every prohibition is nullified once it can no longer give taste
in the permitted food, and it makes no difference whether it is a prohibition or permitted food that nullifies it.
But this presupposes two prohibitions whose tastes differ — like blood and cheilev, like cheese and
meat. The Pischei Teshuva brings on this the Chavos Daas: two prohibitions that came from things
whose taste is the same do not nullify one another, and sixty are needed against both; and in a dry-into-dry
mixture, prohibitions never nullify one another.
« דכל איסור בטל כשאינו יכול ליתן טעם בהיתר וטעם דם וחלב אינה שוה » (ש״ך יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק ל״ג)
« כל א׳ מצטרף עם הנ״ט של היתר לבטל חבירו » (שולחן ערוך יורה דעה צ״ח:9)
« אבל שני כזתים שאין טעמם שוה שנ״נ מדברים שטעמן שוה אין מבטלין זא״ז » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק י)
« וביבש ביבש אין איסורים מבטלין זה את זה » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק י)
Nafka mina — “the piece become neveila” against the joining (Taz ס״ק י״ד). The Taz notes it: the
whole heter of joining in seif 9 is stated for one who does not hold the rule of “the piece become neveila”; but for
us, who hold it in all prohibitions (siman 92), once the blood — or the cheilev — has fallen and the pot has been
forbidden, the whole has become neveila before the mixture ever occurred, and the joining permits
nothing. The Shakh (ס״ק ל״ד) raises the same difficulty and seeks the case to which the seif can still apply. In
practice, then, the rule of this seif is discussed chiefly where the rule of the piece become neveila does not
apply. And in practice — ask your Rav.
« אבל לדידן דקי״ל בסי׳ צ״ב דבכל האיסורים אמרינן חתיכ׳ עצמה נעשה נבילה גם זה התערובו׳ אסור » (ט״ז יו״ד צ״ח ס״ק י״ד)
The chakira that embraces the whole siman: what is the measure of nullification, and what is its
root in each situation?
Its own species — nullified by majority from the Torah, the sixty being rabbinic → its doubt is ruled leniently.
A different species — taste is as the substance, from the Torah, and the sixty are from the Torah → its doubt is ruled stringently.
The kefeila — a heter resting on taste, but the practice is no longer to rely on it, and sixty are required everywhere.
A doubt arising from deficient discernment — the lack is in us, and it is not a doubt; it is forbidden even in a rabbinic matter.
Sixty against the whole · the vessel — against the whole body of the prohibition; and a vessel does not become neveila.
The measures · what is never nullified — sixty-one for the egg, fifty-nine for the ke‘hal; and what gives taste while forbidden in itself is never nullified.
Nafka mina for practice (according to the ruling of most Acharonim):
We no longer rely on a non-Jew’s tasting → sixty are required everywhere, in its own species as in a different species (Rama, seif 1). Tasting by a Jew, however, remains disputed (Shakh ס״ק ה, Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ג).
Its own species spilled with the permitted part in the majority → permitted; a different species spilled → forbidden even if the permitted part was the majority (Mechaber, seif 2).
Before us and impossible to measure → forbidden even in a rabbinic matter (a doubt arising from deficient discernment — Mechaber seif 3, Taz ס״ק ו, Shakh ס״ק ט).
Cooking in a forbidden vessel used that day → sixty against the whole; salting → the thickness of a peel; and a prohibition one recognises must be removed (seif 4).
A vessel does not become neveila (if we know how much it absorbed → sixty against the kezayis); and one should be stringent with earthenware (seif 5, Rama).
Half a kezayis → sixty half-kezeisim; egg → sixty-one; ke‘hal → fifty-nine; chametz on Pesach, yayin nesech and what is made for taste → never nullified (seifim 6 to 8).
Kefeila, or sixty; taste is as the substance, by Torah law
מחבר ס״א ; ט״ז ס״ק ג ; ש״ך ס״ק א
Its own species
No way of settling the matter by taste → sixty (and by Torah law, nullified by majority)
מחבר ס״א ; ט״ז ס״ק ג ; ש״ך ס״ק ו
Its own species, spilled (permitted part in the majority)
Permitted — a rabbinic doubt, hence leniency
מחבר ס״ב ; ש״ך ס״ק ו
A different species, spilled
Forbidden, even if the permitted part was the majority — stringency
מחבר ס״ב ; ט״ז ס״ק ה
Before us, impossible to measure
Forbidden even in a rabbinic matter (a doubt arising from deficient discernment)
מחבר ס״ג ; ט״ז ס״ק ו ; ש״ך ס״ק ט
Cooking in a vessel used that day / salting
Fire — sixty against the whole; salting — the thickness of a peel
מחבר ס״ד ; רמ״א (ועיין סימן ס״ט)
A vessel that absorbed a known kezayis
Sixty against the kezayis; a vessel does not become neveila
מחבר ס״ה ; ט״ז ס״ק ח ; ש״ך ס״ק י״ז
The egg (chick / drop of blood) · the ke‘hal
The egg — sixty-one; the ke‘hal — fifty-nine
מחבר ס״ז–ח׳ ; ש״ך ס״ק כ״ד
What gives taste while forbidden in itself
Salt and spices, chametz on Pesach, yayin nesech — never nullified
רמ״א ס״ח ; ט״ז ס״ק י״א ; פ״ת ס״ק ט
Table — the central disputes of the siman
The subject
First view
Second view
Relying on a non-Jew’s tasting
The Mechaber — we rely on the kefeila (even with less than sixty)
The Rama — we do not rely on him, and sixty are required everywhere
Relying on a Jew’s tasting
The Shakh (ס״ק ה) and the Pri Megadim — we rely on it in a different species
The Bechor Shor (פ״ת ס״ק ג) — there is no room for leniency
The reach of “ta‘am ke-ikkar” by Torah law
The Shakh (ס״ק ו), following Rabbeinu Tam — by Torah law in any different species
The Noda BiYehuda (פ״ת ס״ק ה) — by Torah law only in prohibitions carrying lashes
Setting aside what is not its species (seif 2)
The Rashba and the Taz (ס״ק ה) — it is set aside, and its own species nullifies it
The Shakh (ס״ק ח) — the comparison does not hold; and the Chasam Sofer (פ״ת ס״ק ז) is not lenient against him
A metal spoon partly inserted
The first view, followed by the Rama — against what was inserted only
“There is one who is stringent” — part hot, all hot: against the whole
The vessel that “becomes neveila”
The Mechaber and the Beis Yosef — it depends on age and the day
The Mordechai and the Rama — earthenware becomes neveila, other vessels do not
Removing the congealed cheilev with less than sixty
The Hagahos Issur ve-Heter in the name of the Mordechai, and the Bayis Chadash — the remedy helps after the fact
The Taz (ס״ק ז) and the Shakh (ס״ק ט״ז) — it is of no avail, the taste has already come out
Table — the sources of the sugya
Gemara: Chullin 97b–98a (ta‘am ke-ikkar, the kefeila, nullification in sixty) · Chullin 97b
(the ke‘hal, the thigh, the measures of nullification) · Beitza 3b–4a (davar she-beminyan, the egg) · Nazir 37a
(ta‘am ke-ikkar derived from מִשְׁרַת) · Avodah Zarah 67b (nosen ta‘am lifgam). The “doubt arising from deficient
discernment”, however, does not come from a sugya of the Shas but from the Mordechai (chapter ha-Socher)
and the Rashba, both brought by the Taz ס״ק ו.
Rishonim: Rashi · Rabbeinu Tam · Rambam · Raavad · Maggid Mishneh · Tosafos · Rosh · Rashba
(Toras HaBayis — setting aside what is not its species) · Ran · Mordechai · Ra’avan · Semag · Semak · Tur ·
Issur ve-Heter he-Arokh
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ DAAT · הרב יוסף חיים סממה
תלמיד חכם · מעביר שיעורים בהלכה ובחסידות Pilpul and iyun on a prohibition mixed into permitted food and the manner of its nullification · Siman 98 · ⚡ Level 2 — Lamdan
⚠️ This content is written for study and analysis only. For any practical ruling (לְמַעֲשֶׂה) — ask your Rav.