Siman 167 — Lending on condition that the money be traded with
A single seif — and, in that single seif, the mechanism the whole of siman 177 will live on
יורה דעה · סימן קס״ז
באיזה אופן מותר להלות מעות בתנאי שיתעסק בו לריוח
🌱 Foundations level · מתחילים
✦ ❖ ✦
I give you a hundred; you trade with it for me until it becomes two hundred; the two hundred come back to me, and from then on all the profit is yours. Where is the loan? Where is the interest? The seif is one line long and its answer is two words: באחריות המלוה — so long as the risk stays with the lender, there is no loan at all.
Subject: The loan made to be traded with for the lender’s profit — עסקא, מתעסק, אחריות, שכר עמלו Source: שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן קס״ז
Compiled by: הרב יוסף חיים סממה DAAT · daattorah.com
📑 Plan of study
1.The text of the Mechaber: the single seif, clause by clause
2.Context: the Tur, the Beit Yosef and the Raavad’s responsum
3.The vocabulary: עסקא, מתעסק, פקדון, אחריות, שכר עמלו, advance and deferred interest
4.The two phases: the table of the mechanism
5.The Shach (2 ס״ק), the Taz (1), the Ba’er Hetev (2), the Nekudot HaKesef (1)
6.The Rambam: הלכות מלווה ולווה and הלכות שלוחין ושותפין
7.Contemporary cases
8.Summary and comprehension questions
1. The text of the Mechaber — the single seif
The siman has but one seif — the Shulchan Arukh announces it itself: ובו סעיף אחד. Yet that single seif carries six propositions of the Mechaber and one gloss, and in those seven lines lies the substance of all of siman 177. We therefore read it clause by clause.
The seif — full text
באיזה אופן מותר להלות מעות בתנאי שיתעסק בו לריוח. ובו סעיף אחד: מלוה אדם לחבירו מנה על תנאי שיתעסק בו לריוח המלוה עד שיהא שני מנים ויהיה באחריות המלוה עד אותו זמן ולכשיהיו שני מנים יחזרו שני המנים למלוה ומשם ואילך יהיה כל הריוח ללוה ובלבד שיתן שכר עמלו עד שיהיו ב׳ מנים ואם התנה עמו מתחילה אפילו בכל שהוא שהתנה לתת לו בשכר עמלו סגי: הגה והוא הדין איפכא שמלוה לו תחילה לצורך הלוה ואחר כך יעסוק בו לצורך המלוה ונותן לו (בית יוסף):
Title of the siman: in what manner it is permitted to lend money on condition that one trade with it for profit; and it contains a single seif.
A man lends his fellow a maneh on condition that he trade with it for the lender’s profit until there be two maneh; and it shall be at the lender’s risk until that time; and when there are two maneh, the two maneh return to the lender, and from then on all the profit belongs to the borrower — provided he gives him the wage of his labour until there be two maneh. And if he stipulated with him from the outset, even any small amount that he stipulated to give him as the wage of his labour, that suffices.
Gloss:and the same in reverse — that he lend to him first for the borrower’s need, and afterwards he shall trade with it for the lender’s need, and he gives him (Beit Yosef).
The whole siman hangs on a word one is tempted to skip: באחריות המלוה. So long as the loss would be the lender’s, the money has not left him: it is a deposit in the borrower’s hands, not a loan. And the prohibition of interest bites only on a loan. The gain that carries a hundred to two hundred is therefore not interest at all: it is the lender’s profit on his own money. The only thing left to settle is the labour — and the seif settles it in six words.
The seif, clause by clause
The clause
What it settles
Who speaks
מלוה אדם לחבירו מנה על תנאי שיתעסק בו לריוח המלוה עד שיהא שני מנים
The structure: a hundred lent to be traded with for the lender’s profit until two hundred
מחבר
ויהיה באחריות המלוה עד אותו זמן
The pivot: until then the risk is the lender’s — hence it is not a loan
מחבר
ולכשיהיו שני מנים יחזרו שני המנים למלוה
The term: at two hundred, the two hundred return to the lender
מחבר
ומשם ואילך יהיה כל הריוח ללוה
The second phase: from then on, all the profit is the borrower’s
מחבר
ובלבד שיתן שכר עמלו עד שיהיו ב׳ מנים
The condition: the wage of his labour, for the first phase
מחבר
ואם התנה עמו מתחילה אפילו בכל שהוא שהתנה לתת לו בשכר עמלו סגי
The initial stipulation: where there was one, any amount suffices
מחבר
והוא הדין איפכא שמלוה לו תחילה לצורך הלוה ואחר כך יעסוק בו לצורך המלוה ונותן לו
The gloss: the reverse order is licit at the same price — and he gives him
הגה
2. Context — the Tur, the Beit Yosef, the Raavad’s responsum
The Tur gives the same rule, and adds to it a reason the Mechaber will drop:
« מלוה אדם לחבירו מנה על תנאי שיתעסק בו לריוח המלוה עד שיהא שני מנים » (טור יו״ד קס״ז)
« ובלבד שיתן לו שכר עמלו עד שיהו ב׳ מנים שלא יהיה רבית מוקדמת » (טור יו״ד קס״ז)
summary: a man lends his fellow a maneh on condition that he trade with it for the lender’s profit until there be two maneh… provided he gives him the wage of his labour until there be two maneh, so that it should not be advance interest.
The Tur’s last four words — שלא יהיה רבית מוקדמת — name the danger. The borrower’s labour in the first phase benefits the lender, and it precedes the loan, since the loan only begins in the second phase. A service rendered before a loan with a view to the loan is called advance interest. That is why it must be paid for — not because the labour is worth that price.
The Beit Yosef explains why the initial stipulation changes the measure of the wage:
« ונ״ל דצריך להתנות כן מעיקרא דאם לא כן צריך ליתן שכר בכל יום ויום כפועל בטל כמ״ש בסי׳ קע״ו » (בית יוסף יו״ד קס״ז)
summary: and it seems to me that he must stipulate thus from the outset, for if he does not, he must give him a wage every single day, like an idle worker, as is written in siman 176.
That is where the end of the seif comes from. Without an initial stipulation one falls back on the ordinary measure of a manager’s wage — כפועל בטל, the wage of a man diverted from his own work. With a stipulation, the measure is whatever was agreed, however small. The Beit Yosef refers here to siman 176; the Shach, at ס״ק ב, will refer to the beginning of siman 177 — it is one rule, taken from two places.
And the Beit Yosef brings a responsum of the Raavad that poses the question in exactly the reverse order — the very one the gloss will settle:
« יכול אדם לעשות עסקו מלוה כגון שא״ל מכאן עד סוף שנה יהיה ביני וביניך כתקנת חכמים מאותו יום ולהלן הריוח וההפסד שלך ותן ממוני לזמן פלוני » (בית יוסף יו״ד קס״ז)
« אבל אם ירצה לעשות עסקו פקדון אחר שנה זה לא שמעתי ולא נתברר לי להתיר מפני שהיא כרבית מאוחרת » (בית יוסף יו״ד קס״ז)
« כי בשביל חצי ההלואה שהלוה לו שנה טורח לו שנה בפקדונו » (בית יוסף יו״ד קס״ז)
« מיהו בנותן לו שכר בעבור שמירתו בשנה שניה אפילו כל דהו נראה דפשיטא דמותר דתו לא מיחזי כרבית » (בית יוסף יו״ד קס״ז)
summary: a man may make his עסקא into a loan — for instance if he says to him: from now until the end of the year it shall be between me and you according to the Sages’ institution; from that day onward the profit and the loss are yours, and give me my money on such a date. […] But if he wishes to make his loan into a deposit after a year, that I have not heard, and it has not become clear to me to permit it, because it is like deferred interest: for in return for the half-loan he lent him for a year, he toils for him a year with his deposit. […] However, where he gives him a wage for guarding it in the second year, even any small amount, it seems obvious that it is permitted, for it no longer looks like interest.
This passage is the key to the gloss. The Raavad hesitates over the reverse order — the loan first, the labour afterwards — because the labour then comes after the loan: that is deferred interest. And the Beit Yosef removes the hesitation with a wage, however small. The Rama’s gloss says nothing else, and its last three words — ונותן לו — are precisely the Beit Yosef’s condition. Its source, given in brackets, is indeed בית יוסף.
3. The vocabulary — set down once and for all
עֵסֶק · עִסְקָא — the venture entrusted. The Rambam gives the clearest definition: when only one of the two trades with the common money, the partnership is called essek and the one who trades is called mitassek. Siman 167 is its limiting case: the money is entirely the lender’s, and the mitassek at first works only for him.
מִתְעַסֵּק — the manager. The one who handles another’s money to make it grow. He is not a borrower so long as the risk has not passed to him — and that is why the first phase of the seif is not a loan.
פִּקָּדוֹן · הַלְוָאָה — deposit · loan. The decisive division. What separates them is not the form of the contract but the location of the risk: what is at the owner’s risk is a deposit; what is at the holder’s risk is a loan. The Taz says it in one sentence worth remembering: once he takes on the whole responsibility, פקע ממנו שם הפקדון ונעשה מלוה.
אַחְרָיוּת — where the risk lies. The word on which everything turns. The seif does not say “he shall guard the money well”: it says that the loss, should there be one, is the lender’s. That is a legal allocation, not a precaution.
שְׂכַר עֲמָלוֹ — the wage of his labour. What the lender must pay the manager for the phase in which the manager works for him. Without it, the labour would be a benefit given free with a view to a loan — hence interest.
כְּפוֹעֵל בָּטֵל — like an idle worker. The ordinary measure of a manager’s wage: what a man would accept for being diverted from his own work. It is the measure one falls back on absent an initial stipulation — hence the point of stipulating.
רִבִּית מֻקְדֶּמֶת · רִבִּית מְאֻחֶרֶת — advance interest · deferred interest. A benefit given to the lender before the loan, or after its repayment. Here the whole difficulty lies there: the first phase’s labour precedes the loan (Tur), and in the gloss’s reverse order it follows it (Raavad). The Shach, at ס״ק ב, names both together.
קָרוֹב לְשָׂכָר וְרָחוֹק לְהֶפְסֵד — near the gain and far from the loss. The Rambam’s phrase for an arrangement in which one party takes the profit without bearing the risk. It is the limit the Taz sets against evidentiary clauses: witnesses chosen so that they could never attest to a loss would make the lender “far from the loss” — and the arrangement would fall.
שְׁטַר עִסְקָא — the deed of venture. The writing in which the arrangement is recorded. The Shach, at ס״ק א, settles two evidentiary clauses in it — one permitted, one not — and stresses that they hold only in a deed of that kind.
הַעֲרָמַת רִבִּית — circumventing the interest prohibition. An outwardly licit arrangement whose real function is to pass interest along. It is the name of the disagreement between the Taz and the Nekudot HaKesef at the end of ס״ק א.
4. The two phases — the table of the mechanism
Phase 1 — until two hundred
Phase 2 — after two hundred
Who bears the risk
The lender — באחריות המלוה
The borrower
Legal character of the money
A deposit (פקדון) in the manager’s hands
A loan (הלואה)
Who gets the profit
The lender, up to two hundred
The borrower, entirely
What the borrower does
He works for the lender
He works for himself
What must be paid
The wage of his labour — any amount if stipulated
Nothing
The halakhic risk
That the labour become advance interest
None: it is an interest-free loan
Read this way, the seif contains no exception to the prohibition of interest: it contains a characterisation. It does not say “this loan may earn”; it says that during the phase in which the money earns there is no loan. Nor does it say “the labour is free”; it says that the labour is what must be paid for — because it alone would pass from borrower to lender.
5. The Shach, the Taz, the Ba’er Hetev and the Nekudot HaKesef
The apparatus of this siman is short, and it is given here in full: the Shach has two ס״ק, the Taz one only — but by far the longest text in the siman —, the Ba’er Hetev two, and the Nekudot HaKesef one entry. The Pitchei Teshuva does not comment on this siman: there is nothing of his to report here.
The Shach — two entries
ס״ק א — the two evidentiary clauses of the שטר עיסקא
The Shach begins with the case where the lender does not trust the manager. He permits one clause, refuses another, and sets a limit of scope:
« ואם המלוה אינו מאמין ללוה על ההפסד בקרן או בריוח אזי יכתוב בשטר העיסקא שאין הלוה נאמן בהפסד הקרן כי אם ע״פ עדים כשרים מפורסמים » (ש״ך יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« ועל הריוח לא יהא נאמן כ״א בשבועה חמורה כרצון בעל השטר » (ש״ך יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« דלא כאותן שנהגו לכתוב בשטר שגם בריוח לא יהא נאמן כ״א בעדים שזהו רבית גמור » (ש״ך יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« ומשמע דוקא הכא שהוא בשטר עיסקא אבל בהלואה ממש דהוי רבית דאורייתא אסור להתנות גם על הקרן שלא יהא נאמן כ״א ע״פ ב׳ עדים כשרים » (ש״ך יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
summary: and if the lender does not trust the borrower regarding a loss, whether of capital or of profit, then he shall write in the deed of venture that the borrower is not believed about the loss of the capital except by valid and well-known witnesses; and about the profit he shall not be believed except by a solemn oath, at the will of the holder of the deed. Not like those who have taken to writing in the deed that even about the profit he is not believed except by witnesses — for that is outright interest. […] And it follows that this holds precisely here, where it is a deed of venture; but in an actual loan, which is Torah-level interest, it is forbidden to stipulate even about the capital that he not be believed except by two valid witnesses.
Three things, and they must be kept apart. On the capital, the witness clause is permitted. On the profit, it is not: it would make the profit certain, and a certain profit on money that is no longer one’s own is interest. And outside a שטר עיסקא, in an ordinary loan, even the clause on the capital falls — because there the interest would be Torah-level.
ס״ק ב — must one have stipulated in advance?
The Shach reports the Prisha, who goes back to the very source of the rule:
« והפרישה כתב דמראיית מהר״מ שממנו מקור דין זה מוכח דאפילו בלא התנה תחלה סגי בשכר כל שהוא » (ש״ך יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק ב)
« ול״ד לעיסקא דלקמן ר״ס קע״ז דנותן לו שכרו כפועל בטל דהתם הוא עוסק בחצי שלו ושל המלוה ביחד » (ש״ך יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק ב)
« משא״כ הכא דכשעוסק אין כאן הלואה כלל אלא שהוא כמו רבית מוקדמת ומאוחרת ומשום הכי אפילו בלא תנאי סגי בכל שהוא » (ש״ך יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק ב)
summary: and the Prisha wrote that from the Maharam’s proof — from whom this ruling originates — it emerges that even without having stipulated in advance, any wage suffices; and it is not comparable to the עסקא at the beginning of siman 177, where he gives him his wage as to an idle worker, for there he works on his own half and the lender’s together, whereas here, when he works, there is no loan at all, but it is like advance and deferred interest — and for that reason, even without a stipulation, any amount suffices.
The argument is exactly that of the first section: in the עסקא of siman 177 the manager also works on the share lent to him, and his wage is then the counterpart of real labour — hence the full measure. Here he works on nothing that is his: there is as yet no loan, and the wage serves only to remove the appearance of a benefit given with a view to the loan. A token sum suffices for that.
The Taz — a single entry, and it is the heart of the siman
The Derisha, and the refutation
The Taz begins by citing the Derisha, who wished to permit shifting the risk onto the manager:
« בדרישה כתב ונראה דאם התנה עמו בתחילה ונותן לו שכר מה כדי שיקבל עליו המתעסק באחריות ש״ד דומיא דמתנה עליו בשכר עמלו בדבר מועט » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
summary: in the Derisha it is written — and it appears that if he stipulated with him at the outset and gives him some wage so that the manager should accept the risk upon himself, that is fine, on the model of one who stipulates with him a wage of labour of a modest amount; and it resembles one who agrees with an unpaid bailee to be as a borrower, in Choshen Mishpat siman 291.
« ותמהתי על דברים אלו אם יצאו מפי הצדיק » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
summary: and I was astonished at these words, if indeed they came from the mouth of the righteous one.
« דעיקר ההיתר בדין זה הוא מחמת שבשעה שמרויח מנה הוא עדיין פקדון בידו ולא הלואה » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« ואם יקבל עליו האחריות גם בעת ההיא יהיה המעות בהלואה בידו » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
summary: for the essence of the permission in this ruling comes from the fact that at the hour when he earns a maneh, the money is still a deposit in his hands and not a loan; and if he accepts the risk upon himself at that time too, the money will be a loan in his hands.
This is the most important sentence in the siman, and it explains why the Taz refuses: the wage paid for taking on the risk does not offset the difficulty — it creates it. To shift the risk onto the manager is to make the money a loan; and from then on the lender’s gain becomes interest. The Taz adds that paying for this resembles someone who gives gifts to a borrower so that the latter should borrow from him at interest.
« ומה יועיל מה שנותן מלוה ללוה שכר על שקבל עליו האחריות דזה דומה למי שנותן ללוה איזה מתנות שילוה ממנו מעות ברבית » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
He leans on two texts which he quotes word for word — the Beit Yosef of siman 169 and a responsum of the Rosh:
« היה אחריות המעות עליו הוה לגמרי כאילו הלוה לישראל מעותיו » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« וכ״כ הרא״ש בתשובה כלל ע״ה סי׳ ב׳ דהמקבל למחצית שכר אסור לקבל עליו כל האחריות » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« אבל הכא שנושא ונותן בנכסים כיון שקיבל עליו כל האחריות פקע ממנו שם הפקדון ונעשה מלוה » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« ותו דדוקא במשכון שייך לומר מתנה להיות כשואל דלא ניתן להוצאה אבל לא במעות » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
summary: for there no money was lent to him, whereas here money was lent to him — it is therefore interest.
The second half of the ס״ק deals with the evidentiary clauses, and there the Taz sets a limit the Shach did not:
« ומסיק שם דאין היתר זה אלא בנותן לעיסקא שאין שם רבית דאורייתא אפי׳ בלא שום תנאי כיון דלא קיצץ עמו רק אם יהיה ריוח רק מדרבנן אסור משום קרוב לשכר ורחוק מהפסד » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« משא״כ באותן שבוחרים עדים שאינם יודעים מן המשא ומתן כלל ועושים כן כדי שא״א שיוכלו להעיד על ההפסד זה ודאי איסור גמור הוא דהוה קרוב לשכר ורחוק לגמרי מן ההפסד » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
The Shach permitted the witness clause on the capital. The Taz does not dispute it, but he requires that the witnesses be able to testify: witnesses chosen for their ignorance would make the loss unprovable, hence the capital certain, hence the lender “near the gain and far from the loss”. The clause remains licit; its diverted use does not.
Finally, on the Levush’s device — selling the lender goods cheaply with a penalty — the Taz sets a condition:
« ונ״ל ברור שאין להיתר זה מקום רק אם לא אמר תחלה הלויני מעות » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« אבל אמר תחלה הלויני מנה ואח״כ עושה עמו היתר זה אסור » (ט״ז יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
The Nekudot HaKesef — one entry, and it answers the Taz
The Nekudot HaKesef are the Shach’s reply to the Taz. Here they bear on precisely this last point, and they refuse the analogy with siman 163:
« ול״נ דלא דמי דהתם לאיזה צורך הוא מוכר לו החטין שהרי חוזר ולוקחן ממנו הרי יש כאן הערמת רבית » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קס״ז)
« אבל הכא אע״ג דאמר ליה הלוני מכל מקום י״ל דהמלוה אינו רוצה להלות אלא צריך המעות לקנות בו סחורה » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קס״ז)
« וכשזה מוכרו לו בפחות אין איסור כשיש לו שהרי רשאי אדם למכור סחורותיו בפחות כשיש לו ואין כאן הערמת רבית כיון שהסחורה היא מתחלה של המוכר » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קס״ז)
The division is clear. The Taz argues a fortiori from siman 163; the Nekudot HaKesef reply that the case of 163 is not comparable, because there the seller has no need to sell at all — he buys straight back — whereas here the goods really were his, and a man is entitled to sell his own property cheaply. The disagreement is not about the rule but about the characterisation of the facts: is there, or is there not, a real sale?
The Ba’er Hetev — two entries
The Ba’er Hetev abridges the Shach’s two ס״ק, and adds one thing neither said quite so plainly: he states outright that the Taz disputes the Derisha.
« ואם המלוה אינו מאמין ללוה על הפסד בקרן או בריוח אזי יכתוב בשטר העיסקא שאין הלוה נאמן בהפסד הקרן כ״א ע״פ עדים כשרים מפורסמים » (באר היטב יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק א)
« ובפרישה כתב דאפילו לא התנה בתחלה סגי בשכר כל שהוא » (באר היטב יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק ב)
« והט״ז חולק עליו וכתב דהא עיקר ההיתר בדין זה הוא מחמת שבשעה שמרויח מנה הוא עדיין פקדון בידו ולא הלואה » (באר היטב יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק ב)
« וכתב עוד בענין ההיתר שמתנה המלוה שלא יהא הלוה נאמן על הפסד הקרן כ״א ע״פ ב׳ עדים כשרים היינו דוקא שהעדים הללו יש להם ידיעה קצת בעסק זה של הלוה » (באר היטב יו״ד קס״ז ס״ק ב)
For a first reading, the Ba’er Hetev is the best way into the siman: in two entries he gives the content of the Shach, the position of the Prisha, that of the Derisha, the Taz’s objection and the limit on witnesses — and he ends by reporting, in small type, the reply of the Nekudot HaKesef.
The Pitchei Teshuva
The Pitchei Teshuva does not comment on this siman — there is therefore nothing of his to cite here. We meet him again from siman 168, where he has seven entries, and at siman 171, where he has one.
6. The Rambam — הלכות מלווה ולווה and הלכות שלוחין ושותפין
The Mechaber’s seif does not copy any halakha of the Rambam here — its source is a practice reported by the Rosh, the Mordechai and the Hagahot Maimoniot, going back to the Maharam. But the two notions it lives on are in the Rambam, in two different places. The first is the definition of the עסק:
The word מתעסק is thus technical, and the Rambam makes it a status: one who handles another’s money. The second notion is the division of risk inside an ordinary עסקא:
Hold on to this contrast, for the whole of the Shach’s ס״ק ב lives on it. In an ordinary עסקא, half is a loan and half a deposit: the manager therefore works also on what is his, and his wage is the counterpart of labour. In siman 167 nothing is his: the wage no longer has the same function, and that is why a token sum suffices.
And here is the source of the wage itself, and of the limit the Taz sets against the evidentiary clauses:
« אָסוּר לְאָדָם שֶׁיִּתֵּן מְעוֹתָיו קָרוֹב לְשָׂכָר וְרָחוֹק לְהֶפְסֵד שֶׁזֶּה אֲבַק רִבִּית הוּא וְהָעוֹשֶׂה כֵן נִקְרָא רָשָׁע » (רמב״ם הלכות מלווה ולווה פרק ה׳ הלכה ח)
« וְאִם נָתַן חוֹלְקִין בַּשָּׂכָר וּבַהֶפְסֵד כְּדִין הָעֵסֶק » (רמב״ם הלכות מלווה ולווה פרק ה׳ הלכה ח)
The Rambam names the siman’s two boundaries. The manager’s wage: אלא אם כן נתן לו שכר עמלו ומזונו. And the forbidden arrangement: קרוב לשכר ורחוק להפסד, “dust of interest”, and one who does so “is called wicked”. The whole second half of the Taz consists in preventing the evidentiary clauses from bringing that arrangement back in through the window.
7. Contemporary cases
Case 1 — An arrangement in which the investor never loses
This is the question the siman poses and settles in one line: the arrangement stands so long as the risk stays with the lender. If it does not, the Taz is blunt — פקע ממנו שם הפקדון ונעשה מלוה, and the gain becomes interest. The question to ask is never “how much does he make?” but “who loses if the venture goes wrong?”. Ask your Rav.
Case 2 — It is proposed to pay the manager to guarantee the capital
That is exactly the Derisha’s proposal, and exactly what the Taz refuses: the payment does not offset the transfer of risk, it makes it visible. Ask your Rav.
Case 3 — The evidentiary clause in a deed of venture
The Shach divides: on the capital, proof by witnesses; on the profit, an oath and not witnesses — writing the reverse is, he says, רבית גמור. And the Taz adds that the witnesses must know the business, failing which the clause becomes a way of making loss unprovable. Ask your Rav.
Case 4 — The same writing, but in an ordinary loan
The Shach excludes it expressly: the permission holds only in a שטר עיסקא. In an actual loan, where the interest would be Torah-level, even the clause on the capital falls. Ask your Rav.
Case 5 — Doing a favour for the one who lent to you, once repaid
That is the gloss’s case, and the Raavad found it difficult: a favour that follows a loan is deferred interest. The Beit Yosef answers with a wage, however small — and the gloss takes up his answer in three words. Ask your Rav.
Case 6 — The manager’s token remuneration
The seif allows it — אפילו בכל שהוא — but on a condition the Beit Yosef spells out: that it was stipulated from the outset. Failing that, one returns to the full measure, כפועל בטל. The Prisha is more lenient; the seif, for its part, writes the stipulation in. Ask your Rav.
8. Summary of Siman 167
In one sentence: one may lend a hundred on condition that it be traded with for the lender’s profit until it reaches two hundred, on two inseparable conditions — that the risk remain with the lender throughout that phase, so that there is no loan at all, and that the manager’s labour be paid for, even by a trifling sum stipulated at the outset; and the reverse order is licit at the same price.
Memory table
What the siman says
In Hebrew
Remember
The structure
מלוה אדם לחבירו מנה על תנאי שיתעסק בו לריוח המלוה עד שיהא שני מנים
A hundred lent to be traded with for the lender’s profit
The pivot
ויהיה באחריות המלוה עד אותו זמן
The risk stays with the lender: it is not a loan
The term
ולכשיהיו שני מנים יחזרו שני המנים למלוה
At two hundred everything returns to the lender
What follows
ומשם ואילך יהיה כל הריוח ללוה
From then on all the profit is the borrower’s
The condition
ובלבד שיתן שכר עמלו עד שיהיו ב׳ מנים
The manager’s labour must be paid for
The measure
ואם התנה עמו מתחילה אפילו בכל שהוא שהתנה לתת לו בשכר עמלו סגי
Stipulated in advance: any amount suffices
The gloss
והוא הדין איפכא שמלוה לו תחילה לצורך הלוה ואחר כך יעסוק בו לצורך המלוה ונותן לו
The reverse order is licit — and he gives him
Comprehension questions
The seif permits a gain of a hundred on a hundred. Explain, without using the word “exception”, why this is not interest.
The Tur writes שלא יהיה רבית מוקדמת and the Shach writes כמו רבית מוקדמת ומאוחרת. Why does the second name both?
The Derisha permits paying the manager to assume the risk. Reconstruct his analogy, then the Taz’s objection, and say where the analogy breaks.
Why, according to the Prisha, does any amount suffice here, whereas at siman 177 the wage of an idle worker is required?
The Shach permits the witness clause on the capital and refuses it on the profit. What is the difference, and what becomes of the clause outside a שטר עיסקא?
The Taz and the Nekudot HaKesef differ over the Levush’s device. Is the disagreement about the rule or about the facts? Justify.
The gloss permits the reverse order. Find in the Beit Yosef the Raavad’s difficulty and the answer that supplied the gloss’s last three words.
Going further
If you want to go deeper into this siman:
📚 Level 2 — Lamdan : the deposit/loan division and the location of risk, the Taz–Derisha dispute, the measure of the wage according to the Prisha, the Shach’s two evidentiary clauses, and the Taz–Nekudot HaKesef duel over הערמת רבית
✨ Level 3 — Synthesis : the tables, the vocabulary, the golden rules, the mnemonic and the classic pitfalls
⚖️ Level 4 — Halakha lema’asse : the practical ruling: what holds the arrangement up, what brings it down, and contemporary cases
The sources of this level are available on Sefaria:
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ DAAT · הרב יוסף חיים סממה
תלמיד חכם · מעביר שיעורים בהלכה ובחסידות סימן קס״ז · Level 1 — Foundations · באיזה אופן מותר להלות מעות בתנאי שיתעסק בו לריוח daattorah.com