The woman who says « I am impure », then « I am pure » — study and pilpul
סימן קפ״ה
נאמנות האשה, אמתלא, החכם נאמן, ויציאתו הנאה לו כביאתו
עיון, פלפול, שיטות הראשונים והאחרונים
⚡ For lamdanim and talmidei chachamim ⚡
✦ ❖ ✦
Pilpul and in-depth study
Sugyot, sources, the chakirah of the underlying principle, machlokot of Rishonim and Acharonim,
nafka minot for practice, and an examination of the shitot
The subject:
שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן קפ״ה — four seifim
with its nosei kelim: ש״ך (שפתי כהן) · ט״ז (טורי זהב) · באר היטב · פתחי תשובה
The ground of the sugya:
גיטין ב׳ ע״ב (one witness is believed in matters of issur) · נדרים צ׳ ע״ב (the woman who tells her husband she is forbidden to him) · כתובות כ״ב ע״א (as cited by the ט״ז ס״ק ג)
Written and edited by:
הרב יוסף חיים סממה · DAAT
📑 Table of contents
Opening the sugya — a household of purity built upon the woman's word (seif א)
The ground of her ne'emanut — « וספרה לה » (Shach), chezkat taharah and shavya anafshei
Established as a niddah among her neighbours — deed against word, treated as certainly impure (seif ב)
The nature of the amatla — a word taken back by its reason; toch kedei dibbur, and silence (seif ג)
The amatla after a deed and after time — niddah garments (Taz, the Rashba's answer); thirty days (Beit Shmuel, Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ה)
The amatla said in public — the Taz against the Torat HaShlamim (Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ג)
The chacham is believed — issur against mamon; he is not believed as to the ketubah (Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ח, אה״ע קט״ז; Taz ס״ק ג)
His withdrawal is a pleasure to him like his entry — the nature of the issur in withdrawing, and withdrawing with a dead limb (seif ד)
Shogeg, keshi and ones — forty days of fasting and redemption; the Chatam Sofer (Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ט) and the rulings of ס״ק י
האשה שהיא בחזקת טמאה אסור לו לבא עליה עד שתאמר לו טבלתי: הגה ומאחר שעברו ימים שאפשר לה למנות ולטבול (ב״י) נאמנת אפילו רואה בגדיה מלוכלכים בדם נאמנת לומר בשוק טבחים עברתי או נתעסקתי בצפור וכדומה לזה (ב״י בשם הרא״ש ורבינו ירוחם):
Translation. A woman who stands in a presumption of impurity: he is forbidden to come to her until she tells him that she has immersed. Gloss of the Rama: and once the days have passed in which it was possible for her to count and to immerse, she is believed; even if he sees her garments soiled with blood, she is believed to say « I passed through the butchers' market » or « I was handling a bird », and the like.
1. Opening the sugya — a household of purity built upon the word
The principle — she stands in a presumption of impurity until she says that she has immersed
The principle of the siman: a woman who has seen blood is fixed in a presumption of impurity, and her husband is forbidden to come to her until she tells him טבלתי — for this presumption is not undone of itself, but by her word. The husband is not commanded to investigate her or to shadow her: he relies upon her mouth, and the whole structure of taharat hamishpachah rests on that reliance. The Pitchei Teshuvah, at his ס״ק א, draws a consequence that is not slight: it does not suffice that she comes back and lies beside him — she must say so explicitly, for silence is not the word that uproots a presumption of issur.
« ואפילו שוכבת אצלו לא מהני עד שתאמר לו בפירוש טבלתי » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק א)
The Rama's addition — « once the days have passed »: once the time has elapsed in which she could count and immerse, she is believed to say she is pure even if her garments are seen soiled with blood, provided she gives a reason: she passed through the butchers' market, she was handling a bird. The root of the matter: the stain on her garments came to contradict her word, and without an acceptable reason we would have held her impure; but since the time is fit for immersion and she gives a reason, her credibility stands again.
« ומאחר שעברו ימים שאפשר לה למנות ולטבול » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״א)
« נאמנת אפילו רואה בגדיה מלוכלכים בדם נאמנת לומר בשוק טבחים עברתי או נתעסקתי בצפור וכדומה לזה » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״א)
The Shach ס״ק א — she counts for herself: the verse says « and she shall count for herself » (ויקרא ט״ו:כ״ח) — for herself she counts, and the Torah placed in her hands both the counting and the permission. From this the Shach draws the consequence: if the husband does not know whether the days have passed or not, he relies upon her, for just as the Torah believed her regarding the count, so it believed her that her time has passed. Her credibility is therefore not a surrender of clarification but a din of the Torah. And the Shach sets its limit in the same stroke: this only excludes the case where it is known with certainty that the days have not passed.
« אבל אם הבעל אינו יודע אם עברו או לא סומך עליה דכתיב וספרה לה לעצמה » (ש״ך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק א)
2. The ground of her ne'emanut — chezkat taharah and shavya anafshei
The root of the whole siman is the question of where this credibility comes from: whence is the woman believed about herself, and what is its measure.
The chakirah — whence her credibility: several paths open here, and one must see which bears the weight. The first is that of the עד אחד: one witness is believed in matters of issur, and the woman would be as one witness about her own purity. The second is that of בידה: it lies within her power to immerse and to render herself pure, and one who holds the matter in hand is believed more strongly than a bare single witness. The third is that of חזקת טהרה: a woman who has immersed stands in a presumption of purity until it is known that she has seen. And there is room to ask: when she says she is pure, by force of which of these is she believed? The sugya in Gittin states the first of them in plain words.
The yesod — « וספרה לה » and shavya anafshei:
The Torah entrusted the examination of the niddah neither to the husband nor to the beit din but to her — she is the one who counts and who immerses. From this, her word has two faces:
• when she says טהורה אני — she is believed, by the law of the single witness who moreover holds the matter in hand, and by the law of chezkat taharah once the time of immersion has passed;
• when she says טמאה אני — שויא אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא: she has forbidden herself to him by her word, and can no longer retract without a reason. This is the pivot of the entire siman: the woman's word forbids and permits, and it must therefore be established when it is uprooted.
Pilpul — presumption of purity against presumption of impurity: in seif א the woman is in a presumption of impurity (she has already seen), and she is therefore released only by the word that she has immersed — at which point a fresh presumption of purity arises. But a woman who has immersed and stands in her purity, and who then says she is impure: she has forbidden herself by shavya anafshei, even though the presumption of purity is still beneath her. Does the presumption alone then restore her, or is an amatla required to uproot the shavya anafshei? On this question the whole of seif ג depends. The mishnah in Nedarim is the first place where the case is put.
« טְמֵאָה אֲנִי לָך » (נדרים צ׳ ע״ב)
3. Established as a niddah among her neighbours — deed against word
ואם הוחזקה נדה בשכנותיה שראוה לובשת בגדים המיוחדים לימי נדותה, חשובה כודאי טמאה:
Translation. And if she was established as a niddah among her neighbours — who saw her wearing the garments set aside for her days of niddah — she is treated as certainly impure.
The yesod — a presumption born of a deed:
Here there is no word at all, but a מעשה: her neighbours saw her wearing her niddah garments. This wearing is not like a word one takes back: it is the fixing of a presumption by a deed. Hence the Mechaber: she is treated as certainly impure, and this presumption is not easily uprooted. The root of the distinction will appear below: a person's word can be taken back with a reason, but a presumption set up by a deed is hard to undo.
« ואם הוחזקה נדה בשכנותיה שראוה לובשת בגדים המיוחדים לימי נדותה, חשובה כודאי טמאה » (שולחן ערוך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ב)
The kashya the Taz cites in the name of the Tur (ס״ק ב) — why establishment by deed is heavier than an admission: in seif ג a woman who has said she is impure is believed to retract by an amatla; here, established by the wearing of garments, she is not believed to retract even with an amatla. What is the difference? At first glance the explicit word ought to be the heavier, since it is a formal admission.
« והקשה הטור וכי עדיף הוחזקה נדה מאומרת בפירוש טמאה אני שמהני שם נתינת אתמלא » (ט״ז יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ב)
The Rashba's answer — deed against word: the Rashba distinguishes the word from the deed. A woman may say she is impure out of shame or under duress, and there is nothing there but a word; but to perform a deed as full as putting on niddah garments, she does not do. The amatla therefore undoes a word and not a deed: the strength of the presumption turns not on the gravity of its content but on the manner in which it was established. The Taz and the Shach both cite this answer, in very close terms.
« ותירץ הרשב״א דמשום בושת או אונס מקרי שאומרת טמאה אני אבל לעשות מעשה כולי האי ללבוש בגדים של נדה אינה נאמנת » (ט״ז יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ב)
« הטעם כ׳ בשם הרשב״א דמשום בושה או אונס מקרי ואמרה טמאה אבל לעשות מעשה כולי האי ללבוש בגדי נדה אינה לובשת » (ש״ך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ה)
A second reason, and a limit — Rabbi Leib of Prague, and the Shach: the Taz cites in the name of Rabbi Leib of Prague another reason, which turns not on shame but on the public: she who established herself as a niddah among her neighbours established herself before people who do not know of the amatla — on what, then, was she relying when she held herself out as impure before all? Whereas she who says it to her husband could rely on telling him the reason afterwards. The Shach, for his part, sets the limit in the opposite direction: where she could not have acted otherwise, she is believed — and he supports this from a responsum of the Rama concerning the woman who had given birth three times in the eighth month, feared the evil eye, and wished to conceal her pregnancy from her household and her neighbours. The Bach resists: it would have been enough for her to tell her husband that she was impure, without going so far as to put on niddah garments.
« דשאני הוחזקה נדה בשכנותיה דלאו כ״ע ידעי מן האמתלא ואם כן על מה סמכה כשהחזיקה עצמה נגד כולי עלמא » (ט״ז יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ב)
« משא״כ באומרת לבעלה טמאה אני אפשר שסמכה עצמה שאח״כ תאמר לו את האמתלא » (ט״ז יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ב)
« משמע מדבריהם דהיכא דלא היה אפשר לה בע״א נאמנת » (ש״ך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ה)
« וכן כתב הב״ח ומסיים דהרי היה די כשתאמר לו טמאה אני ולא היה לה ללבוש בגדי נדה » (ש״ך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ה)
4. The nature of the amatla — a word taken back by its reason
This is the heart of the siman: when is a woman who has said she is impure believed to retract and say she is pure?
The text of the Mechaber and the Rama (seif ג)
אמרה לבעלה טמאה אני ואחר כך אמרה טהורה אני אינה נאמנת (אם הוא לאחר כדי דבור) (ב״י בשם רבינו ירוחם) ואם נתנה אמתלא לדבריה כגון שאומרת שלא אמרה לו כן תחלה אלא מפני שלא היה בה כח לסבול תשמיש או טענה אחרת כיוצא בזה נאמנת: הגה ומכל מקום מי שרוצה להחמיר על עצמו שלא להאמין לה מדת חסידות הוא (ב״י) אבל מדינא נאמנת אפי׳ בשתיקה אח״כ רק שהיא באה ושוכבת אצל בעלה והוא יודע ומכיר שמה שאמרה תחלה טמאה אני עשתה מחמת קטטה שהיה לו עמה (מהרי״ו סי׳ כ״ב) וכדומה לזה:
Translation. She said to her husband that she is impure, and afterwards said that she is pure: she is not believed — gloss: if this is after the span of a single utterance. And if she gave a reason for her words — for instance that she says she only told him so at first because she had not the strength to bear relations, or some other like plea — she is believed. Gloss of the Rama: and nevertheless, one who wishes to be strict with himself and not believe her, that is a measure of piety; but by strict law she is believed even by the silence that follows, provided she comes and lies beside her husband and he knows and recognises that what she said at first she did on account of a quarrel he had had with her, and the like.
The yesod — what an amatla is:
An amatla is the acceptable reason for which the first word was spoken, and by whose force she retracts it. Two conditions stand in it:
• the first word was not a full admission but was spoken for a collateral cause — weakness, a quarrel, shame;
• the reason fits the word and settles it: « I only told you so because I had not the strength ».
Hence: the amatla is not fresh testimony but the annulment of the first word from its root — it emerges that it was never anything but a word, and not an admission of issur. The Mechaber himself supplies the example.
« ואם נתנה אמתלא לדבריה כגון שאומרת שלא אמרה לו כן תחלה אלא מפני שלא היה בה כח לסבול תשמיש או טענה אחרת כיוצא בזה נאמנת » (שולחן ערוך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ג)
The condition of toch kedei dibbur, and the Rama's chiddush about silence: if she retracts within the span of a single utterance, no amatla is required at all: a word within the span of a word is one and the same word, and nothing has been established. The whole law of the amatla is stated after that span — once the first word is complete and the issur has settled upon her through shavya anafshei. And the Rama adds that by strict law she is believed even by silence: she need not voice the amatla, it suffices that the husband knows and recognises that her first word came of a quarrel. The amatla is thus a clarification of the facts, and not necessarily a stated plea. The Shach, at his ס״ק ד, does not let the point pass without bounding it: in the name of the Bach he holds that the husband is obliged to ask her why she is coming, for the amatla must be drawn out of her mouth.
« אם הוא לאחר כדי דבור » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ג)
« אבל מדינא נאמנת אפי׳ בשתיקה אח״כ רק שהיא באה ושוכבת אצל בעלה והוא יודע ומכיר שמה שאמרה תחלה טמאה אני עשתה מחמת קטטה שהיה לו עמה » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ג)
Measure of piety and strict law, and what an amatla cannot be: the Rama distinguishes — by law she is believed with an amatla, and even by silence where the matter is recognisable; but one who wishes to be strict with himself and not believe her takes upon himself a measure of piety, not the law. Still, the reason must be a reason. The Shach cites in the name of the Rambam that if she says she spoke in jest, she is not believed; and he gives, again in the name of the Rambam, the model amatla: she said she was impure because her husband's sister or mother were with them in the courtyard and she did not want them to be seen. In the name of the Sefer HaTerumah and the Mordechai he gives another form of it: she thought she was a niddah, has since examined herself, and the blood came from a wound or a bruise.
« ומכל מקום מי שרוצה להחמיר על עצמו שלא להאמין לה מדת חסידות הוא » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ג)
« לשון רמב״ם כגון שתבעה בעלה ואחותו או אמו עמה בחצר ואמרה טמאה אני ואח״כ חזרה ואמרה טהורה אני ולא אמרתי לך טמאה אני אלא מפני אחותך ואמך שלא יראו אותנו ה״ז נאמנת » (ש״ך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ג)
« שאמרה סבורה הייתי להיות נדה אבל עכשיו בדקתי עצמי ומצאתי שמחמת מכה או חבורה בא אלי הדם וכיוצא בזה נאמנת » (ש״ך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ג)
The text of the Mechaber and the Rama (continuation of seif ג)
אבל אם ראוה לובשת בגדים המיוחדים לימי נדותה ואח״כ אמרה טהורה אני אע״פ שנתנה אמתלא לדבריה אינה נאמנת (אמרה פלוני חכם טהר לי כתם והחכם אומר שהיא משקרת החכם נאמן וטמאה היא) (ר״ן בשם הרמב״ן ורבינו ירוחם):
Translation. But if she was seen wearing the garments set aside for her days of niddah and afterwards said that she is pure — even though she gave a reason for her words, she is not believed. Gloss: she said « such-and-such a chacham declared a stain pure for me », and the chacham says that she is lying: the chacham is believed, and she is impure.
The limits of the amatla — deed and time:
The case
Does the amatla help?
Source
After a word alone (she said she is impure)
It helps — a word is uprooted by a reason
מחבר ס״ג
After a deed (she wore niddah garments)
It does not help — a deed is not uprooted
מחבר ס״ג ; ט״ז ס״ק ב (תירוץ הרשב״א)
After thirty days have passed since the word
It does not help — unless the matter itself required that span
בית שמואל ; פ״ת ס״ק ה
The chakirah — why the amatla lapses after thirty days: if the amatla is the clarification that the first word was only a word, what difference is there between within the thirty days and beyond them? The explanation offered is this: the amatla avails only when it is close to the word and presents itself as the repair of that very word; but after a long time, the first word having settled in the world and the issur having been practised on its strength, the retraction no longer appears as an explanation of the word but as fresh testimony — and no one is believed to uproot a presumption he himself established. The Pitchei Teshuvah cites the law in the name of the Beit Shmuel, and gives its measure: that she held herself impure throughout those thirty days.
« ואחר שלשים יום לא מהני אמתלא » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ה)
« בית שמואל סי׳ י״ט סכ״ב » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ה)
The Pitchei Teshuvah's own reservation: he does not rest with the law he has just cited. He writes that he has established elsewhere that where the amatla is of a kind that required the matter to extend over thirty days, the amatla avails despite the span; and he adds that he afterwards found that the Chatam Sofer, in his responsum סי׳ ט׳, ruled so for practice. And in practice — ask your rav, and in matters of taharat hamishpachah a certified yoetzet halachah as well.
« ובדרושי הוכחתי דאם האמתלא באופן שהענין היה צריך להאריך שלשים יום מועיל האמתלא » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ה)
« ושוב מצאתי בתשו׳ ח״ס סי׳ ט׳ שהחליט כן לדינא » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ה)
The amatla said in public — what the Taz derives from Rabbi Leib's reason: from that very reason — that the public does not know of the amatla — the Taz draws a consequence for the spoken word: if she said before many that she is impure, the amatla no longer helps afterwards. And he concludes that the poskim wrote « she said to her husband » with precision: the law is so only where she said it to her husband alone.
« ולמדתי מזה עוד דאפי׳ באמרה יש חילוק דאם אמרה בפני רבים שהיא טמאה לא מהני אחר כך אמתלא » (ט״ז יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ב)
Those who dispute him — the Torat HaShlamim and the Kreti uPleti: the Pitchei Teshuvah, at his ס״ק ג, cites the Taz and then those who depart from him: the Torat HaShlamim holds that even said before many the amatla helps, and the Kreti uPleti writes likewise. The machloket may then be put thus: does the publicity of the word carry it over into the régime of a deed, which the amatla does not uproot, or does it remain a word, to which the amatla is fitted? And in practice — ask your rav, and in matters of taharat hamishpachah a certified yoetzet halachah as well.
« ועי׳ בתוה״ש שחולק ע״ז וכתב דאפילו אמרה בפני רבים מהני אמתלא » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ג)
The close of seif ג opens a fundamental chakirah into the limits of the credibility granted to the chacham.
The yesod — « the chacham is believed », and its measure:
She said that such-and-such a chacham declared a stain pure for her, and the chacham contradicts her and says she is lying: the chacham is believed, and she is impure. Two grounds stand in this:
• the chacham is as one witness in matters of issur, and he is believed about what took place before him — whether he declared it pure or not;
• the matter was in his hand, since he is the one who ruled, so that he is believed about the content of his own ruling more than one who comes to testify about it.
The Shach, at his ס״ק ו, refers to the Ran in the name of the Ramban for a reason taken from elsewhere — from the régime of relayed testimony: wherever the first comes and denies, the second who speaks in his name is no longer believed.
« והחכם אומר שהיא משקרת החכם נאמן וטמאה היא » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ג)
« עיין בר״ן שכ׳ בשם הרמב״ן הטעם שקבל שכן הדין בכל עד מפי עד אם בא הא׳ וכפר אין השני האומר משמו נאמן » (ש״ך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ו)
The Taz's precision (ס״ק ג) — the chacham himself, and not one who testifies about him: it is the chacham himself who is believed to say that he did not declare it pure, since it is upon him that she relied and it turns out that there is a falsehood; but a single witness who reports having heard the chacham declare her impure does not amount to the chacham's denial. The reason is technical, and the Taz takes it from Ketubot: wherever the Torah granted credibility to one witness, he is as two — and a single witness does not come to contradict that which counts as two.
« נראה לי דוקא החכם עצמו כיון שהיא סומכת עליו ואשתכח שיקרא » (ט״ז יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ג)
« כל מקום שהאמינה תורה עד אחד הרי כאן שנים » (ט״ז יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ג)
Chakirah — believed for issur, not for money (Taz ס״ק ג; Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ח): the Taz separates the two planes: this credibility of the chacham holds only for איסור; for ממון — for instance to make her forfeit her ketubah — he is not believed more than any other single witness. The Pitchei Teshuvah takes the matter up at his ס״ק ח and refers to Even HaEzer סי׳ קט״ז. The law therefore splits: as to issur she is impure and forbidden to him, as to money she does not forfeit her ketubah on a single testimony.
« והך נאמנות דחכם כאן היינו דוקא לענין איסור אבל לענין ממון כגון להפסידה כתובתה אין החכם נאמן יותר משאר עד אחד » (ט״ז יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ג)
« דהא דהחכם נאמן היינו לענין איסור אבל לענין ממון כגון להפסידה כתובתה » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ח)
Pilpul — the root of the distinction: the whole basis of a single witness's credibility lies in matters of issur — the Torah believed him about a piece of forbidden matter: shechitah, niddah and the like, and that is what the sugya in Gittin cited above says. But in money two witnesses are required, and a single witness serves there only to impose an oath. Hence in our case: the chacham's denial fixes the issur — that he not come to her — but it does not fix a monetary liability that would make her forfeit her ketubah, for that would need full clarification by two witnesses. This is a principle that runs through all the laws of credibility in arayot and purity.
7. His withdrawal is a pleasure to him like his entry — and withdrawing with a dead limb
היה משמש עם הטהורה ואמרה לו נטמאתי ופירש מיד חייב כרת שיציאתו הנאה לו כביאתו כיצד יעשה נועץ צפרני רגליו בארץ ושוהה בלא דישה עד שימות האבר ופורש באבר מת: הגה וימלא פחד ורתת על העבירה שבאה לידו (ב״י בשם סמ״ג) ולא יסמוך עליה רק יסמוך על רגליו וידיו שלא יהנה ממנה ואם פירש ממנה בקשוי ובשוגג שלא ידע שאסור לפרוש ממנה יתענה מ׳ יום ואינן צריכין להיות רצופים רק כל שבוע שני ימים כגון שני וחמישי ובליל התענית אסור ביין ובשר ואם לא יוכל להתענות יפדה כל יום בממון שיתן לצדקה כפי ערך ממון שיש לו כי עשיר יתן יותר קצת מעני ויש להחמיר בתשובתו וכל המרבה לשוב זכות הוא לו (פסקי מהרא״י סי׳ ס׳) והאשה אינה צריכה כפרה ואם שמשה שלא בשעת וסתה ומצאה אחר התשמיש דם אפי׳ נמצא על עד שלו מקרי אונס אפי׳ לא בדקה תחילה ואינם צריכים כפרה לא הוא ולא היא (מרדכי והרא״ש כלל כ״ט בשם מהר״ם):
Translation. He was having relations with the pure woman, and she said to him: I have become impure; if he withdrew at once, he is liable to karet, for his going out is a pleasure to him like his coming in. What should he do? He digs the nails of his feet into the ground and remains without movement until the limb dies, and he withdraws with a dead limb. Gloss of the Rama: and let him be filled with dread and trembling over the transgression that came to his hand; and let him not lean upon her but upon his feet and his hands, so that he derive no pleasure from her. And if he withdrew from her in a state of arousal and inadvertently — not knowing that it is forbidden to withdraw from her — let him fast forty days, which need not be consecutive but two days a week, Monday and Thursday; on the night of the fast wine and meat are forbidden; and if he cannot fast, let him redeem each day with money given to tzedakah according to what he possesses, for the rich man will give somewhat more than the poor; and one should be strict in his repentance, and whoever repents the more, it is a merit for him. And the woman needs no atonement; and if she had relations not at the time of her veset and found blood after the relations — even found upon his own examination cloth — that is called ones, even if she did not examine beforehand, and neither of them needs atonement.
The yesod — the going out is itself a coming in:
The entry was in permission — she was pure — and she became impure in the middle. One who withdraws at once, forcibly, although his intention is to leave the issur, derives from his going out the very pleasure he derived from his coming in: the withdrawal is itself a motion of relations. It follows that the going out is also an act of coming in, and that he is liable to karet like one who comes to a niddah. Hence the remedy the Mechaber prescribes — to dig the nails of his feet into the ground, to remain until the limb dies, and to withdraw with a dead limb: then there is no pleasure of relations in the going out at all.
« היה משמש עם הטהורה ואמרה לו נטמאתי ופירש מיד חייב כרת שיציאתו הנאה לו כביאתו » (שולחן ערוך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ד)
« כיצד יעשה נועץ צפרני רגליו בארץ ושוהה בלא דישה עד שימות האבר ופורש באבר מת » (שולחן ערוך יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ד)
Chakirah — in what does the issur of withdrawing consist: there is room to ask — is withdrawal in a state of arousal forbidden because it is a fresh act of relations, a motion within the body of the niddah, or only on account of the pleasure in it? The nafka mina is the dead limb, in which there is neither arousal nor pleasure and which is permitted: it would seem, then, that the nerve of the issur lies in the pleasure of relations that is in the motion, since the dead limb, though contact remains, is permitted. And it is on this point that the Rama adds that he should not lean upon her but upon his feet and his hands — so that he derive no pleasure from her at the moment of withdrawal.
« ולא יסמוך עליה רק יסמוך על רגליו וידיו שלא יהנה ממנה » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ד)
« Let him be filled with dread and trembling » (Beit Yosef in the name of the Semag): the Rama adds a direction of the soul: let one who withdraws be filled with dread and trembling over the transgression that came to his hand — for even without having willed it, an act carrying karet came to his hand, and he needs atonement and repentance. It is from here that the Acharonim pass to the laws of repentance and fasting that follow.
He withdrew at once, forcibly, knowing that withdrawing is forbidden
Liable to karet — his going out is a pleasure to him like his coming in
מחבר ס״ד
He withdrew in a state of arousal, inadvertently (not knowing that withdrawing is forbidden)
Repentance — forty days of fasting, or redemption through tzedakah; and the woman needs no atonement
רמ״א ס״ד (פסקי מהרא״י)
Not at the time of her veset, and she found blood after the relations
Ones — neither of them needs atonement, even if she did not examine beforehand
רמ״א ס״ד (מרדכי, רא״ש כלל כ״ט בשם מהר״ם)
The form of the fast (Rama seif ד; Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק י״ב and ס״ק י״ג): the Rama fixes the form of the repentance — forty days, which need not be consecutive but two days a week, Monday and Thursday; on the night of the fast wine and meat are forbidden; and if he cannot fast, he redeems each day with money given to tzedakah according to what he possesses, the rich man giving somewhat more than the poor. The Pitchei Teshuvah, at his ס״ק י״ב, refers to the laws of fasts in Orach Chaim סי׳ תקס״ח, where it emerges that three consecutive days with their nights count as the forty days, and that for a weak man two days suffice; he further cites the Magen Avraham, who holds that it is nevertheless better to fast scattered days, so that each time his heart be humbled and his sins be always before him. And at his ס״ק י״ג he cites the Torat HaShlamim's doubt as to what « the night of the fast » means — the night before or the night after — and the conclusion in the name of the Maharshal. And in practice — ask your rav, and in matters of taharat hamishpachah a certified yoetzet halachah as well.
« ואם פירש ממנה בקשוי ובשוגג שלא ידע שאסור לפרוש ממנה יתענה מ׳ יום ואינן צריכין להיות רצופים רק כל שבוע שני ימים כגון שני וחמישי » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ד)
« ובליל התענית אסור ביין ובשר ואם לא יוכל להתענות יפדה כל יום בממון שיתן לצדקה כפי ערך ממון שיש לו כי עשיר יתן יותר קצת מעני » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ד)
« ויש להחמיר בתשובתו וכל המרבה לשוב זכות הוא לו » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ד)
« דשלשה ימים רצופים עם הלילות חשיב כמ׳ יום » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק י״ב)
« והמג״א כתב דמ״מ יותר טוב שיצום מפוזרים שבכל עת יהיה לבו נכנע ויהיו חטאיו נגדו תמיד » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק י״ב)
« ומסיק בשם מהרש״ל דראוי לנהוג שלא יאכל בשר ולא ישתה יין בליל שלפני התענית ובליל שאחר התענית » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק י״ג)
The great chakirah — the man who was never told (Chatam Sofer סי׳ קנ״ה, cited by the Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ט): the Pitchei Teshuvah cites in the name of the Chatam Sofer a case that shifts the question. If she felt it in the middle of relations and told him nothing until after the withdrawal, the husband is a complete ones and is entirely exempt — for he never knew that there was anything to hold back from, and the whole law of the seif assumes that she told him. But as to the woman, the Chatam Sofer leaves the matter in doubt: is she too called an anusah? She entered in permission and her yetzer then clothed itself in her — which is the case of a beginning under duress and an end in willingness. We report, and we do not rule.
« עי׳ בתשו׳ חתם סופר סי׳ קנ״ה » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ט)
« דאם הרגישה באמצע תשמיש ולא הגידה לו כלום עד אחר הפרישה » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק ט)
Two rulings of the Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק י — close to the veset, and « I feel »:
• One who had relations סמוך לוסתה inadvertently and remembered in the middle of relations must likewise withdraw with a dead limb: the remedy of the seif extends to that case.
• And the ruling immediately turns about: this holds only where she finds blood in the middle of relations; but if she said מרגשת אני, he need not withdraw with a dead limb, for one may say that it is the sensation of the relations themselves — unless she said that she feels with certainty that it is blood. And in practice — ask your rav, and in matters of taharat hamishpachah a certified yoetzet halachah as well.
« דה״ה כששימש סמוך לוסתה בשוגג ונזכר באמצע תשמיש צריך ג״כ לפרוש באבר מת » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק י)
« ודוקא כשמוצאת דם באמצע תשמיש אבל אם אמרה מרגשת אני א״צ לפרוש באבר מת דאימור הרגשת שמש הוא אם לא שאמרה מרגשת אני בבירור שהוא דם » (פת״ש יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ק י)
Ones — no atonement required (Rama seif ד; Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק י״ד and ס״ק ט״ו): if she had relations not at the time of her veset and found blood after the relations — even found upon his own examination cloth — that is called ones, and neither of them needs atonement, even if she did not examine beforehand. Upon this the Pitchei Teshuvah brings the long clarification of the Noda BiYehudah, who distinguishes according to whether she has a veset or not, whether she examined before relations, and whether she told him to withdraw or not; and at his ס״ק ט״ו he further cites the Meir Netivim. All of this states the principle of the siman: a person is not called to account for what it was not in his power to stop.
« ואם שמשה שלא בשעת וסתה ומצאה אחר התשמיש דם אפי׳ נמצא על עד שלו מקרי אונס אפי׳ לא בדקה תחילה ואינם צריכים כפרה לא הוא ולא היא » (רמ״א יו״ד קפ״ה ס״ד)
The chakirah that runs through the siman: what is the force of the woman's word to forbid and to permit, and when is it uprooted?
She counts for herself — the Torah entrusted the counting and the immersion to her; hence her credibility (Shach ס״ק א).
Shavya anafshei — saying she is impure forbids her, and she no longer retracts without an amatla.
The amatla — it annuls a word, not a deed (the niddah garments), nor a word thirty days old, unless the matter itself required that span (Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ה).
The chacham is believed — for issur (one witness in matters of issur) and not for money (the ketubah).
His going out is a pleasure to him like his coming in — karet for withdrawing in a state of arousal; permission with a dead limb; inadvertence and duress — repentance, or exemption.
Nafka mina for practice — each line resting on the entry that carries it:
The woman stands in a presumption of impurity: forbidden until she says explicitly that she has immersed (Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק א); and once the requisite time has passed, she is believed even in the presence of a stain, with an amatla (Rama seif א).
The amatla serves a word, and the Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ה bounds it at thirty days in the name of the Beit Shmuel, with his own reservation where the matter required that span.
Established as a niddah by wearing niddah garments: treated as certainly impure, and the amatla does not help (Taz ס״ק ב, the Rashba's answer) — except where she could not have acted otherwise (Shach ס״ק ה).
The chacham is believed to forbid her and not to make her forfeit her ketubah (Pitchei Teshuvah ס״ק ח, אה״ע סי׳ קט״ז); and it is the chacham himself, not one who testifies about him (Taz ס״ק ג).
She became impure beneath him: a dead limb; withdrawal in a state of arousal, inadvertently: repentance, forty days of fasting or redemption; ones not at the time of the veset: no atonement (Rama seif ד).
And in practice — ask your rav, and in matters of taharat hamishpachah a certified yoetzet halachah as well.
She felt it and told him nothing before the withdrawal
ח״ס — הבעל אנוס גמור ופטור לגמרי (פ״ת ס״ק ט)
ח״ס שם — ובאשה נשאר בספק
Table — the sources of the sugya
Gemara:גיטין ב׳ ע״ב (one witness is believed in matters of issur) · נדרים צ׳ ע״ב (the woman who tells her husband she is forbidden to him) · כתובות כ״ב ע״א (as cited by the ט״ז ס״ק ג)
Rishonim:רמב״ם (ש״ך ס״ק ב–ג) · רא״ש כלל כ״ט · רשב״א (ט״ז ס״ק ב ; ש״ך ס״ק ה) · רמב״ן and ר״ן (ש״ך ס״ק ו ; רמ״א ס״ג) · רבינו ירוחם · מהרי״ו סי׳ כ״ב · סמ״ג · מרדכי · ספר התרומה · טור · בית יוסף
Acharonim:רמ״א · ש״ך · ט״ז · ב״ח · דרישה · מהר״ר ליב מפראג (ט״ז ס״ק ב) · פסקי מהרא״י · בית שמואל · תורת השלמים · כרתי ופלתי · מגן אברהם and מהרש״ל (פ״ת ס״ק י״ב–יג) · סדרי טהרה · חתם סופר · נודע ביהודה · מאיר נתיבים · באר היטב · פתחי תשובה
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