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DAAT · LEVEL 2 — LAMDAN

Siman 88 — Lamdan Level: meat and cheese on one table

What the fence protects, and how far it reaches

סימן פ״ח

בשר וגבינה על שלחן אחד — היכר ומראית העין

עיון, פלפול, שיטות הראשונים והאחרונים

⚡ For students and talmidei chachamim ⚡

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Pilpul and in-depth study

Sugyos, sources, the underlying chakira, machlokos of Rishonim and Acharonim,
nafka minos for halacha and examination of the shitos

Subject:
שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן פ״ח — two seifim
with the commentaries: ש״ך (שפתי כהן), ט״ז (טורי זהב), פרי מגדים, פתחי תשובה

Talmudic basis of the sugya:
חולין ק״ג: — ק״ד: · חולין ק״ז: · נדרים מ״א: · עבודה זרה ל״ז:

Written and edited by:
הרב יוסף חיים סממה · DAAT

📑 Table of contents

The text of the Shulchan Aruch — the two seifim
The reason for the prohibition — lest he come to eat them together
The underlying chakira — a decree upon a decree (Taz ס״ק א)
“And the same in reverse” — the prohibition runs both ways (Shach ס״ק א)
Why meat and milk and not other prohibitions (Shach ס״ק ב)
A vow of non-benefit and other prohibitions — what the Shach draws from the Rosh and the Rashba
When they keep their distance from one another — the Shach and the Taz against the Maharshal
What makes a marker — cloth, bread, vessel, lamp, salt
The Bach's objection on the vessel they drink from — Shach ס״ק ו
“Because the food sticks to the vessel” — even at two tables (Shach ס״ק ח)
Chakira and nafka mina for practice
Summary tables

📜 The text of the Shulchan Aruch — seif א

« אפילו בשר חיה ועוף אסור להעלותו על שלחן שאוכל עליו גבינה שלא יבא לאכלם יחד אבל בשלחן שסודר עליו התבשיל מותר ליתן זה בצד זה: » (שו״ע יו״ד פ״ח:א)

summary: even the meat of a wild animal or of fowl — whose cooking with milk the Torah does not forbid — may not be brought up onto a table where cheese is being eaten, lest he come to eat them together. But a serving table, the one on which the dishes are set out, is not included: there one may place them side by side.

The text of the Shulchan Aruch — seif ב

« הא דאסור להעלותו על השלחן דוקא בשני בני אדם המכירים זה את זה אפילו הם מקפידים זה על זה אבל אכסנאים שאין מכירין זה את זה מותר ואפי׳ המכירים אם עשו שום היכר כגון שכל אחד אוכל על מפה שלו או אפילו אוכלים על מפה אחת ונותנים ביניהם פת להיכירא מותר: » (שו״ע יו״ד פ״ח:ב)

הגה — « הגה ודוקא שאין אוכלין מן הפת המונח ביניהם להיכר אבל אם אוכלין ממנו לא הוי היכר דבלאו הכי הפת שאוכלין ממנו מונח על השלחן » (רמ״א יו״ד פ״ח:ב)

« אבל אם נתנו ביניהם כלי ששותין ממנו ובלאו הכי אין דרכו להיות על השלחן הוי היכר אעפ״י ששותין מן הכלי » (רמ״א יו״ד פ״ח:ב)

« וכל שכן אם נתנו שם מנורה או שאר דברים שעל השלחן דהוי היכר ויהיו זהירים שלא לשתות מכלי אחד משום שהמאכל נדבק בכלי » (רמ״א יו״ד פ״ח:ב)

« וכל שכן שלא יאכלו מפת אחד וכן נוהגין ליחד כלי של מלח לכל אחד בפני עצמו כי לפעמים טובלים במלח ונשארו שיורי מאכל במלח: » (רמ״א יו״ד פ״ח:ב)

summary: the prohibition of bringing both up onto one table applies only to two people who know one another — and even if they keep their distance from one another; travellers who do not know one another are exempt. And even among people who know one another, a distinguishing marker removes the prohibition: each on his own cloth, or a loaf placed between them. The Rama then specifies what counts as a marker and what does not, and adds two directives of a different order: not to drink from one vessel nor eat from one loaf, because food adheres to them — and the practice of giving each his own salt dish.

1. The reason for the prohibition — lest he come to eat them together

The prohibition of this siman is not that of meat and milk themselves — that was set out in siman 87. It is a fence, a keeping-apart: the Sages forbade bringing meat and cheese up onto one table at which people eat, « שלא יבא לאכלם יחד » (שו״ע יו״ד פ״ח:א). Because the two lie there close to one another, the concern is that he may eat them together without noticing. This is one of the distancing decrees the Sages erected around the prohibition of meat and milk.

First chakira. What is the nature of this prohibition — a concern for an actual mishap (that he swallow them unawares), or a matter of appearance (that he be seen mixing meat and milk)?

(a) The reason the Mechaber gives — « שלא יבא לאכלם יחד » (שו״ע יו״ד פ״ח:א) — points to a concern for a mishap: that he come to eat both in fact.
(b) But the Shach, in examining the case of chametz on Pesach, brings a second register into play: there are foods a person does not keep away from on his own, and the required distance there is wider. We return to this in section 5.

And the nafka mina is in the next seif: if the reason is the concern for a mishap, two travellers who do not know one another have no reason to fear eating from the other's food — and the Mechaber indeed permits them.

2. The underlying chakira — a decree upon a decree

The text of the Taz (ס״ק א)

הט״ז (ס״ק א), on the words « שלא יבוא לאכלם יחד » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק א)

« ואע״פ דכשאוכלם יחד נמי ליכא איסור דאורייתא שאין איסור אלא דוקא דרך בישול יחד ונמצא דהוי גזירה לגזירה בגמרא אמרי׳ דבכה״ג גזרינן גזירה לגזירה: » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק א)

The chakira. We hold as a rule that one does not decree a decree upon a decree. Yet here is what we have: eating meat and cheese together without having cooked them together is already only a rabbinic prohibition — the Torah forbids only what was cooked together, as siman 87 sets out. To forbid bringing them up onto one table is therefore to decree lest he eat them, when that eating is itself already a decree. A decree upon a decree — so how was it decreed?

The Taz's answer. The Taz does not deny the difficulty: he states it himself, and then answers that the gemara allows that in such a case one does decree a decree upon a decree. He writes גזירה לגזירה and refers to the gemara without naming the place — בגמרא, and no more. We report his words as they stand and add no reference he did not give.

3. “And the same in reverse” — the prohibition runs both ways

The text of the Shach (ס״ק א)

הש״ך (ס״ק א), on the words « אפילו בשר כו׳ אסור כו׳ » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק א)

« וה״ה איפכא גבינה אסור להעלות על שלחן שאוכל עליו בשר בהמה וחיה ועוף ופשוט: » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק א)

The Mechaber framed his seif in one direction only — meat brought up onto a table where cheese is eaten. The Shach saw the need to stress that there is no precedence here: cheese too may not be brought up onto a table where meat is eaten. And why was this obvious to him? Because the reason the Mechaber gives holds equally in both directions: whether the meat was set down first or the cheese was, the concern is exactly the same. Hence his closing word — ופשוט.

4. Why meat and milk and not other prohibitions

The text of the Shach (ס״ק ב)

הש״ך (ס״ק ב), on the words « אסור להעלות על השלחן » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

« ונראה דוקא בשר אסור להעלות על השלחן שאוכל חלב או איפכא משום דלא בדילי אינשי מיניה מפני שכל אחד היתר בפני עצמו » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

« אבל מותר להעלות בשר נבילה על השלחן שאוכל עליו בשר כשירה וכן מבואר בדברי הר״ן ומביאו ב״י בסימן צ״ז » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

The chakira in precise terms. What is the scope of the decree — does it cover any two foods liable to be mixed, or meat and milk in particular?

(a) The Shach's reason: « לא בדילי אינשי מיניה » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב) — since meat and milk are each permitted on their own, a person does not keep away from them of himself, and that is why we fear he may eat them together.
(b) It is otherwise with neveila meat beside kosher meat: neveila is forbidden in itself, a person keeps away from it of himself, so there is no fear that he will eat it — and it may be brought up even onto a table of kosher meat. The Shach draws this from the Ran, whom the Beis Yosef cites in siman 97.

The underlying principle.
The scope of the decree turns on a single test: does a person keep away from the thing of his own accord? With meat and milk, both permitted separately, he does not — and so they decreed. With something forbidden in itself, he keeps away on his own — and there is no place for a decree. This is the root of the distinction between siman 88 and the other prohibitions.

5. A vow of non-benefit and other prohibitions — what the Shach draws from the Rosh and the Rashba

The Shach continued (ס״ק ב)

הש״ך (ס״ק ב, continued):

« מיהו ממ״ש הרא״ש בפירושו לנדרים סוף דף מ״א גבי המודר הנאה מחבירו אוכל עמו על השלחן » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

« ולא חיישינן שמא יאכל עמו דכיון שהדירו מסתמא שונאים זא״ז טפי מב׳ אכסנאים האוכלים על שלחן א׳ זה בשר וזה גבינה » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

« משמע דאפילו בשאר איסורים נמי דינא הכי » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

Kashya on the Shach. If the decree covers only meat and milk, as he has just established, why does the Rosh in his commentary on Nedarim compare one forbidden by vow to derive benefit from his fellow — which belongs to the other prohibitions — to “two travellers, one with meat and one with cheese”? It follows that the rule of the table would apply to other prohibitions as well.

The Shach's answer.

« וי״ל דנדרים כיון שאינו אסור אלא מצד נדרו חשוב כבשר וחלב שכל א׳ היתר בפני עצמו אבל בשאר איסורים י״ל דמודה הרא״ש » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

That is: one bound by a vow is not in the case of an ordinary prohibition. The thing itself remains entirely permitted, and the prohibition hangs only on the vow — so that a person does not keep away from it, exactly as with meat and milk. For the other prohibitions, however, such as neveila, the Shach holds that the Rosh himself concedes that bringing them up is permitted.

The second part of the answer — chametz on Pesach. The Shach still faces a responsum of the Rashba, which the Beis Yosef cites and the Shulchan Aruch takes up in או״ח ת״מ: a non-Jew entering a Jew's house with his chametz may not be brought up with him to the table.

« והא דכתב הרשב״א בתשובה ס״ס קע״ז ומביאו ב״י בא״ח סימן ת״מ דעובד כוכבים הבא עם חמצו לבית ישראל אסור להעלותו עמו על השלחן » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

The Shach sets this objection aside on two distinct grounds. The first is the special stringency of chametz, which is forbidden in the smallest measure:

« נראה דהתם משום חומרא דחמץ שאני דכיון דחמץ במשהו » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

The second concerns bread itself, which a person does not keep away from because he lives by it and is used to it all year:

« דשאני התם דעל הלחם יחיה האדם ורגיל בו כל השנה ולא בדילי אינשי מיניה » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

On the substance, however, the Shach concludes in favour of the Ran:

« ומ״מ דברי הר״ן נראים וכן משמעות כל הפוסקים שלא כתבו איסור זה אלא גבי בשר וחלב » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

6. When they keep their distance from one another — the Shach and the Taz against the Maharshal

This is one of the central machlokos of the siman: two men who know one another but keep their distance from one another — each disliking to eat from what belongs to the other — are they permitted or forbidden? Here first is the text of the Shach and that of the Taz; the analysis follows.

The text of the Shach (ס״ק ד)

הש״ך (ס״ק ד), on the words « אפילו הם מקפידין » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ד)

« כ״כ הטור וכ״כ ברמזים וכ״כ ב״י בא״ח סי׳ קע״ג וזה דעת האחרונים ודלא כמהרש״ל שם שמתיר בשני ב״א שאינן אחין אפילו מכירין זא״ז אם מקפידין: » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ד)

The text of the Taz (ס״ק ב)

הט״ז (ס״ק ב), on the words « אפי׳ הם מקפידים זה על זה » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

« רש״ל בפ׳ כ״ה סי׳ מ״ג כתב ע״ז ולא נהירא דהא איתא בגמרא א״ל רב יימר לאביי אחין ומקפידין זע״ז מהו ופשט ליה דאסור » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

« ולא מבעיא ליה בשאר בני אדם מכירין זא״ז ומקפידין אלא ש״מ דוקא אחין שמקפידין אבל בשאר בני אדם אין שייך מכירין ומקפידין דלשון מכירין משמע שאוהבין זא״ז בלא הקפדה » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

« ולא נלע״ד כן דהא בשני אחין ומקפידין היה ג״כ הסברא להתיר בגמרא אלא משום לא פלוג רבנן אסרו מטעם שלא יאמרו כל הסריקין כו׳ » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

« א״כ ה״נ בשאר המכירים זא״ז אמרי׳ לא פלוג א״כ מ״ש הטור בא״ח אפי׳ מקפידין קאי גם ארישא דהיינו מכירין זא״ז וכדבריו כאן וזה ברור: » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ב)

Shitah	They know one another and keep their distance	Source
The Mechaber, the Tur, the Shach, the Taz, the Acharonim	Forbidden — “even if they keep their distance”; the Sages drew no division	Mechaber seif ב; Shach ס״ק ד; Taz ס״ק ב
The Maharshal (ים של שלמה, פרק כ״ה סימן מ״ג)	Permits between men who are not brothers, if they keep their distance — he reads the word “brothers” out of the gemara	Cited by the Shach ס״ק ד and the Taz ס״ק ב

Analysis of the dispute.

The Maharshal's reasoning. In the gemara, Rav Yeimar asks Abaye only about אחין ומקפידין — brothers who keep their distance. If the question had to be asked about brothers, then for other men, once they keep their distance, the permission was self-evident. And the word “know one another”, on his reading, denotes those who love one another with no reserve between them; but those who know one another and keep their distance would be permitted.
The Taz's rejection. On the contrary: for brothers who keep their distance there was likewise ground to permit, and they nevertheless forbade — on account of the refusal to divide the rule, לא פלוג, so that people should not say that this case is permitted and that one is not. The same therefore holds for other people who know one another: here too we apply the refusal to divide, and their distance avails nothing. As for what the Tur writes in או״ח — “even if they keep their distance” — the Taz holds that it bears also on the first clause, those who know one another, in keeping with his own words here at seif ב.
The Shach and the Taz go together. Both set the Maharshal aside and rule according to the plain sense of the Mechaber: forbidden, even where they keep their distance. The Shach adds the weight of the Tur, of the Remazim, of the Beis Yosef in או״ח קע״ג, and of the Acharonim.

The Pischei Teshuva (ס״ק ג, on the word מקפידים) brings two leniencies. The first comes from the Rosh cited by the Shach at his ס״ק ב, and the Pri Megadim wrote likewise:

« מדברי הרא״ש שהביא הש״ך בס״ק ב׳ מבואר דאם נדרו הנאה זה זה מותרים לאכול בשר וגבינה ששונאים זה את זה » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ג)

The second comes from the Bach in the name of the Maharshal, and turns on physical distance:

« וכתב הב״ח בשם רש״ל דביושבים רחוקים זה מזה בכדי שאין יכול האחד לפשוט ידו ולאכול ממה שאוכל חבירו שרי לד״ה בלא הכירא: » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ג)

Note on the text: the Sefaria text here reads זה זה where the sense calls for “one from the other”. We copy what the source gives and restore nothing.

7. What makes a marker — cloth, bread, vessel, lamp, salt

The chakira on the marker. What then is a היכר, the marker that removes the prohibition?

First side — a marker that reminds. The marker is there to remind a person to take care. What is needed, then, is something unusual on the table, something that catches the eye; and bread, which is there in any case, will not do.
Second side — a marker that separates. The marker is there to separate the meat from the cheese in fact, after the manner of a partition. A separate cloth for each would then suffice, since it separates in fact.

The nafka mina between the two sides — and it lies in the Rama himself. Why does a loaf they eat from not make a marker, while a vessel they drink from does? The Rama gives the reason in each case. For the loaf: « דבלאו הכי הפת שאוכלין ממנו מונח על השלחן » (רמ״א יו״ד פ״ח:ב) — bread has its ordinary place on the table and is not noticed. For the vessel: « ובלאו הכי אין דרכו להיות על השלחן » (רמ״א יו״ד פ״ח:ב) — and even if they drink from it, its unusual presence alone makes a marker. It follows that the test is one of reminding — it turns on how usual the thing is on the table, not on any material separation.

The marker	Does it count?	The reason
A separate cloth for each	Yes	A visible separation (Mechaber seif ב)
A loaf placed between them — not eaten from	Yes	Unusual, it remains as a sign (Mechaber seif ב)
A loaf placed between them — eaten from	No	The loaf they eat from is on the table in any case (Rama)
A vessel they drink from, whose place is not on the table	Yes	Unusual — even though they drink from it (Rama)
A lamp or other unusual objects	All the more so, yes	A full marker (Rama; Taz ס״ק ד; Shach ס״ק ז)
A salt dish for each	Such is the practice	Remnants of food are left in the salt (Rama)

The Taz (ס״ק ד), on the words « וכ״ש אם נתנו שם מנורה כו׳ » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ד):

« היינו ג״כ במקו׳ שבלאו הכי לא הית׳ המנורה עומדת שם דאל״כ הוי היכר דבכל שלחן צריכה המנורה להיות עומדת על השלחן » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ד)

And he adds, in the name of the Darkei Moshe citing the Issur veHeter:

« שצריך שתהא המנורה גבוה קצת. » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ד)

The Taz too, then, makes the marker turn on the unusual: a lamp whose place is there makes no marker. Note on the text: the Sefaria text here reads דאל״כ הוי היכר where the rest of the sentence calls for the opposite. The Shach says the same thing plainly, and it is he who settles the doubt:

« היינו כשאין דרכה להיות שם כגון ביום ובכה״ג אבל אם דרכה להיות בלילה במקום הזה לא הוי היכר: » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ז)

8. The Bach's objection on the vessel they drink from

The text of the Shach (ס״ק ו)

הש״ך (ס״ק ו), on the words « כלי ששותין ממנו וכו׳ » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ו)

« ובב״ח פסק דאם שותין ממנו לא הוי היכר אע״פ שאין דרכו להיות על השלחן ודברי הב״י והרב עיקר: » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ו)

Shitah	A vessel they drink from, whose place is not on the table
The Bach	If they drink from it — it is no marker, even though its place is not there: the use made of it undoes the marker
The Beis Yosef, the Rama, the Shach	It is a marker even though they drink from it — “the words of the Beis Yosef and the Rav are the main view”

The root of the dispute. For the Bach, a vessel they drink from is like a loaf they eat from: the use made of it ranks it among the ordinary utensils of the meal and undoes the marker. For the Beis Yosef and the Rama there is ground to distinguish: bread belongs on the table by its nature, so that eating from it completes its ordinariness; but a drinking vessel has no place on the table at all, and its unusual presence remains a marker even though they drink from it. The Shach rules like the Beis Yosef and the Rama.

A neighbouring dispute, on the shared expense. The Shach (ס״ק ה) cites the Tur:

« ז״ל הטור וי״א שאם יש להם הוצאה אחת שאין להם היתר ע״י היכר שעושין ביניהן » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ה)

and then shows that the Tur in או״ח, the Mechaber here and the decisors do not hold so:

« מיהו מדברי הטור בא״ח ס״ס קע״ג ומדברי המחבר כאן משמע דאפילו יש להם הוצאה אחת מהני היכר » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ה)

The Taz (ס״ק ג) reads that passage of the Tur differently: on his reading, the opinion cited makes the permission depend not on the marker but on the expense.

« אבל אם יש להם שני הוצאות מותר אפילו בלא היכר שעושין כל שאין הם עצמן מכירין זא״ז » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ג)

And he concludes against the Bach, who had left the Tur's words in suspense:

« והש״ע פוסק כפירוש הראשון של הטור דאפי׳ במכירין יש היתר ע״י היכר שעושין: » (ט״ז יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ג)

9. “Because the food sticks to the vessel” — even at two tables

The text of the Shach (ס״ק ח)

הש״ך (ס״ק ח), on the words « משום שהמאכל נדבק בכלי » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ח)

« והלכך אפי׳ הם בשתי שולחנות ואפי׳ שני אכסנאים אסור וכן כתוב באו״ה כלל א׳ דין י״ד: » (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ח)

A great chiddush of the Shach. The prohibition of drinking from one vessel does not belong to the rule of the table — which depends on their knowing one another and on the marker — but is a rule of its own, because the food actually adheres to the vessel and passes from one to the other. Hence:

even at two tables, where the rule of the table does not apply at all, it is forbidden to drink from one vessel;
even between two travellers, for whom the table is permitted with no marker at all, it is forbidden to drink from one vessel.

For here the concern is no longer that he may eat them together, but an actual mixture of remnants of meat and dairy in the vessel.

The underlying principle.
Two rules must be distinguished in this siman. (a) The rule of the table — a decree of keeping-apart, depending on their knowing one another, on their distance and on the marker. (b) The rule of the shared vessel and the shared loaf — a rule of actual mixture, weightier, and depending neither on the table nor on the marker.

10. Chakira and nafka mina for practice

The underlying chakira of the siman. What is the nature of the prohibition of bringing up onto the table?

First side — a prohibition resting on the table. The table at which people eat is the place of the meal, and they forbade setting both kinds upon it. That is why the serving table, which is not a place of eating, falls outside the rule.
Second side — a prohibition resting on the person. The prohibition arises from the concern that the person may eat them; it therefore depends on their knowing one another — where the concern exists — and falls away for travellers, where it does not.

And both sides are true: seif א teaches the rule of the place (a table where people eat as against a serving table), seif ב that of the person (knowing one another, the marker).

The nafka minos, anchored in the text:

The table on which the dishes are set out — one may place them side by side: « אבל בשלחן שסודר עליו התבשיל מותר ליתן זה בצד זה: » (שו״ע יו״ד פ״ח:א). Proof that there is a rule of place.
Two travellers — permitted with no marker at all (Mechaber seif ב). Proof that there is a rule of the person.
Drinking from one vessel — forbidden even at two tables and even between travellers (Shach ס״ק ח). Proof that this is a third rule — actual mixture — depending neither on the place nor on the concern.

Further nafka minos drawn from the commentaries

The case	What the sources say (for study only)
Cheese on a meat table	Forbidden — וה״ה איפכא (ש״ך יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק א)
Neveila meat on a table of kosher meat	Permitted — a person keeps away of himself from what is forbidden (Shach ס״ק ב, in the name of the Ran)
One bound by a vow of non-benefit, or who forbade this food upon himself	Forbidden to bring it up with him, as with meat and milk (Shach ס״ק ב; Pischei Teshuva ס״ק ב)
Lighting with butter near meat	The Pischei Teshuva reports the warning not to light with butter, lest it drip onto the meat; the Beis Lechem Yehuda extends the concern to tallow candles, and the Pri Megadim distinguishes between them (ס״ק א). For practice — ask your rav.
Others eating at the same table	The Pischei Teshuva draws from the responsa Masas Binyamin (סימן קי״ב) that if others are also eating at that table it is permitted even without a marker (ס״ק ד)

The Pischei Teshuva (ס״ק א), on the butter lamp:

« שכתב בשם א״ז להזהיר שלא להדליק בחמאה דגזרינן שמא ינטף ממנה על הבשר » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק א)

« והפמ״ג כתב ולדידי מהא לא איריא דחמאה מהותך בנר שקורין קרוזו״ל יש לחוש ע״י נענוע ישפוך משח״כ נר שומן עשוי כעין פתילה לא חיישינן שמא יטיף » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק א)

And the Pischei Teshuva (ס״ק ד), on the Masas Binyamin:

« ועיין בתשובת משאת בנימין סימן קי״ב באמצע התשובה דמשמע שם דאם גם אחרים אוכלים על שלחן זה מותר אף בלא היכר דזה עדיף מאם עשו שום היכר » (פתחי תשובה יו״ד פ״ח ס״ק ד)

Summary of the principle.
The whole siman turns on the reason the Mechaber gives — « שלא יבא לאכלם יחד » (שו״ע יו״ד פ״ח:א). From it, three rules:
• The prohibition of bringing up to the table — a decree upon a decree (Taz ס״ק א), aimed at meat and milk in particular, which a person does not keep away from (Shach ס״ק ב), and running both ways (Shach ס״ק א).
• The conditions resting on the person — forbidden between people who know one another, even where they keep their distance (Shach ס״ק ד, Taz ס״ק ב); permitted between travellers; and the marker removes the prohibition.
• The rule of the shared vessel — a distinct prohibition, because the food adheres to it, holding even at two tables (Shach ס״ק ח).

11. Summary tables

The three rules of the siman

The central machlokos

The sources of the sugya

The rule	Its definition	Where it is written
The body of the decree	Meat and cheese are not brought up onto one table at which people eat; a decree upon a decree	Mechaber seif א; Taz ס״ק א
The scope of the decree	Both ways; meat and milk in particular, not the other prohibitions	Shach ס״ק א and ס״ק ב
The conditions resting on the person	Forbidden between people who know one another, even where they keep their distance; permitted between travellers; the marker removes the prohibition	Mechaber seif ב; Shach ס״ק ג, ד, ה; Taz ס״ק ב
What makes a marker	Cloth, a loaf not eaten from, a vessel, a lamp, salt — something unusual	Mechaber and Rama seif ב; Shach ס״ק ו, ז; Taz ס״ק ג, ד
The rule of the shared vessel	Forbidden to drink from one vessel, even at two tables and between travellers	Rama seif ב; Shach ס״ק ח

The point	The Shach	The Taz	Who disagrees
Knowing one another and keeping their distance	Forbidden (ס״ק ד) — against the Maharshal	Forbidden (ס״ק ב) — the Sages drew no division	The Maharshal — permits between men who are not brothers
Does a vessel they drink from make a marker?	Yes (ס״ק ו) — like the Beis Yosef and the Rama	Like the Rama (ס״ק ג)	The Bach — no marker if they drink from it
The scope of “they place a loaf between them”	The marker counts even where they have a shared expense (ס״ק ה)	The matter turns on the expense (ס״ק ג) — and he rules like the Tur's first reading	The Bach — left the Tur's words in suspense
Do other prohibitions fall under the rule of the table?	Only meat and milk, and a vow of non-benefit (ס״ק ב)	—	—

גמרא : חולין ק״ג: — ק״ד: (פרק כל הבשר; חלת חו״ל ק״ד: — מובא בש״ך ס״ק ב) · חולין ק״ז: (אחין ומקפידין — לשון הט״ז) · נדרים מ״א: (מודר הנאה אוכל עמו על השלחן — הרא״ש) · עבודה זרה, פרק אין מעמידין ל״ז: (לחם — מובא בש״ך ס״ק ב)