From the ruling of the Mehaber and the Rama, through the arbitration of Taz, Shach
and Pitchei Teshuva, down to the waiter speaking over our table
Subject:
שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן קכ״ז (ד׳ סעיפים)
עם נושאי הכלים: ט״ז, ש״ך, פתחי תשובה, רמב״ם
⚠ A note on this level:
This level is not “Daat HaRav”: the Shulchan Aruch HaRav
(the Alter Rebbe) does not cover Yoreh De'ah, hence not Siman 127.
It is a level of practical psika: what one does, and whom one asks.
Written and studied by:
הרב יוסף חיים סממה · DAAT
How to read this level. Every statement here is anchored either in the language of the Shulchan Aruch and its nossei kelim (Taz, Shach, Pitchei Teshuva), or in a named and checkable posek (Rambam, Gemara Gittin and Kiddushin, Tosafot). On Yoreh De'ah there is no Mishnah Berurah (which comments only on Orach Chaim) and no Shulchan Aruch HaRav / Daat HaRav (the Alter Rebbe did not write Yoreh De'ah). The Aruch HaShulchan is not cited here: his text on this siman is not accessible to us, and one does not quote what one cannot verify. Siman 127 is the shortest of the block — four seifim — and yet it is the one whose reach extends furthest beyond wine: it raises the question of one man's word when it comes to prohibit, and seif 3 formulates that question for the whole of Yoreh De'ah. Wherever the question runs past the siman, this level says so and stops: halakha lema'asse goes through your Rav.
אם נאמן האדם לאסור יינו של חבירו. ובו ד׳ סעיפים:
האומר לחבירו נתנסך יינך אם הוא בידו נאמן ואפילו אם אינו עתה בידו שכבר הוחזר לבעלים אם בפעם ראשון שמצאו אמר לו נתנסך יינך נאמן אפי׳ אם הבעל מכחישו אבל אם אינו בידו ולא אמר כן לבעל בפעם ראשון שראהו וא״ל אחר כך אינו נאמן אם הבעל מכחישו (תוך כדי דבור) (מרדכי פרק האומר) או אומר איני יודע אבל אם שתק שתיקה כהודאה דמיא:
The founding case. A man tells his fellow: your wine has been made yayin nesekh. The Mehaber does not ask whether he is an honest man — he asks whether his mouth has the power to prohibit. Three gates, and passing one is enough. (1) The wine is in his hand, entrusted to him to guard: he is believed. (2) The wine is no longer in his hand, having been returned to its owner, but he spoke at the first meeting: he is believed, even if the owner contradicts him. (3) Neither one nor the other — he is not believed if the owner contradicts him, or says “I do not know”.
And the fourth situation, which is the real one. If the owner keeps silent — שתיקה כהודאה דמיא, silence is as an admission. That is where the siman turns: in real life owners almost never contradict, they stand there stunned and mute. It is for that very second that this siman was written.
— Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah 127:1 · Sefaria YD 127:1
« מִי שֶׁאָמַר לוֹ עֵד אֶחָד נִטְמְאוּ טָהֳרוֹתֶיךָ וְהַלָּה שׁוֹתֵק הֲרֵי זֶה נֶאֱמָן וַהֲרֵי הֵן טְמֵאוֹת. וְאִם הִכְחִישׁוֹ וְאָמַר לֹא נִטְמְאוּ הֲרֵי הֵן בְּחֶזְקָתָן עַד שֶׁיָּעִידוּ שְׁנַיִם »
— רמב״ם הלכות מטמאי משכב ומושב פרק י״ג הלכה ח
Two readings, and they do not yield the same rules. (a) Silence is an admission: whoever kept quiet has conceded. That is the way of Tosafot, the Rosh and the Tur, and it is why the Mehaber will require the witness to have said “in your presence” or “you yourself know there are grounds” — otherwise silence means nothing. (b) Silence is no admission at all: the witness is the one who is believed, and silence merely removes the obstacle of denial. That is the way of the Raavad, the Rashba, the Ran, the Ritva, the Nimukei Yosef and the Rivash, and on it a man who is silent because he does not know leaves the testimony standing. The Shach records them and adds that this seems to him the main view (ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ט״ז). An immediate practical difference: the owner who answers “I do not know”. On (a) the testimony collapses; on (b) it stands. The Mehaber ruled like (a) — he writes expressly that “I do not know” counts as a denial — and that is the text we follow.
Siman 127 has four seifim — that is the count announced by its heading (ובו ד׳ סעיפים), and it is the real count of the text. The distribution is wildly uneven: seif 1 alone carries two thirds of the siman and alternates four times between Mehaber and Rama, while seif 4 is a single line. Here is the overall map, as it emerges from the text itself.
| Seif | Subject | Ruling (anchored in the text) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | when one witness is believed to prohibit | Believed if the wine is in his hand; believed if he spoke at the first meeting, even against the owner's denial; otherwise not believed if the owner denies or says “I do not know” — but silence counts as admission. Rama: the owner is taught to say “I do not believe you”, and then it is permitted according to all, for owners are believed about their own; a third party's denial achieves nothing so long as the owners are present and silent. Mehaber (continued): silence counts as admission only if the witness said “it happened in your presence” or “you know there are grounds”; and one who kept silent and then explains that he was collecting his thoughts is believed. Rama (continued): an amtla for the delay, migo against witnesses, שוויה אנפשיה, the butcher who retracts, two brothers who count as one, those disqualified as witnesses, and the two partners. |
| 2 | the worker who loses his wage | All the above applies only where he works for nothing, or for a wage he does not forfeit — he says it happened under duress, or he was hired for a trifle. But if he was hired for much and forfeits his whole wage — he says it happened through his own negligence — he is believed even though the wine is no longer in his hand and even though he did not speak at the first meeting. Rama: provided the loss of the wage is plain and known to all; if the worker could have thought he was not losing it, he is not believed. |
| 3 | the general rule | One witness is believed in matters of prohibition to permit, but not to be stringent. Rama: except in a matter that can be clarified (“come and I will show you a non-Jew making your wine nesekh”) — there one must heed his words; except in something with no established status either way — there he is believed even to prohibit; and a man is always believed about what is his. Then the limits: a woman, a minor, and the cross-references to simanim 119 and 185. |
| 4 | the child entrusted with watching | In something with no established status of prohibition but only a concern that a non-Jew may swap it or touch it — there is one who says that one relies on a minor, once he has reached the awareness required to guard. |
« ל׳ הטור כגון שנתנו בידו לשומרו ור״ל דל״ת דבידו היינו בידו לנסכו אלא דהיינו שנתנו בידו לשומרו »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק א
« והשטה המחוורת בש״ס היא שטת הראב״ד והרשב״א דמפרשים הך דאמרינן בהנזקין דאי אשכחי׳ וא״ל מיד נאמן בשותק »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ג
« אלא כיון ששותק נראה שיודע רגלים לדבר וסומך על העד »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י
Lema'asse (the first minute). This siman is decided in the few seconds after the witness speaks, and it is worth knowing beforehand what one will have to do. Three questions, in order: is the bottle in the keeping of the one who is speaking? is this the first meeting with the owner since the events? and what does the owner answer? What cannot be recovered is time: a denial must come תוך כדי דבור, and silence, once settled, counts as admission. For any real application, ask your Rav.
« פי׳ מלמדים אותו קודם שא״ל העד שכשיבא העד ויאמר לו יאמר לו מיד תוך כדי דיבור איני מאמינך ואין מלמדין אותו להכחישו דהיאך ילמדוהו לשקר »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״א
The Rama rules that even if the owner inwardly believes him as two witnesses there is no need to be stringent — and at once adds the limit: ודוקא ביין נסך שאין לדקדק בו כל כך אבל בשאר איסורים לא מהני אם אמר איני מאמינך אם מאמין בלבו. The Shach refuses to read Rabbenu Tam as licensing a man to say the opposite of what he thinks; to him the sentence means “for this matter you are not to me as two” — and once said, it has genuinely cancelled the witness's credibility. The Taz, in the first note of the siman, records that some do not accept the mechanism at all.
« אלא ר״ת ה״ק דאפילו אי מהימן ליה כב׳ יכול לומר איני מאמינך כלומר לדבר זה לא מהימנת לי כב׳ »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ט״ו
« כי יש חולקין וס״ל דכל שהוא מאמין בלבו שאומר אמת אין מועיל מה שמכחישו ועל זה נאמר ויראת מאלהיך »
— ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק א
« ובאשר הדברים ניכרים מאד שהאמת אתו והבעלים מאמינים לו נראה דכ״ע מודים שאין מלמדים לבעל היין לומר איני מאמינך »
— פתחי תשובה יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ו, בשם שו״ת חוות יאיר סימן ע״ז
« ואז מותר לכל העולם וכן כתב הרב בסוף הסעיף ואפילו אמר איני יודע מותר לכל העולם »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ו
Lema'asse (what one answers, and what one does not). The siman puts one sentence, and one only, in the owner's mouth: “I do not believe you”. It never puts “it did not happen” there. Between the two lies the whole distance from a halakhic mechanism to a lie, and the Shach wrote it down. Still, the Taz notes views on which the sentence is worth nothing when the heart says otherwise, and the Rama confines it to wine. An honest conscience is not settled by a table: this is exactly a question for a Rav.
Works: “I was silent to settle my mind and remember” — that is the Mehaber's own formula. Also works, according to the Taz: “I was silent because I assumed you knew and I did not, and I have now heard from others that you are not reliable” — provided he can substantiate it from those others. Does not work: “I was silent because I did not care to answer you”. The Taz explains why the very same excuse is accepted in monetary admissions and rejected here:
« אבל כאן אין אדם עשוי שלא לחוש אם אומרים שהוא שותה איסור »
— ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ב
« נ״ל דוקא אם מכחישו אח״כ אבל אם אמר ליה אח״כ איני יודע ומה ששתקתי תחלה לא מפני שהודיתי כו׳ העד נאמן לכ״ע »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״ז
« בסי׳ א׳ סעיף י״ג כתבתי שאין לפסוק כן »
— ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ג
Lema'asse (retraction). Remember the sorting rule, easy to state and hard to apply: an amtla is accepted when it explains conduct that makes sense independently of the speaker's present interest — fear, forgetfulness, deliberation. It is refused when it amounts to “it did not matter to me”, because a man told he is drinking something forbidden does care. As for the butcher, the Taz expressly disagrees: do not rely on it. A real retraction, with its circumstances, belongs to a Rav — not to a criterion.
« ולכן אין להתיר כ״א לצורך גדול »
— פתחי תשובה יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ז, בשם ספר בכור שור
Lema'asse (what one says out loud). This paragraph is the reason one does not declare a bottle forbidden loosely, “just to be safe”. A sentence once uttered has an effect of its own on the one who utters it, and undoing it requires a pressing need and a posek. Conversely, one who has seen something need not stay quiet: the siman gives him a framework for speaking. The measure between the two belongs to your Rav.
« לאו כל שכרו אלא ה״ה אם הטעות שסובר שמקצת שכרו יפסיד והוא סך מועט ג״כ דינא הכי »
— ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ד
« אע״פ שנאמן להפסיד שכרו אינו נאמן להפסיד היין שכבר מכרהו »
— פתחי תשובה יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ח, בשם שו״ת שבות יעקב ח״ב סימן ע״א
« יין נסך בזה״ז אין להחמיר כולי האי »
— פתחי תשובה יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ח, בשם שו״ת שבות יעקב ח״ב סימן ע״א
« דדוקא במעיד על דבר השייך לחברו ואין לו נגיעה בדבר משא״כ אם ההיזק מגיע גם לו כגון שיש לו חלק בדבר ההוא אפי׳ שמיני שבשמינית מתוך שנאמן על שלו נאמן גם על של חבירו »
— פתחי תשובה יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י, בשם שו״ת חוות יאיר סימן ק״ט
Lema'asse (the employee and the partner). Two opposite reflexes, and both are in the siman. An employee who accuses himself — “it was my fault, I let it happen” — is the strongest witness in the siman, provided his fault visibly costs him his wage. A guest with nothing to lose is the weakest: seif 3 does not believe him to prohibit. And between them, a man with a share in the bottle becomes strong again, however tiny his share. But as soon as money already paid is at stake — wine resold, stock delivered — we have left the ground of prohibition for that of money, and the Shvut Yaakov stops. That is precisely where one needs a Rav and not an argument.
This is the commonest question of all, because he is usually the one talking: the waiter, the delivery man, the workman. The Shach gathers the poskim on the point, and the rule is symmetrical — neither to prohibit nor to permit.
« ולענין עדות העובדי כוכבים כתבו הפוסקים בכמה דוכתי דאין העובדי כוכבים נאמן לא לאיסור ולא להיתר »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ׳
« ועוד יש כאן סברא גדולה להתיר משום די״ל אוקי גברא להדי גברא ואוקי חמרא בחזקת היתירא דמעיקרא »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״ד
Lema'asse (who speaks, and with what weight). Before weighing what is said, weigh who says it. A non-Jew: his word has no effect either way. Two brothers: one witness. A man otherwise disqualified: admissible, unless suspect in this matter. Two witnesses who contradict each other: the Shach gives a substantive reason to permit, but he writes it at the close of a note in which he also records stringent views. The Pitchei Teshuva adds a responsum of the Chatam Sofer about a theft in a cellar where the witnesses disagreed about the thief's identity, and there the answer turns entirely on the facts and on the local majorities. In other words: from two conflicting voices onward, a Rav decides.
« כלומר תמצא דעד א׳ נאמן באיסורים להתיר אפי׳ בלא שתיקת הבע״ד דתהוי כהודאה אבל להחמיר לא תמצא דהעד נאמן בלא שתיקת הבע״ד »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ״ג
« מכאן יש להוכיח דכל דבר שיכול להתברר עד א׳ נאמן עליו ואפילו עד א׳ מכחישו »
— תוספות קידושין ס״ו ע״ב ד״ה שלח ואחוי
« וגם מוכח בש״ס שם דאפילו הבע״ד מכחישו נאמן בדבר דאיכא לברורי »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ״ד
« פירוש שצריך לילך עמו אבל אם הלך עמו ולא מצאו אין כאן איסור כן נראה לי פשוט »
— ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ה
Lema'asse (“come and I will show you”). When somebody claims that something is happening right now, and it can still be checked, the siman does not allow a shrug: one must go. But the Taz adds the half that is always forgotten — if one goes and finds nothing, there is no prohibition. So this is not a machine for prohibiting: it is a duty to go and look. What one does with what one has seen, however, belongs to your Rav.
« וכן דבר שיש בו טרחא אין הנשים נאמנות דנשים עצלניות הן »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ל׳
« מיהו היכא דהוא בידו הקטן נאמן אפילו להוציא דבר מחזקתו להתיר או לאסור »
— ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ל״א
Everything above concerns a minor who testifies. The Pitchei Teshuva brings from the Beit Yaakov the opposite case — the witness addresses a minor, and it is the minor who keeps silent or denies — and there, he writes, his law is that of an adult, and the same holds for a woman. The reason runs through the whole siman: a man is believed about what is his, and that credibility is not the credibility of a witness.
« דאם אמר ע״א לקטן נתנסך יינך והקטן שותק או מכחישו דינו כמו גדול אף שאינו נאמן להעיד באיסורין מ״מ כה״ג נאמן וה״ה באשה כה״ג »
— פתחי תשובה יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ב, בשם שו״ת בית יעקב סימן ק״נ
Lema'asse (the child). Distinguish three questions that are always confused. Can a child serve as a guardian — the siman says yes, once he has the awareness required to guard, and that is seif 4. Can a child prohibit by his word — the siman says no, apart from the Rashba's case where one is to be stringent. Can a child defend what is his — the Pitchei Teshuva says yes, like an adult. Where it turns delicate is age, maturity, and the exact nature of what was entrusted to him. These are questions for a Rav, and they are asked about the actual child, not about an age on a chart.
| Modern case | Tool of the siman | Direction (to be confirmed with your Rav) |
|---|---|---|
| A non-Jewish waiter says himself that he poured or touched the bottle | ש״ך ס״ק כ׳ | His word has no halakhic effect — neither to prohibit nor to permit. It creates no prohibition; but neither does it dispel a concern grounded in something else. The question reverts to what we know apart from his words. |
| A Jewish guest says: “I saw the waiter pour into this bottle” | Seif 1 · seif 3 | He is neither guardian nor employee: he is an ordinary witness, and seif 3 does not believe him to prohibit. Everything then turns on the owner's answer — silence or denial — and on the first meeting. |
| The owner answers “I do not believe you” | הגה סעיף א׳ · ש״ך ס״ק י״א · ט״ז ס״ק א | The Rama goes so far as to teach it; the Shach specifies that it is taught beforehand, and never as a denial of the facts. The Taz records views on which the sentence is worth nothing if the heart believes the witness. The Rama in any case confines it to yayin nesekh. |
| The owner answers “I do not know” | Seif 1 · ש״ך ס״ק ו | The Mehaber expressly equates this answer with a denial: the witness is not believed, and the Shach writes that the wine is then permitted to the whole world. |
| The owner says nothing | Seif 1 · ש״ך ס״ק י | שתיקה כהודאה דמיא, provided the witness said “in your presence” or “you know there are grounds”. A denial must come תוך כדי דבור. |
| The mashgiach, the cellarman, the employee holding the bottle in trust | Seif 1 · ש״ך ס״ק א | This is the case of בידו: he is believed with no further condition, because he stands over what is in his keeping as its owner does. |
| An employee comes forward weeks after the event | הגה סעיף א׳ · פת״ש ס״ק ו | An amtla is needed — a reason for his silence. Fear of the employer is one, and the Chavot Yair accepted it in an almost identical case; the Rama then writes יש לחוש לדבריו. |
| An employee says it happened through his fault, and he forfeits his wage | Seif 2 · ט״ז ס״ק ד | He is the strongest witness in the siman: believed even though the wine is no longer his and even though he did not speak at once. The loss must be evident; the Taz adds that a partial loss suffices. |
| The wine has already been resold and the money collected | פת״ש ס״ק ח | The Shvut Yaakov stops there: believing the witness would mean extracting money on the word of one man, and he concludes that one should not be so stringent about yayin nesekh nowadays. |
| The speaker himself has a share in the bottle | פת״ש ס״ק י | Counter-intuitive: the stake makes him more credible, not less — even for a minute share — because a man is believed about what is his. |
| “Come and I will show you” — the scene can still be checked | הגה סעיף ג׳ · ט״ז ס״ק ה | One must go: this is דבר דאיכא לברורי, and the Shach writes that it holds even against a denial. But if one goes and finds nothing, the Taz is clear: there is no prohibition. |
| Two people say opposite things | ש״ך ס״ק י״ד · פת״ש ס״ק ה | The Shach records both routes and adds a substantive reason to permit — set man against man and leave the wine in its original status. The Chatam Sofer treats a real case turning entirely on local majorities. A question for a Rav. |
| Somebody declared the bottle forbidden, then thought better of it | הגה סעיף א׳ · פת״ש ס״ק ז | For him it stays forbidden — שוייה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא — even if nobody else follows him. The Bekhor Shor opens a gap only for a pressing need. |
| A child says a non-Jew touched the bottle | הגה סעיף ג׳ | He has no status as a witness. But if he is sharp, knows the subject, and there are grounds supporting his words, the Rashba requires stringency. |
| A child is left watching the table while one steps away | Seif 4 · ש״ך ס״ק ל״א | The siman allows it, once he has reached the awareness required to guard, and because there is no established prohibition here but only a concern. The criterion is the mishnah in Sukkah, not an age. |
| A witness says mevushal wine had been made nesekh before boiling | ש״ך ס״ק א | The Shach draws the consequence expressly: he is not believed, even if the wine is now in his keeping, for want of a migo. The Pitchei Teshuva discusses the exact scope of the case (פת״ש ס״ק א). |
| A woman says she checked or prepared it herself | הגה סעיף ג׳ · ש״ך ס״ק כ״ט–ל׳ | Believed to say “I did it”, where the thing is hers or in her power. The Rama and the Shach set limits: not on a doubt to be resolved, not where there are grounds for leniency, and not on a laborious task. |
Lema'asse. Before putting the question, gather the facts the siman calls for, in this order: who is speaking (Jew or not, adult or minor, man or woman, related to another witness); in what capacity (guardian, employee, guest); when (is this the first meeting since the event, and if not, why the delay); what exactly he said (“in your presence”, “you know there are grounds”, “come and I will show you”); what the owner answers (nothing, a denial, “I do not know”); what he stands to lose; and what is at stake (a glass, a bottle, stock already sold). With those seven items the question becomes answerable. Without them no table can answer — and with them, it is your Rav who answers.
| Question | Measure (in practice) | Source |
|---|---|---|
| The wine is in the keeping of the speaker | Believed | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ש״ך ס״ק א ; גיטין נ״ד ע״ב |
| He spoke at the first meeting | Believed, even against the owner's denial | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| Neither of those, and the owner denies | Not believed | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| The owner says “I do not know” | Counts as a denial ; permitted to all | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ש״ך ס״ק ו |
| “Perhaps you did not look carefully” | Counts as a denial | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ז |
| The owner keeps silent | Counts as admission — if the witness said “in your presence” or “you know” | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ש״ך ס״ק י |
| Time allowed for a denial | תוך כדי דבור | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א (מרדכי פרק האומר) |
| “I do not believe you” | Permitted ; taught beforehand, never as a denial of facts | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; טור יו״ד סימן קכ״ז ; ש״ך ס״ק י״א |
| He believes him inwardly | The Rama is not stringent, for wine only ; the Taz records opposing views | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ט״ז ס״ק א ; ש״ך ס״ק ט״ו |
| Silence, then “I was collecting my thoughts” | Believed | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ט״ז ס״ק ב |
| Silence, then “I do not know” | The witness remains believed according to all | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״ז |
| The witness was late, with a reason | יש לחוש לדבריו | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| The butcher who retracts with an amtla | The Rama records “יש מי שאומר” that he is believed ; the Taz refuses the ruling | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ט״ז ס״ק ג |
| He declared it forbidden and witnesses contradict him | Forbidden to him alone — שוייה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; פת״ש ס״ק ז |
| Worker paid little, or force majeure | As in seif 1 — no added credibility | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ב |
| Worker who forfeits his whole wage through his fault | Believed, even without the wine and without speaking at once | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ב ; גיטין נ״ד ע״ב |
| The loss is not evident to all | Not believed | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ב (רבינו ירוחם) |
| Partial loss of the wage | Sufficient | ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ד |
| The wine was resold at a profit | Not believed — money is not extracted on one witness | פת״ש יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ח |
| The witness has a share, however small | Believed, including about another's share | פת״ש יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י |
| Two brothers | One witness | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:א (רשב״א סימן תקמ״ד) |
| Those disqualified as witnesses | Admissible for prohibitions, unless suspect in the matter | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ש״ך ס״ק כ׳ |
| A non-Jew | Not believed — neither to prohibit nor to permit | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ׳ |
| Two partners, one silent and one denying | Forbidden to the silent one ; permitted to the other and to all | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:א (הגהות אלפסי) |
| Two witnesses who contradict each other | The Shach records the views and adds a substantive reason to permit | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״ד |
| The general rule | Believed to permit, not to be stringent | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ג ; ש״ך ס״ק כ״ג |
| Something that can be checked | One must heed his words — even against a denial | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ג ; ש״ך ס״ק כ״ד ; תוספות קידושין ס״ו ע״ב |
| They went and found nothing | No prohibition | ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ה |
| Status established neither way | Believed even to prohibit | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| Status established as forbidden | Not believed to permit, unless he can repair it | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| Two pieces, one permitted and one forbidden | Believed to say which is which | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ג (ר״ן) |
| A man about what is his | Believed, even where the prohibition is established | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| A woman: “I did it / prepared it” | Believed, where it is hers or in her power ; not on a doubt nor on a laborious task | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ג ; ש״ך ס״ק כ״ט–ל׳ |
| A minor as a witness | No status as a witness ; but a sharp minor with grounds — be stringent | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ג (ריב״ש רמ״ה ; רשב״א כ״ד) |
| A minor, rabbinic prohibition, leniently | Believed — unless the prohibition is established | הגה יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| A minor as a guardian | Relied upon once he has the awareness required to guard | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ד ; ש״ך ס״ק ל״א ; סוכה מ״ב ע״א |
| The witness addresses a minor or a woman who owns the wine | Their silence or denial counts as an adult's | פת״ש יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ב |
| Posek | Decisive contribution (anchored in the corpus) |
|---|---|
| Mehaber (ד׳ סעיפים) | s.1: the three gates — בידו, the first meeting, silence — and the condition on silence (בפניך / ידעת דרגלים לדבר), plus the amtla of one who kept silent; s.2: the worker who forfeits his whole wage; s.3: the general rule, believed to permit and not to be stringent; s.4: the minor who has reached the awareness required to guard. |
| Rama (הגה on s.1, s.2, s.3) | s.1: the owner is taught to say “I do not believe you”; a third party's denial achieves nothing while the owners are present and silent; the Rashba's reservation; the limit to yayin nesekh alone; the amtla of a witness who was late; migo against witnesses and שוויה אנפשיה; the butcher; two brothers; those disqualified; the two partners. s.2: the loss must be evident. s.3: דבר דאיכא לברורי; what has no chazaka; the two pieces; a man about what is his; the woman; the minor; and the cross-references to simanim 119 and 185 and to Even HaEzer 152. |
| Taz (טורי זהב, ז׳ ס״ק) | note 1: some do not accept “I do not believe you” when the heart believes — ויראת מאלהיך; note 2: the sorting of amtlaot, and why “I did not care to answer” fails here; note 3: refusal of the ruling about the butcher; note 4: a partial loss of wage suffices; note 5: “come and I will show you” obliges one to go — and if nothing is found, no prohibition; note 6: the long objection about unporged meat, and the daily practice of believing anyone who says it was porged; note 7: the butter case and the cross-reference to siman 185. |
| Shach (שפתי כהן, ל״ב ס״ק) | note 1: בידו means entrusted to guard, not a migo — and the mevushal wine case; note 3: the great difficulty of one witness against the owner, and the way of the Raavad and the Rashba; note 6: when the owner denies, permitted to all; note 7: “perhaps you did not look carefully” counts as a denial; note 10: silence is not a literal admission; note 11: taught beforehand, and never to lie; note 14: the two contradicting witnesses, and אוקי גברא להדי גברא; note 15: the correct reading of Rabbenu Tam; note 16: the great dispute about one who is silent from ignorance; note 17: a later “I do not know” unsettles nothing; note 20: those disqualified, and a non-Jew never believed; note 23: why “not to be stringent” is a statement of fact; note 24: איכא לברורי is an explicit Gemara; notes 26-29: unestablished status, the two pieces, the woman; note 30: a laborious task; note 31: the minor, and what is in his keeping. |
| Pitchei Teshuva (ט״ז ס״ק) | note 1: mevushal wine and the Dagul Mervava; note 2: a minor or a woman who owns the wine may deny like an adult; note 3: the force of “it seems to me I saw”; note 5: the Chatam Sofer's responsum on the thief in the cellar; note 6: the servant who confesses — the amtla of fear, and the case where “I do not believe you” is not taught; note 7: may one eat in private what one forbade to oneself; note 8: wine already resold; note 10: a man with a share is believed about the whole; note 13: the two pieces when the forbidden ones are the majority. |
| Rambam (הלכות מטמאי משכב ומושב פרק י״ג) | halakha 8: the frame of seif 1 before the fact — the silent one is believed, denial preserves the chazaka until two witnesses testify, and the distinction between the first and the second meeting. |
| Gemara (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב · קידושין ס״ה–ס״ו) | גיטין נ״ד ע״ב: כל שבידו נאמן, and the two scribes — the one who forfeits his whole wage and the one who forfeits only part; קידושין ס״ה ע״ב: the silence of the man told “you ate chelev”; קידושין ס״ו ע״ב: אלא דשתיק, and the שלח אחוי from which Tosafot derive דבר דאיכא לברורי. |
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