A man comes and tells his fellow: your wine was made yayin nesekh. His sentence costs somebody else a barrel. When is it enough? The wine still in his hands, the word spoken at the very first meeting, the silence that counts as admission, the answer “I do not believe you”, the worker who forfeits his wage — and the general rule of the single witness, which outgrows wine and underpins all of Yoreh De'ah
Structured review, psak tables, rapid memorisation
« האומר לחבירו נתנסך יינך אם הוא בידו נאמן » (שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א).
The braita from which everything flows was not about wine at all, but about purity: « היה עושה עמו בטהרות ואמר לו טהרות שעשיתי עמך נטמאו » (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב).
| The source | What it establishes | Its trace in the siman |
|---|---|---|
| The braita of the worker and the טהרות (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב) | He who works with you is believed to report the damage — but not to date it | The very division of seif 1 |
| Abbaye: « אמר אביי כל שבידו נאמן » (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב) | What remains in his hands, he is believed to declare forbidden | The first branch of seif 1 |
| Rava: « רבא אמר כגון דאשכחיה ולא אמר ליה ולא מידי ולבתר הכי אשכחיה ואמר ליה » (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב) | Silence at the first meeting undoes whatever is said later | The second and third branches of seif 1 |
| Abbaye on the silence of the accused: « אמר לו עד אחד אכלת חלב והלה שותק נאמן » (קידושין ס״ה ע״ב) | Silence in the face of a charge counts as admission | The closing words שתיקה כהודאה דמיא |
| The scribe and the sefer Torah (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב) | He who loses his wage by speaking is believed on that ground alone | The reversal of seif 2 |
There the gemara rules in the phrase that seif 2 will unfold: « מתוך שאתה נאמן להפסיד שכרך אתה נאמן להפסיד ספר תורה » (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב).
On the third question the Mehaber states the condition in so many words: « והוא שיאמר לו נתנסך יינך בפניך או שאמר ליה ידעת דרגלים לדבר » (שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א).
And the ש״ך warns that this silence is no admission in the strict sense: « לאו כהודאה ממש … אלא כיון ששותק נראה שיודע רגלים לדבר וסומך על העד » (ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י).
Basis: seif 1 of the Mehaber, with the ש״ך. The sorting is by how the speaker stands to the wine, and not by his piety or by how plausible he sounds.
| His standing | The Mehaber's wording | Ruling | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| The wine is בידו — he keeps it and still holds it | « האומר לחבירו נתנסך יינך אם הוא בידו נאמן » | Believed, with no further condition | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He gave it back, but spoke at the first meeting | « ואפילו אם אינו עתה בידו שכבר הוחזר לבעלים אם בפעם ראשון שמצאו אמר לו נתנסך יינך נאמן » | Believed — אפי׳ אם הבעל מכחישו | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He gave it back and spoke only afterwards | « אבל אם אינו בידו ולא אמר כן לבעל בפעם ראשון שראהו וא״ל אחר כך אינו נאמן » | Not believed, once the owner responds | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| The same case, but the owner does not respond | « אבל אם שתק שתיקה כהודאה דמיא » | The wine is forbidden | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He never had the wine in hand | summary : even at the first meeting he is believed only where the owner keeps silent | Not believed against a denial | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ה |
| He delayed, but offers a reason for delaying | « ואם לא הגיד לו בפעם ראשון שמצאו ואומר לו אח״כ ואמר אמתלא למה לא אמר לו בראשונה יש לחוש לדבריו » | His words must be taken into account | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
Once the word is out, everything turns on the man facing it. The siman knows three answers, and a fourth that is a delayed one.
| What the owner answers | Effect | Ruling | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| He denies — מכחישו | An owner is believed about his own against a single mouth | Permitted — and, says the ש״ך, permitted to everybody | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ו |
| He says “I do not know” | No admission, so nothing is added to the speaker's word | Permitted | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He only says שמא לא דקדקת | summary : this counts as a denial | Permitted | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ז |
| He keeps silent, and the speaker had told him בפניך or ידעת דרגלים לדבר | The silence is received as an acknowledgement | Forbidden | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He kept silent, then denies and explains the silence | « מה ששתקתי תחילה לא בשביל שהודיתי אלא להתיישב ולחשוב בלבי לזכור אם הוא אמת » | The owner is believed | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He kept silent, then says only “I do not know” | summary : the witness is then believed by all opinions | Forbidden | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״ז |
To seif 1 the Rama adds a practice that spread widely, and a limit that is regularly forgotten.
« ומלמדי׳ אותו לכתחלה שיאמר איני מאמינך ואז לכ״ע שרי דבעלים נאמנים על שלהם » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א).
And he adds that the inner conviction does not undo the spoken answer: « ואם הבעלים אומרים איני מאמינך אע״ג דבלבו מאמין לו כבי תרי אין להחמיר » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א).
The device is not a lie, and the ש״ך insists on it: summary : one instructs him in advance, so that he answers תוך כדי דיבור when the witness comes — and one does not teach him to deny, « דהיאך ילמדוהו לשקר » (ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״א).
The difference is total: “I do not believe you” is a refusal to receive one man's word, which the law allows; “it never happened” would be an assertion about the facts, and that is taught to nobody.
Then comes the limit, the most quoted sentence in the siman and the most often quoted out of place: « ודוקא ביין נסך שאין לדקדק בו כל כך אבל בשאר איסורים לא מהני אם אמר איני מאמינך אם מאמין בלבו » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א).
The ט״ז supplies the ground for that restriction: « כי יש חולקין וס״ל דכל שהוא מאמין בלבו שאומר אמת אין מועיל מה שמכחישו ועל זה נאמר ויראת מאלהיך » (ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק א).
The Rama goes on with three neighbouring cases that must not be melted into one.
| Situation | Ruling | Ground | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| A third party contradicts the speaker, while the owners stand there and keep silent | The third party's denial achieves nothing | The owners' silence weighs more than a stranger's word | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| A third party contradicts, and the owners are not there | The denial takes effect | No silence is left to be read | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| An opinion in the name of הרשב״א: « ויש מי שכתב דעד אחד בהכחשה לאו כלום הוא » | One man's denial is void of itself | The first witness, once received, counts as two | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| The ש״ך on that opinion | He finds it very hard to sustain | summary : he sees no reason for a denial to be void even where the owners are absent | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״ד |
| Two partners: « אחד שאומר לשני שותפים נתנסך יינכם ואחד שותק והשני מכחישו » | Forbidden to the one who kept silent, permitted to the other and to everybody | Each is judged by his own mouth | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He is believed by מיגו, but witnesses contradict him | He forbids it to nobody, save to himself | « מ״מ לדידיה אסור משום דשוייה אנפשיה חתיכה דאיסורא » | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
The gemara had put the question in four words, and the whole discussion starts there: « עד אחד בהכחשה מי מהימן » (קידושין ס״ה ע״ב).
Seif 2 revisits the whole of seif 1 with a במה דברים אמורים : the conditions of the first meeting and of the wine still held apply in one case only — where speaking costs the speaker nothing.
« במה דברים אמורים כשעושה עמו בחנם או אפי׳ בשכר והוא בענין שלא יפסיד שכירותו » (שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ב).
« אבל אם שכרו הרבה והוא בענין שמפסיד כל שכרו כגון שאומר שנתנסך בפשיעתו נאמן אפילו אינו עתה בידו » (שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ב).
The principle comes from the scribe who reports having written a sefer Torah improperly: « מתוך שאתה נאמן להפסיד שכרך אתה נאמן להפסיד ספר תורה » (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב).
Just before, the gemara had brought the opposite position, that of רבי אמי: « נאמן אתה להפסיד שכרך ואי אתה נאמן להפסיד ספר תורה » (גיטין נ״ד ע״ב).
In seifim 3 and 4 the siman stops being a siman about wine. In six words it states one of the most heavily used rules in all of Yoreh De'ah.
« עד אחד נאמן באיסורים להתיר אבל לא להחמיר » (שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ג).
The ש״ך explains why the second half is not a stringency but an observation: « כלומר תמצא דעד א׳ נאמן באיסורים להתיר אפי׳ בלא שתיקת הבע״ד דתהוי כהודאה אבל להחמיר לא תמצא דהעד נאמן בלא שתיקת הבע״ד » (ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ״ג).
In other words: where nothing is established, the object is already doubtful without the witness; where the permitted status is established, one witness alone does not overturn it. The Rama then opens four breaches in that rule, and it is the breaches that are remembered.
| The breach | What it allows | Ruling | Source |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. דבר דאיכא לברורי — « בא ואראך עובד כוכבים מנסך יינך » | A verifiable claim obliges one to verify | His words must be reckoned with | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| The ט״ז pins down the duty | « פירוש שצריך לילך עמו אבל אם הלך עמו ולא מצאו אין כאן איסור כן נראה לי פשוט » | Checked and found nothing: no prohibition here | ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ה |
| The ש״ך objects to the Rama's phrasing | « לא ה״ל להרב לכתוב כן בלשון י״א דש״ס ערוך הוא » | This is no mere minority view | ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ״ד |
| 2. Nothing is established — neither permitted nor forbidden | « וכל דבר שלא אתחזק לא להיתר ולא לאיסור עד אחד נאמן עליו אפילו לאסרו » | The witness is believed even to forbid | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| 3. The prohibition is established — טבל, meat not cleaned | « אין העד נאמן עליו להתירו אלא א״כ בידו לתקנו » | Not believed to permit, unless he can put it right | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| Two pieces, one forbidden and one permitted | « ואם היו בכאן ב׳ חתיכות אחת של איסור ואחת של היתר נאמן העד לומר זה היתר וזה איסור » | Believed to tell them apart | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| 4. About his own | « ואדם נאמן על שלו אפי׳ היכא דאתחזק איסורא » | Believed, even against a חזקת איסור | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
The Rama closes his gloss with three cross-references that should not be dropped: to Siman 119 for a man suspect on the very matter he comes to attest, to Siman 185 for one who invokes a sage who denies it, and to Even HaEzer 152 for הפה שאסר הוא הפה שהתיר.
« וכל הפסולי עדות כשרים לענין איסורים אם לא שחשוד לאותם דברים » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א).
Those the law bars from a court remain admissible in matters of issur — unless they are suspect on the very matter at hand. The ש״ך notes, however, that the הר״ן, cited as the source, writes the opposite elsewhere, and offers a distinction: to permit, a disqualified man is certainly believed (ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ). And two witnesses are not always two: « ב׳ אחים אינם אלא כעד אחד לענין איסורים » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א).
« ואשה נאמנת בדבר איסור לומר תקנתיו » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג).
She is believed where the prohibition is certain and the task is a defined one — the נִיקּוּר of meat. She is not believed in a doubt, nor where the matter admits of grounds for leniency: « אין אשה נאמנת דאשה דעתה קלה להקל » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג). The ש״ך adds two decisive qualifications: summary : she is believed even on a Torah prohibition, but only where putting it right lies in her power or the object is hers (ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק כ״ט); and he excludes whatever calls for prolonged toil — « וכן דבר שיש בו טרחא אין הנשים נאמנות דנשים עצלניות הן » (ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק ל).
« קטן אין לו דין עד להיות נאמן באיסורין » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג).
The Rama lays down the rule, then qualifies it three times. First towards stringency: « מ״מ בקטן חריף ובקי בדבר ואיכא רגלים לדבריו יש להחמיר אם מעיד על דבר איסור » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג). Then towards leniency, and only in the rabbinic sphere: « ואם מעיד על איסור דרבנן להקל ולא אתחזק איסורא … כגון בדיקת חמץ נאמן דהמנוהו רבנן בדרבנן » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג). Finally the closing bar: « אבל אם אתחזק איסורא אינו נאמן כלל » (רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג).
« דברים שאין בהם חזקת איסו׳ אלא חששא שמא יחליפנו עובד כוכבים או יגע בו יש מי שאומר שסומכין על הקטן מכיון שבא לכלל דעת שמירה » (שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ד).
The shift is sharp, and it is what closes the siman on its opening subject. The minor is not asked to testify that nothing happened: he is asked to have guarded. Where there is no חזקת איסור at all and only the fear that a non-Jew swapped the thing or touched it, a child who has come to דעת שמירה is enough to lay that fear to rest. The Mehaber gives it as יש מי שאומר: a reported opinion, not a settled matter.
| Seif | Subject | The essential |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Who is believed to say נתנסך יינך | One who tells his fellow that his wine was made yayin nesekh is believed if the wine is in his hands; and even if it is no longer, having been returned to the owners, he is believed if he said so at the first meeting — even where the owner denies it. But if it is no longer his to hold and he spoke only afterwards, he is not believed once the owner denies or says “I do not know”; if the owner keeps silent, silence counts as admission. And all this only where he told him “in your presence” or “you know there is ground for it”; if the owner kept silent and then explains his silence — I was collecting my thoughts to remember — he is believed. Rama: the owner is taught in advance to answer “I do not believe you”, and then it is permitted by all opinions, for owners are believed about their own; a third party's denial achieves nothing while the owners stand there and keep silent; a man contradicted by witnesses forbids it to nobody, yet the wine stays forbidden to himself; those disqualified as witnesses are admissible in matters of issur, and two brothers count as one; and of two partners, the one who kept silent has his wine forbidden, the other does not. |
| 2 | The worker who forfeits his wage | All of that holds where he works for him for free, or even for a wage where he loses nothing by speaking — say he ascribes the mishap to an אונס, or he was hired for very little. But if he was hired dearly and forfeits his whole wage — because he says the wine was spoilt through his own negligence — he is believed even though the wine is no longer in his hands and even though he said nothing at the first meeting. Rama: provided the forfeiture is plain and known to all; if one may hold that the worker is mistaken and thinks his wage safe, he is not believed — even though he does forfeit as a matter of law. |
| 3 | The general rule of the single witness | One witness is believed in matters of issur to permit, but not to be stringent. Rama: yet in a matter that can be checked — “come and I will show you a non-Jew making your wine nesekh” — his words must be reckoned with. Where nothing is established, neither permitted nor forbidden, he is believed even to forbid. Where the prohibition is established — טבל, meat not cleaned — he is not believed to permit, unless it lies in his power to put it right; but between two pieces, one forbidden and one permitted, he is believed to say which is which. Everyone is believed about his own, even against a חזקת איסור. A woman is believed to say “I have put it right” where the prohibition is certain, not in a doubt nor where there are grounds for leniency. A minor has no standing as a witness; but if he is sharp, expert and his words have support, one is stringent, and he is believed to be lenient in a rabbinic prohibition — such as בדיקת חמץ — so long as nothing forbidden is established. |
| 4 | The minor as a keeper | In matters with no חזקת איסור at all, but only the fear that a non-Jew swapped the thing or touched it, there is an opinion that one relies on the minor, once he has reached the age of knowing how to guard — דעת שמירה. |
| Question | Reflex answer | Source |
|---|---|---|
| The keeper still holds the wine and says it is forbidden? | He is believed | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He returned the wine, but spoke the moment he saw the owner? | Believed, even against the owner's denial | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He returned the wine and spoke only later? | Not believed once the owner denies or says “I do not know” | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| The owner keeps silent? | Silence counts as admission — but only if he was told בפניך or ידעת דרגלים לדבר | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| He kept silent, then explains his silence? | Believed: he was weighing it, not conceding | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| What is he taught to answer in advance? | “I do not believe you” — never “it never happened” | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ש״ך יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק י״א |
| Does that device hold beyond yayin nesekh? | No: elsewhere a man who believes in his heart stays bound | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א ; ט״ז יו״ד קכ״ז ס״ק א |
| Witnesses contradict him — is the wine permitted? | Permitted to all, forbidden to him alone | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:א |
| The worker forfeits his whole wage by speaking? | Believed, without the conditions of seif 1 | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ב |
| But the loss is not plain to everybody? | Not believed, even though he forfeits as a matter of law | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ב |
| One witness, to permit? | Believed — that is the rule | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| One witness, to forbid? | Not believed — unless nothing was established, or he offers to go and show | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ג ; רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| May a woman say “I cleaned it”? | Yes where the prohibition is certain, no in a doubt | רמ״א יו״ד קכ״ז:ג |
| May a child guard wine against a non-Jew? | One opinion allows it, once he has reached דעת שמירה | שו״ע יו״ד קכ״ז:ד |
| Level | Content | Outcome |
|---|---|---|
| 🌱 Level 1 — Base | The text of all 4 seifim, translation, step-by-step explanation | Overall understanding |
| ⚡ Level 2 — Lamdan | The definition of בידו — migo or the standing of a keeper, the nature of שתיקה כהודאה, מיגו במקום עדים and שוייה אנפשיה, and the reach of עד אחד נאמן באיסורים | In-depth study |
| ✨ Level 3 — Synthesis | Two master grids, the four breaches of seif 3, golden rules, mnemonic, pitfalls and a recap of the seifim | Practical mastery and review |
| 📜 Level 4 — Halacha le-ma'aseh | The practical ruling according to the ש״ך, the ט״ז, the פתחי תשובה and the poskim | Contemporary application |
DAAT דעת — © 5786 / 2026 · Back to home · Siman קכ״ז · ♥ Support