Siman 227 — Lamdan: where the benefit of a sale lies (דין מי שאסר עצמו מכל ישראל)

יורה דעה · סימן רכ״ז

דין מי שאסר עצמו מכל ישראל

זבינא מציעא · זבינא חריפא · זבינא דרמי באפיה · דבר שלא בא לעולם · טובת הנאה

📜 רמת הלמדן · Talmid Hakham

✦ ❖ ✦

Level 2 · Four questions: the direction of the benefit, the vow over what does not yet exist, the decree not made, and טובת הנאה

Subject:
שולחן ערוך יורה דעה סימן רכ״ז (ג׳ סעיפים)
עם נושאי כלים: ש״ך (ט׳ ס״ק), ט״ז (ג׳), באר היטב (ו׳), פתחי תשובה (ג׳), בית יוסף, טור
יסוד: משנה נדרים פרק ד׳ · נדרים ל״א ע״א · נדרים ל״א ע״ב · נדרים פ״ד ע״ב · נדרים פ״ה ע״א · משנה נדרים י״א:ג · רמב״ם הלכות נדרים פרק ז׳

Written by:
הרב יוסף חיים סממה · DAAT

Plan of the pilpul

Shmuel’s sugya: three kinds of goods, three directions of benefit
The vow that reaches what is not yet in the world
The decree not made here — and why
טובת הנאה — the mishna’s contradiction and Rava’s answer
The gifts of the poor, and compulsion on tzedaka
What this siman teaches beyond itself

1. Shmuel’s sugya: three kinds of goods, three directions of benefit

The mishna gives the two directions of the vow and their effects on trade. It does not explain why the buyer would pay more and the seller sell for less: that presupposes a theory of benefit in a sale, and it is the gemara that builds it — starting from a rule of Shmuel that has nothing to do with vows.

The sugya’s ḥakira. In a sale, is the benefit a juridical fact — the exchange itself advantages both sides — or an economic one, depending on the goods and the market? Shmuel reasons as an economist: the one who takes the object to inspect it bears the risk because he is the one with something to gain. The gemara concludes that the question “who benefits?” has not one answer but three.

The Shulḥan Arukh takes the three cases in the gemara’s order and draws six branches: for each kind of goods, the direction in which the vow is aimed at himself and the one in which it is aimed at others. The rule generating them all is single — the one who must not benefit is the one who loses — and it has a corollary the Shakh stresses: an even price is not neutral. It is forbidden whenever the sale carries a benefit for the bound party.

2. The vow that reaches what is not yet in the world

A general rule of nedarim holds that one cannot forbid another a thing that does not yet exist — a palm’s future fruit, what one will buy tomorrow. Yet the siman assumes the vow governs all future sales, including goods the vower does not yet hold. The Ran, reported by the Shakh, removes the difficulty by a distinction of subject.

The Ran’s point, in one sentence. A vow bearing on a thing needs the thing to exist. A vow bearing on the man — “let my benefit be forbidden to them” — needs only the man, and the man is in the world. The vow therefore does not attach to future goods: it attaches to him, and makes him unable to give them benefit, whatever the goods.

The corollary is immediate, and the Shakh draws it: where the vow bears not on the benefit but on the property itself, everything reverses. There the vow has already taken hold of the present property, and no price undoes it — even buying a hundred for two hundred stays forbidden. But in exchange, it seizes only what existed then.

3. The decree not made here — and why

In siman 221, one forbidden to benefit from his fellow does not lend to him, lest he borrow from him; and does not sell to him, lest he buy from him. Here seif 2 expressly permits lending. The Shakh and the Taz both give the same reason, drawn from the Rambam by the Tur.

What the argument teaches beyond the siman. A rabbinic decree is a precaution, and a precaution is measured by what it costs. Forbidding the permitted to protect the forbidden makes sense only where the forbidden remains avoidable; a decree that would make life impracticable is not made. The Shakh generalises: this is not about Israel in particular, but about any body large enough that there is nowhere else.

4. טובת הנאה — the mishna’s contradiction and Rava’s answer

The mishna of the eleventh chapter says two things that seem to exclude each other. If he forbade his benefit “to the kohanim and the leviim”, they take against his will: a sign that the right to choose to whom to give — טובת הנאה — is not property. But if he said “these kohanim”, he gives to others: a sign that this right is property. The gemara states the contradiction outright.

Rava refuses to read the first clause as a thesis about טובת הנאה. He reads it as a property of terumah: it is good for nothing but the kohanim. Once this man wishes to forbid it to them, he has reduced it, in his own hands, to dust — and they take it as one takes ownerless property. The contradiction vanishes: טובת הנאה is indeed property, in both clauses.

The Shakh then reports an extension of the Ran that goes far: if the argument holds, it should hold too for one who forbade himself his own property — others could take it from him. The Maharshal, whom he cites, sets the limit: the comparison fails, because what he forbade himself is still usable by him for tzedaka or another mitzva; it is therefore not dust.

5. The gifts of the poor, and compulsion on tzedaka

The move from terumah to tzedaka is no mere analogy: it changes the ground. Terumah is taken because the vow reduced it to nothing; tzedaka is taken because כופין על הצדקה — an obligation the court enforces, vow or no vow. Two distinct routes to one result.

6. What this siman teaches beyond itself

One. “Benefit” is no fixed category. It is read off the market: the same sale advantages the buyer, the seller, or both, according to what is sold. The law of vows here borrows its criterion from economics.

Two. A vow on my person has not the limits of a vow on a thing: that is what lets it reach what does not yet exist.

Three. A precautionary decree is measured by its cost. Where there is nowhere else, it is not enacted.

Four. What has value only for the one you would withhold it from cannot be withheld: to forbid it is to reduce it to nothing in your own hands.

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DAAT · הרב יוסף חיים סממה
תלמיד חכם · מעביר שיעורים בהלכה ובחסידות
סימן רכ״ז · Level 2 — Lamdan · דין מי שאסר עצמו מכל ישראל
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