✦ ❖ ✦
DAAT · LEVEL 2 — LAMDAN

Siman 173 — Lamdan level: eight mahlokot on the measure of the criteria

The principle is nowhere contested; it is the thresholds that divide
יורה דעה · סימן קע״ג
הרבה פרטי דיני רבית
🔥 Lamdan level · תלמיד חכם
✦ ❖ ✦

Siman 173 opens no controversy of principle: nobody disputes that there is interest in sale, nor that the criterion is אגר נטר. The eight mahlokot that follow all bear on the measure of a criterion already granted — how much one must possess, how far the rate must be established, which liability counts as a liability, how much a man’s trouble is worth. That is what makes them formidable in practice.

DAAT · daattorah.com — הרב יוסף חיים סממה

📑 Plan of the pilpul

1. The foundation — הרבה פרטי דיני רבית: a siman of cases, and yet a single principle
2. First mahloket — seif 6: כל דמי הדינר, or only a part?
3. Second mahloket — seif 7: אין שומתו ידוע when the seller has nothing
4. Third mahloket — seif 13: which liability may the seller take, and which disqualifies him?
5. Fourth mahloket — seif 13: בניסן or בטבת, and why the question is not philological
6. Fifth mahloket — seif 14: the Shakh emends the Rambam’s text
7. Sixth mahloket — seifim 16 and 18: does “ויש מתירין” denote a disagreement?
8. Seventh mahloket — seif 15: the wage of trouble, its measure and its reason
9. Eighth mahloket — seif 18: dust of interest or stipulated interest?
10. The Rishonim behind the seifim
11. Summary — who follows whom, and on what

The Hebrew apparatus is here rigorously identical in the three languages — the source text is not translated, it is accompanied. It is the glosses, the questions, the answers and the headings that change language.

1. The foundation — הרבה פרטי דיני רבית: a siman of cases, and yet a single principle

The title of the siman warns the reader: these are particulars. But nineteen seifim of particulars do not make nineteen laws. The Tur, who is here the Shulhan Arukh’s source almost sentence for sentence, opens with the proposition that holds them all together, and he places it before any particular case.

« כשם שיש רבית בהלואה כך יש רבית במכר » (טור יו״ד קע״ג)

And he redoubles, in the middle of the siman, with the symmetrical sentence — which is not a second rule but the same one, reversed:

« וכשם שאסור למכור ביוקר בשביל המתנת המעות כך אסור ליקח בזול בשביל המתנת המעות » (טור יו״ד קע״ג)
The yesod of the siman. The prohibition bears not on a type of contract but on an economic function: what is paid because the money waited. The Shulhan Arukh therefore never asks “is this a loan?” — it asks “does the surplus pay for a thing or for a delay?”. The whole difficulty of the siman is that, in a sale, both answers are true at once: the thing has a price, and the delay has a value. The nineteen seifim are nineteen ways of separating them.
Hakira — where does the prohibition lodge?. Two readings of seif 1 are possible, and the whole siman tips according to which is taken. (a) The prohibition bears on the measurable gap: as soon as a price difference is attributable to the delay there is interest, and measurability is only a means of proof. (b) The prohibition bears on what presents itself as interest: without a public measure there is nothing to see, and therefore nothing to forbid. The Mehaber seems to hold the second — since he permits the cloak — but the “there is one who says” he at once reports holds the first, since it forbids a large rise even without speech. The Shakh at note 17 will decide for the first, and the Taz more strongly still.

2. First mahloket — seif 6: כל דמי הדינר, or only a part?

The Mehaber, following the Rosh as the Tur reports him, requires that he who receives the dinar have at home the whole value of the coins he will return. The Rama rejects the condition and grounds his rejection on the se’ah-for-se’ah of siman 162.

« וכתב א״א הרא״ש ז״ל שצריך שיהיו ביד הלוקח כל דמי הדינר » (טור יו״ד קע״ג)
Question of the Taz, the Levush, the Bah and the Derishah. The Rama’s comparison does not hold. A se’ah for a se’ah is a loan — and there one returns no more than one received; that is why a little suffices. Here he returns more than he received, and the permission therefore comes not from the loan but from the sale. But a sale requires that the thing sold exist. The Taz sets the contradiction in one sentence:
« ובעיני יפלא מאד מה שכ׳ רמ״א ז״ל ול״נ מדברי התוספות » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ט)
« ומהרש״ל והלבוש והב״ח והט״ז חולקים על הרב בזה דלא דמי זה להלואת סאה בסאה דהא נותן לו יותר משוי » (באר היטב יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ט)
The Shakh’s answer — and he defends not the reasoning but the text. The Shakh does not answer the argument: he turns the question back. The Bah wondered that one should rule leniently against an express text of the Tur; but the Rama had written, in the gloss itself, that some copies of the Tur read the reverse — and that this reading seems to him the right one. The disagreement is therefore not about reasoning but about the text of the Rosh: those who have “כל דמי הדינר” before them read a condition, those who read the reverse see none.
« תמהני מאד על תמיהתו שהרי הרב כ׳ שבקצת ספרי הטור הגירסא להיפך ושהוא הנכון » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ט״ו)

The Nekudot HaKesef add a factual correction, and it is far from secondary: the Taz had set the Tosafot against the Rama, whereas the Tosafot are precisely of his view.

« ולא כמ״ש התוספות כו׳. זה אינו דאף דעת התוס׳ כן וכמ״ש בש״ך ס״ק י״ד » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קע״ג)
« ובעיני יפלא כו׳. כבר קדמוהו האחרונים בזה » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קע״ג)
Nafka mina. A man wishes to sell forward currency he has not yet fully received. According to the Rama it suffices that he hold a part of it; according to the Taz, the Levush, the Bah, the Maharshal and the Ba’er Hetev, he needs the whole. The Pit’hei Teshuva reports that the Yeriot HaOhel rejected the leniency and concluded like the Taz — but he adds the second half, which is lenient the other way: where he really has the sum, the permission holds even if the lender does not know it.
« ומיהו היכא דיש לו מותר אף שהמלוה אינו יודע כמבואר בט״ז לעיל סי׳ קס״ב סק״ג » (פת״ש יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ז)

3. Second mahloket — seif 7: אין שומתו ידוע when the seller has nothing

This is the longest discussion in the siman, and it is born of a reading. The Beit Yosef, reading the Tosafot and the Rosh on the sugya of the wax-seller, draws from them that an object without a known valuation escapes the condition of possession; the Rama writes it at the end of seif 7.

« משמע מדבריהם שאם הוא דבר שאין שומתו ידועה אע״פ שאין לו מותר להקדים לו מעות כדי לקנות ממנו בזול » (בית יוסף יו״ד קע״ג)
The Taz’s question. The Taz opens with two words that set the tone — דברים תמוהים יש כאן — then copies out the sugya to show that the question of the Tosafot and the Rosh was not going that way. They asked: why does Rav Nahman forbid here, when elsewhere he permits tarsha? And they answered that mentioning a rate — “four to the zuz” — is here tantamount to an explicit statement. That answer says nothing about an object of unknown valuation; it says only why a known rate aggravates.
« והקשו בתוס׳ והרא״ש ממאי דאמר רב נחמן גופיה טרשא שרי » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ב)
« וי״ל כיון דאזלי הכא ארבע בזוזי הוה כמפרש אם מעכשיו בפחות » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ב)
The Shakh’s answer — a third term neither the Beit Yosef nor the Taz had posited. The Shakh takes no side on the reading of the Tosafot: he introduces a condition the discussion had left out of view, the יצא השער. To sell what one does not have is lawful once a market rate is established, for then the price can no longer run away; so long as it is not, the fear of a rise forbids the transaction even at the current price. The Rama’s permission is therefore not general: it holds where the rate is fixed — and the Taz’s question, which assumed a general permission, falls.
« ולפ״ז כי שרינן באין שומתן ידוע אפי׳ באין לו נמי ביצא השער בדוקא היא דלא כדמשמע בעט״ז » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ז)
« האריך להקשות על הב״י והרמ״א ולפמ״ש בש״ך ס״ק י״ז לק״מ ע״ש » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קע״ג)
The division, and what it governs in practice. Beit Yosef and Rama — an object of unknown valuation is outside the field: permitted even without possession. Shakh — permitted, but only once the rate is established; otherwise forbidden, even at the current price. Taz — the Beit Yosef’s reasoning does not carry; wherever there is fear of a rise, one must forbid where he has nothing. Ba’er Hetev, who writes for practice, ranges the Shakh and the Taz on one side and concludes with them.
« הנה בט״ז האריך בראיות לחלוק על הרמ״א ומסקנתו דבכ״מ שיש חשש שמא יתייקר יש לאסור באין לו וכן הוא דעת הש״ך » (באר היטב יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ג)

4. Third mahloket — seif 13: which liability may the seller take, and which disqualifies him?

The seif divides the risks: souring to the seller, market rate to the buyer. The Shakh gives the reason — souring is not a market hazard but a flaw the wine already bore — and at once draws the limit.

« ולא חשבינן רבית מה שהמוכר מקבל עליו אחריות בשביל הקדמת המעות. טור » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ד)
« אבל אם המוכר מקבל עליו גם כן אחריות דיוקרא וזולא אסור וכן מוכח בבית יוסף » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ד)
The Shakh against the Derishah. The Derishah had inverted the two terms — the seller may take the market rate, not the souring — and the Shakh rejects it with a formula that is not merely polemical: he says he did not reach the bottom of its meaning. Then he sets aside the proof it drew from the פוסק על הפירות of siman 175: there one may fix at today’s rate or at the low rate, but if the seller takes rise and fall upon himself, it is forbidden there too.
« והדרישה הפך הדברים והאריך ולא ירדתי לסוף דעתו בכל דבריו » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ד)
« דלא שרי לקמן סי׳ קע״ה אלא לפסוק כשער של עכשיו או כשער הזול אבל כשמוכר מקבל עליו אחריו׳ דיוקרא וזולא ודאי אסור » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ד)
What the mahloket lays bare. The disagreement is not about who bears the risk but about what a risk means. For the Shakh, a risk is lawfully taken by the seller only if it bears on the thing sold — its quality, its identity. A risk bearing on price does not belong to the seller: it belongs to the market, and he who unloads it onto another has placed money. The Taz reaches the same point by the gemara’s formula: without the risk of a fall, the buyer is near to gain and far from loss.
« אפי׳ (לא) משכו דהוי קרוב לשכר ורחוק להפסד כן נראה לענ״ד » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ט)
« וכ׳ הש״ך בשם הטור ולא חשבינן רבית מה שהמוכר מקבל עליו אחריות שיהיה יין טוב אבל אם המוכר מקבל עליו ג״כ אחריות דיוקרא וזולא אסור ודלא כהדרישה וכ״כ הט״ז » (באר היטב יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ז)

5. Fourth mahloket — seif 13: בניסן or בטבת, and why the question is not philological

The gemara reads Tevet. The Tur, whom the Mehaber copies, reads Nissan. The Taz notes the discrepancy and proposes two explanations, the second of which amounts to saying that the month is not decisive.

« חֲזִי מָר רַבָּנַן דְּקָא אָכְלִי רִבִּיתָא, דְּיָהֲבִי זוּזֵי אַחַמְרָא בְּתִשְׁרִי וּמְבַחֲרִי לֵהּ בְּטֵבֵת » (בבא מציעא ע״ג ע״ב)
« וכתב ב״י שבגמרא של הטור היתה הגירסא בניסן או שסובר הטור דלאו דוקא עד טבת אלא אפי׳ עד ניסן » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ח)
Why the month matters. The month is not a date but a criterion. The permission rests on the idea that wine which will turn already bore its flaw within it: the buyer therefore never bought that wine, and the seller’s guarantee gives him nothing more. That reason holds only so long as the flaw was prior. Past the term at which the wine clears, a new souring may occur — and then the guarantee becomes a real advantage, hence interest. The Shakh says it expressly, and draws the consequence: the date follows place and season.
« שבירור היין הוא עד ניסן ומעיקרא קלקולו בתוכו אלא שאינו ניכר אבל בתר הכי אפשר דמעיקרא חמרא והשתא חלא ואסור » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ה)
« ויש פוסקים עד טבת ונראה דהכל לפי המקום והזמן שהוא עת בירור היין » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ה)
The Tosafot broaden, the Beit Yosef relies on it, the Shakh closes again. The Tosafot hold that Tevet is not exact and that the whole year is alike. The Beit Yosef relies on them, and his argument is not exegetical but categorial: the matter being rabbinic, one may lean on the lenient view. The Shakh reports both, then adds three words that restore the measure — ומ״מ יש להחמיר.
« והתוס׳ כתבו דטבת לאו דוקא אלא ה״ה כל ימות השנה וכב״י כיון דמידי דרבנן הוא נראה דסמכינן על דברי התוספות ומביאו ד״מ ומ״מ יש להחמיר » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ה)

6. Fifth mahloket — seif 14: the Shakh emends the Rambam’s text

Seif 14 is, word for word, the Rambam’s language. It states two successive permissions, and the difficulty is that the clause “and if he found no way to sell it he ought to have returned it” stands after the first — where it serves no purpose, since the loss there is already the seller’s.

« כל הסעיף הוא ל׳ הרמב״ם והב״י והאחרונים נדחקו בישוב דבריו » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ט)
The three attempts. The Perishah distinguishes by the holding of the funds: in the first case the buyer keeps the money until summer and profits by it, whence the name of loan and the requirement that the seller keep the liability; in the second, he does not hold the funds. The Bah distinguishes by the term: in the first the liability runs only until the date; in the second no term was fixed at all. The Levush, whom the Taz reports, explains the whole by the accumulation of advantages granted to the buyer.
« הפרישה כתב דבדין הא׳ מיירי שהמקבל מחזיק המעות עד הקיץ ומרויח בו ושם הלואה עליו לכך בעינן שהמוכר יקבל אחריות » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ט)
« והב״ח כתב דברישא אינו מקבל אחריות אלא עד הזמן אבל אחר שהגיע הזמן הרי היא ברשות הלוקח לכל דבר » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ט)
« ובלבוש נתן טעם להיתר זה דלאו משום המתנת המעות אוקיר גביה אלא משום שאם אבדה או נשברה לא ישלם לו כלום » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ)
The Shakh does not decide between them: he moves a sentence. What makes this note remarkable is that it changes plane. The Shakh dismisses the three answers in a word, then asserts that an error crept into the copies of the Rambam: the clause of return belongs to the second rule. Reading it there resolves everything — for it is in the second that the loss falls on the buyer, and only there, therefore, that a right of return is needed to keep him from being bound to a price he will not obtain.
« וכל זה איננו שוה לי ולבי אומר לי שטעות נפל בספרי הרמב״ם » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ט)
« והאי שאם לא מצא למכרה ולהרויח בה כו׳ צריך להיות אחר סוף דין השני » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ט)
« דבריו דחוקים בישוב דברי הרמב״ם והנכון כמ״ש בש״ך ע״ש » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קע״ג)
Nafka mina. According to the Bah, the right of return belongs to the first arrangement: a buyer who has found no taker may return the barrel even after the summer. According to the Shakh it belongs to the second: it is the one who took the risk upon himself who may return. A modern consignment contract follows this line — the two halves are distinguished by who bears the loss, and the right of return goes with the bearing of risk, not against it.

7. Sixth mahloket — seifim 16 and 18: does “ויש מתירין” denote a disagreement?

Twice in this siman the Rama adds a gloss beginning “there are those who permit”. The formula suggests a view opposed to the Mehaber’s. The Shakh maintains that it is nothing of the kind — and this is a general thesis about the reading of glosses, which he states as such.

« אין כאן מחלוקת דגם הרמב״ם והמחבר מודים לזה כדמשמע בהרב המגיד וב״י אלא דמיירי באינו נותן לו שכר טרחו » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל״ג)
« וכן לקמן סעיף י״ח שכ׳ הרב ויש מתירין אינם חולקי׳ אסברא ראשונה וכה״ג בדוכתא טובי » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל״ג)
The Taz stumbles on the same thing, and says it otherwise. At seif 18 the Taz uses a rare expression: he stammers before the gloss. It implies that these “permitters” contradict the Rivash — and that cannot be, for the Rivash was treating a loan, and the Rama’s case is a full sale in which the lender himself receives the merchandise.
« גמגום חזינא כאן דמשמע מלשון זה שיש מתירין אלו חולקין עם הריב״ש דלעיל ולא נראה כן » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל״א)
« ונ״ל פשוט שגם הריב״ש מודה בזה דכאן אין שום הלואה אלא מכר גמור » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל״א)
The Nekudot HaKesef: there was nothing to stammer at. The answer holds in five words, and it refers back to note 33: the question does not arise, because the Shakh’s general thesis has already dissolved it. What the Taz discovers at seif 18 as a local anomaly, the Shakh had laid down two seifim earlier as a rule of reading — וכה״ג בדוכתא טובי, and there are many such places.
« גמגום חזינא כו׳. לק״מ כמ״ש בש״ך ס״ק ל״ג » (נקודות הכסף יו״ד קע״ג)
« והש״ך כ׳ דאין כאן מחלוקת דגם הרמב״ם והמחבר מודים בזה אלא דהם אמרו באינו נותן לו שכר טרחו » (באר היטב יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ה)
What the Shakh puts at stake. If “there are those who permit” denotes not a disagreement but another set of facts, then the Rama’s gloss does not soften the Mehaber’s view: it makes it explicit. The practical consequence is plain — the permission cannot be invoked without the wage of trouble, since it is the wage that makes the whole difference between the two situations. And so the Ba’er Hetev, who writes for practice, reports it.

8. Seventh mahloket — seif 15: the wage of trouble, its measure and its reason

The Mehaber requires that the wage of trouble be paid. Two questions arise at once: how much, and why. They are linked, for the amount depends on the function one assigns to the payment.

« בבית יוסף משמע דבעי למיתן ליה שכר עמלו ומזונו משלם וע״ל סימן קע״ז » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל)
Two reasons, two measures. The Beit Yosef, as the Shakh reads him, holds that a full wage is needed — labour and maintenance. The reason is that without it the carrier takes trouble for the loan that will follow, and that trouble is a service rendered for money. He must therefore be paid for his work, failing which the work itself becomes a consideration. The Taz contests the reason, and thereby the amount: he holds that the carrier works for himself, since his aim is to get the money into his hands; it is therefore no wage of a loan, and a modest sum suffices. The Ba’er Hetev, as often, sets the two face to face.
« כ״כ התוס׳ והרא״ש מטעם דאל״כ הרי הוא טורח לו בהליכה בשביל הלואה שאח״כ » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ד)
« ולע״ד נראה דבזה לא יצאנו עדיין מאיסור רבית אלא טעמא דהלוקח טרח בשביל עצמו כדי שיגיע מעות לידו ואין זה שכר הלואה » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ד)
« בב״י משמע דבעי למיתן ליה שכר עמלו ומזונו משלם ולא די בדבר מועט אבל הט״ז כתב דאפילו בדבר מועט סגי » (באר היטב יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ב)
Nafka mina. A carrier receives a token commission. According to the Shakh reading the Beit Yosef, the transaction is not covered: a full wage was required. According to the Taz, it is. The same divergence recurs at seif 16, where the Taz concludes that paying for the trouble suffices to permit even without transferring the liability — which the Ba’er Hetev reports in his name.
« כ׳ הט״ז נראה דאם נותן לו שכר טרחא על ההבאה שרי אפילו בלא אחריות » (באר היטב יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק כ״ד)

9. Eighth mahloket — seif 18: dust of interest or stipulated interest?

The seif’s prohibition raises no difficulty; its gravity does. The Taz reports from the Rivash a distinction: the liability taken changes the qualification.

« ואם לא קיבל עליו האחריות הוי רבית קצוצה כן כתב ריב״ש סימן ש״ח » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל)
« ובלבוש כתב כאן דאפילו אם קבל עליו אחריות הוה רבית קצוצה ושגגה היא דלא עיין בגוף הדין » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל)
The Radbaz against the Rivash — and the argument lies elsewhere. The Pit’hei Teshuva reports a responsum of the Radbaz that arrives at what the Taz had called an error — it is stipulated interest even with the liability. But his argument is not the Levush’s. It is a matter of civil law: the Rivash assumes that a conditional undertaking binds, and that the lender really lost his capital if the ship failed to arrive. But if אסמכתא does not bind, the lender lost nothing — the liability was an illusion, and nothing remains but a loan of twenty at twenty-four.
« היינו לפי שהוא סובר דאסמכתא קניא ואם לא תגיע הספינה היה מפסיד מעותיו » (פת״ש יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י)
« נמצא שלא היה מפסיד המלוה והרי הוא ר״ק ויוצא בדיינים » (פת״ש יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י)
And he himself gives the way out. The Radbaz does not merely aggravate: he indicates the arrangement that escapes. If one writes מעכשיו, the undertaking binds, and there is no more than dust of interest. And if, instead of money, merchandise is handed over, acquired by the other from now, there is nothing to fear at all — for then the risk borne is real and bears on a thing.
« אבל היכא דאסמכתא קניא כגון דכתב ליה מעכשיו מודה אני שאין בו אלא א״ר » (פת״ש יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י)
« ומ״ה מודה אני דאם לא נתן לו מעות אלא סחורה והתנה עמו שאם תבא הספינה בשלום יתן לו יותר משויים ואם לא יפסיד לגמרי וקנוים לו מעכשיו מותר » (פת״ש יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י)
Seif 19, and why it is not seif 18 reversed. The Shakh and the Taz agree here: marine insurance is no loan at all, for nothing must be returned. The Taz adds a fine observation: even if the twenty is paid in advance, it is not an advance of funds, for the hundred that may be paid will not be paid for the twenty but for the loss the other took upon himself — and the twenty was already acquired from the outset.
« שידוע שאין נותן לו מאה ליטרין בשביל הקדמת ך׳ ליטרין אלא מפני ההפסד שקבל עליו » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל״ב)
« לפי שאין כאן הלואה אלא כעין מכר שמקבל עליו אחריות מעות האחר בעד סך ההוא שנותן לו זה » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל״ד)

10. The Rishonim behind the seifim

The Rambam — הלכות מלווה ולווה, chapters 8 and 9 — He supplies the frame: chapter 8 carries the side of sale (seifim 1, 2, 3, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14), chapter 9 that of advance payment (seifim 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17). Seif 14 is his language word for word, and seif 1 receives from him its qualification — אבק רבית — and the civil rule that goes with it.
« הֲרֵי זֶה אֲבַק רִבִּית שֶׁזֶּה דּוֹמֶה כְּמִי שֶׁנּוֹטֵל עֶשְׂרִים בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁנָּתַן לוֹ מֵאָה לְהִשְׁתַּמֵּשׁ בָּהּ עַד זְמַן פְּלוֹנִי » (רמב״ם הלכות מלווה ולווה פרק ח׳ הלכה א׳)
The Rosh and the Tosafot — They stand at the heart of the first two mahlokot. At seif 6 the Rama invokes them to dispense with the whole value of the dinar, and the Shakh testifies that this is indeed their view; the Taz had denied it, and the Nekudot HaKesef correct him. At seif 7 it is their answer to the question about tarsha that the Beit Yosef broadens into a general permission, and that the Taz refuses to broaden.
« וכן נ״ל שהוא דעת התוס׳ והרא״ש וכ״מ בב״ח ס״ה דלא כהפרישה ס״ו » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ד)
The Ramban — Two contributions, both reported by the Beit Yosef. At seif 6 it is he who lays down that unminted coin has the status of a commodity — whence the money-changer’s permission, and whence its limit. At seif 4 it is he who explains what the royal office of the Rama’s gloss consists in, and why to take it upon oneself is forbidden.
« כמ״ש ב״י בשם הרמב״ן דהיינו מעות שאין עליהם צורה וה״ל כפירות » (ט״ז יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ט)
The Rivash — Three times decisive. At seif 7 he gives the reason why the seller’s possession suffices — coins acquire by Torah law. At seif 16 he removes the impediment of the man of standing when liability and wage are joined. At seif 18 he lays down the distinction of gravity that the Levush will deny and the Radbaz combat.
« וכשמקבל עליו אחריות ונותן לו ג״כ שכר טרחו אפי׳ אדם חשוב שרי. ריב״ש מביאו ב״י » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ל״ב)
The Ba’al HaTerumot — Seif 4 names him in the Mehaber’s own text: from him comes the permission to sell a claim at a discount. The Shakh recalls him also at seif 1, on Rabbenu Tam’s formula that indexes the price to the rate of a future date, and on land that escapes overreaching.
« וכתב בה״ת בשם ר״ת דכל שלא אמר ליה אם תתן מעכשיו כו » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק ג)
The Rashba — His responsum 686 is the whole source of the Rama’s gloss at seif 4 — the distinction between “take the office in my stead” and “deliver me from the office”. The Shakh adds to it, from another of his responsa, the extension concerning the liability the seller of a claim may take where collection is prevented by the authorities.
« כתב ב״י בשם תשובת הרשב״א דה״ה אם קבל עליו המוכר אחריות שאם לא יוכל לגבות מחמת גזרת המלך מותר » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י)
The Ramah and the Nimukei Yosef — The Ramah, through the Tur, restricts the permission of seif 6 to the professional money-changer; the Beit Yosef had set it aside, the Shakh upholds it. The Nimukei Yosef, with the Maggid Mishneh, supplies the reason that separates the orchard from the gourds at seif 10, and, at seif 3, the distinction between before and after the conclusion of the sale.
« כתב הטור בשם הרמ״ה דוקא שולחני דאורחיה בהכי אבל באינש אחרינא אסור » (ש״ך יו״ד קע״ג ס״ק י״ב)

11. Summary — who follows whom, and on what

Eight points of division, and a regularity worth stating: at the five places where the Taz and the Shakh diverge, the Nekudot HaKesef — which are the Shakh’s reply to the Taz — intervene four times, and always against the Taz. The Ba’er Hetev, who writes for practice, follows the Shakh everywhere, except at seif 6, where he ranges against the Rama the Maharshal, the Levush, the Bah and the Taz.

The pointThe view of the Rama or the MehaberThe ShakhThe TazWhat the Nekudot HaKesef or the Ba’er Hetev make of it
Seif 6 — is the whole value of the dinar needed?Rama: a part sufficesdefends the Rama on the reading of the Turwonders at it at lengthNK 1-2 correct the Taz; Ba’er Hetev 9 ranges four Aharonim against the Rama
Seif 7 — אין שומתו ידוע where he has nothingRama: permittedpermitted, but only once the rate is establishedrefuses: wherever a rise is feared, forbidNK 3: the Shakh’s restriction dissolves the question; Ba’er Hetev 13 concludes with the Taz and the Shakh
Seif 13 — which liability may the seller take?Mehaber: souring yes, price fall noconfirms, and rejects the Derishahagrees with the ShakhBa’er Hetev 17 reports the Shakh and notes that the Taz writes likewise
Seif 13 — בניסן or בטבת?Mehaber: Nissan, with the Turall depends on place and season; יש להחמירthe gemara reads Tevet; two explanationsboth agree the month is not the law; the Shakh closes again
Seif 14 — the Rambam’s textMehaber: the Rambam’s language as it standsemends: the clause belongs to the second caseexplains from the Levush, and objectsNK 4: the Taz’s answer is forced, the Shakh’s is right
Seif 15 — how much is the wage of trouble?Mehaber: it must be givenlabour and maintenance, in fulla modest sum sufficesBa’er Hetev 22 sets the two views face to face without deciding
Seifim 16 and 18 — is “ויש מתירין” a mahloket?Rama: there are those who permitno: it is another case, where the wage is paidat seif 18 he stammers, then concludes like the ShakhNK 5: no difficulty, see Shakh note 33; Ba’er Hetev 25 and 27 follow
Seif 18 — dust of interest or stipulated interest?Mehaber: forbidden, without qualifyingrefers to the Rivash through the TazRivash: with the liability, dust; the Levush errsPit’hei Teshuva 10: the Radbaz holds it stipulated, for want of asmakhta — and points to the way out
The line of the siman. None of these eight mahlokot bears on the principle. All bear on the measure of a criterion already granted: how much he must have, how far the rate must be established, which liability counts, how much the trouble is worth, up to which month. That is the mark of simanim of cases — and it is also why level 4 must decide by thresholds and not by principles.
DAAT · daattorah.com — Siman 173 of Yoreh De’ah · Study by Rav Yossef Haim Samama