Siman 224 — “behold I am חרם upon you”: the formula decides who is bound (יורה דעה רכ״ד)
Two men, Reuven and Shimon, and a single question: what exactly did he say? “Behold I am חרם upon you” closes my property to the other; “behold you are חרם upon me” closes his to me. The preposition, and it alone, designates the man who will be inconvenienced. Then comes the real difficulty: the Temple Mount belongs to all Israel and stays open, but the synagogue belongs to the townspeople — and each has a share in it. The remedy is to convey one’s share; one opinion holds there was no problem at all. The Shakh and the Taz are not on the same side. (Shulḥan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 224 — 1 seif)
ראובן שאמר לשמעון הריני עליך חרם או הרי אתה אסור בהנאתי ראובן מותר בהנאת שמעון ושמעון אסור בהנאת ראובן
Reuven who said to Shimon: “behold I am חרם upon you”, or: “behold you are forbidden my benefit” — Reuven is permitted the benefit of Shimon, and Shimon is forbidden the benefit of Reuven. The man who speaks is not the man who is bound: the whole siman lies in that displacement.
Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De'ah 224:1
The 4 levels of study
LEVEL 01
רמת המתחיל
Base — Beginner & Intermediate
The single seif in Hebrew, its translation, its breakdown into ten clauses — three formulas, the property of all Israel against the town’s, the remedy, the יש אומרים and the Rama’s gloss — the vocabulary, the sources (the mishna of נדרים מ״ז ע״ב, the Rambam, the Tur, the Beit Yosef, the echo in או״ח קנ״ג) and the nine apparatus entries quoted one by one.
Pilpul: the grammar of the vow and why the formula never names the object; the storey of מלקות the Meḥaber dropped and about which the Beit Yosef notes the Ran differs; the contradiction raised against the Rambam, the Ba’ḥ’s answer which the Taz demolishes in three objections, and the three degrees of דין חלוקה; the Shakh against the Taz; and the takana that removes the question from the law.
The three formulas in one axiom, the mechanism of shared property in five steps, what the apparatus adds, the clause-by-clause table, the three open disputes, the vocabulary, the golden rules and the five classic pitfalls.
The practical halakha: recognising the formula, classifying the shared asset, and the remedy — a real act of קנין. The Shakh–Taz dispute remains open, but the Ra’avad’s takana overrides it for the synagogue and the books. Note: the Admur HaZaken did not write a Shulḥan Arukh on Yoreh De’ah — a level of psak, not “Daat HaRav”.
What is the difference between “הריני עליך חרם” and “הרי אתה עלי חרם”?
All the difference, and it hangs on one suffix. The first closes my property to the other: he is the one bound. The second closes his property to me: I am the one bound. The mishna says it in two words — « הריני עליך חרם המודר אסור הרי את עלי חרם הנודר אסור » (נדרים מ״ז ע״ב).
Why may they enter the Temple Mount but not the synagogue?
Because the criterion is not public use but the share. On the Temple Mount, which belongs to all Israel, neither has a share of his own from which the other would benefit. In their town’s synagogue each has a real share — and to enter is to enter the other’s share too.
What is the remedy?
To convey to a third party the share they hold in the thing, so that neither benefits from his fellow’s property. The Rambam describes the procedure: each writes his share over to someone and conveys it to him through an intermediary. It is a real legal act, carried out under a Rav’s direction.
Do the Shakh and the Taz agree about the synagogue?
No, and this is the central dispute of the siman. The Taz devotes nearly four thousand characters to defending the Meḥaber’s first opinion — forbidden. The Shakh holds the opposite and writes that it is the main view in the Shas — « וכן נראה עיקר בש״ס » (ש״ך יו״ד רכ״ד ס״ק ב). The Ba’er Hetev presents both positions without choosing.
Can one really forbid someone his share of the synagogue?
The Shakh begins precisely by distinguishing: מדינא, that is the debate above. But he immediately reports a takana of the Ra’avad and all the sages of his generation by which one cannot, and that if one did, the prohibition is none. The Shulḥan Arukh writes it himself in אורח חיים — « אין אדם יכול לאסור חלקו מב״ה ולא מהספרים ואם אסר אינו כלום » (שו״ע או״ח קנ״ג:ט״ו).
I lent a room of my house for a minyan and I have fallen out with one of the worshippers.
That is exactly the Rama’s gloss, which invokes a takana of Rabbenu Gershom: one may not shut the door on a single member of the congregation — one must shut it on all or on none. The Rama adds in אורח חיים an important proviso: this holds only if the loan was made unconditionally at the outset. A real case goes to a Rav.