Siman 218 — How the Intention of the One Who Vows Is Followed
Six seifim, and the third term of a series. Siman 216 asked what a word conveys in the language of the Torah, 217 what it conveys in the language of men; this one leaves words behind and asks what that man meant. And it does not ask him: it looks at what made him vow. The same sentence then forbids the load to one pained by carrying and the garment to one pained by the garment. The Rama at once bounds the rule to a vow a man makes alone; once a third party has a right in it, the language takes over again. There follow four applications and a communal ordinance. (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 218 — 6 seifim)
כל הנודר או נשבע רואין דברים שבגללן נשבע או נדר ולומדים מהם לאיזה נתכוין והולכין אחר הענין ולא אחר משמעות הדיבור
Whoever vows or swears — one looks at the things on account of which he swore or vowed, and learns from them what he aimed at; and one follows the matter, not the meaning of the utterance. The siman opens with its rule, and it is a reversal.
Choulhan Aroukh, Yoreh De'ah 218:1
The 4 study levels
LEVEL 01
רמת המתחיל
Base — Beginner & Intermediate
The six seifim in Hebrew, with fluent English translation and a clause-by-clause breakdown: the rule and the wool that proves it, the Rama’s boundary, the wine already made, the refused marriage and invitation, the borrowed cow, the communal ordinance and the word “dwell”. The twenty-three commentary entries — Shakh, Taz, Ba’er Hetev, Pit’hei Teshuva, Nekudot HaKesef — cited one by one, with the Tur, the Beit Yosef, the Rambam and the mishnayot of Nedarim.
The pilpul: the mishna and braita of נדרים נ״ה ע״ב and whether they diverge; the Rambam, the Rosh, the Ran and the Taz’s own reading; the division נודר בינו לבין עצמו against נודר לחבירו, grounded on פיו ולבו שוין and on Rivash 195; the Mabit on דררא דממונא; the Taz’s three-pronged attack on the Rashbatz and the Nekudot HaKesef’s defence; the Rama’s כל שכן against the Terumat HaDeshen, the teiku of Ḥullin and the Maharshal; the two versions of seif 5; and the limit of כוונה at ס״ק ז.
Revision: the rule and its mechanism in a diagram, the six seifim in the order of the book, three tables of positions — on the הוכחה, on seif 2, on the communal takana — the vocabulary and five classic pitfalls.
Halakha lema‘asse: six propositions of ruling, the two open divergences and how they are decided, the cases reported by the commentaries — the sea voyage, the two separated partners, the vow not to walk, the shochet, the price of wine, the secret told through a third party — and the decisive question: who may invoke intention, and on what conditions. With the constant referral: actual conduct belongs to the Rav.
I said something excessive in a tense moment. Am I bound by everything I said?
The siman addresses exactly this question, and its rule is in seif 1:
« כל הנודר או נשבע רואין דברים שבגללן נשבע או נדר ולומדים מהם לאיזה נתכוין והולכין אחר הענין ולא אחר משמעות הדיבור » (שו״ע יו״ד רי״ח:א)
But two major reservations. The Shakh at ס״ק א writes that without an established painful circumstance there is no הוכחה and nothing is permitted; and at ס״ק ז, that one is not believed to say afterwards what one had in mind. Ask your Rav.Does this hold for an undertaking I made toward someone?
No, and that is the boundary the Rama sets at the end of seif 1:
« וכל זה דוקא בנודר בינו לבין עצמו אבל בנודר לחבירו כל שלשון הנדר כולל הולכין אחריו אם לא באומדנא דמוכח » (רמ״א יו״ד רי״ח:א)
The Taz explains at ס״ק ב why: a personal vow requires פיו ולבו שוין, an undertaking toward another does not — the beneficiary acquires through the language used. The exception of the אומדנא דמוכח remains. Ask your Rav.Our community passed an ordinance. Does it reach what we already had?
The Rama writes so in seif 2, as a כל שכן — but he himself notes that this is his reasoning, and against the Terumat HaDeshen:
« וכל שכן קהל שעשו תקנה כיוצא בזה שאסורין למכור אפילו מה שהיה להם קודם לכן » (רמ״א יו״ד רי״ח:ב)
The Shakh at ס״ק ג, the Taz at ס״ק ד and the Ba’er Hetev at ס״ק ד all three restrict it: an ordinary ordinance does not reach it; one taken under a ḥerem does. Have the text read by a Rav before the vote.After a divorce I said she would never benefit from me. May I still give her anything?
That is exactly the second case of seif 3, and the mishna at נדרים ס״ג ע״ב reads it as aimed at the union, not the person:
« וכן המגרש את אשתו ואמר קונם שהיא נהנית לי לעולם הרי אלו מותרות ליהנות לו שלא נתכוון אלא לשום אישות » (שו״ע יו״ד רי״ח:ג)
But the real situation — the exact words used, the moment, what followed — decides everything, and this siman shows precisely that those elements are not judged by the person involved. Ask your Rav.