Three seifim, and the same silence acting twice in opposite directions. A man vowed to marry, to buy, to pay a teacher — and did not say when: he is not pressed, one waits for what suits him, because no one bound himself to whatever comes first. A man forbade himself a thing — and did not say until when: then nothing bounds the prohibition, and it lasts forever; the Taz and the Shakh extend the rule to an oath, against the nezirut model, which lasts thirty days. (Shulchan Arukh, Yoreh De’ah 219 — 3 seifim)
מי שנדר או נשבע לישא אשה או לקנות בית וכיוצא בו ולא קבע זמן אין מחייבין אותו לישא או לקנות עד שימצא הראוי לו
One who vowed or swore to marry a woman, or to buy a house, or the like, and did not set a term — he is not obliged to marry or to buy until he finds what is fitting for him. The siman opens on the vow to act, and on the measure of its execution.
Choulhan Aroukh, Yoreh De'ah 219:1LEVEL 01
The three seifim in Hebrew, with fluent English translation and a clause-by-clause breakdown: the vow to marry or to buy and the measure of the fitting, the schoolteacher “up to ten litrin” and the Rashba’s proviso, the term-less prohibition that lasts forever. The ten commentary entries — Shakh, Taz, Ba’er Hetev, Pit’hei Teshuva, Nekudot HaKesef — cited one by one, with the Tur, the Beit Yosef, the Rambam and the braita of Bava Kamma.
📖 StudyLEVEL 02
The pilpul: is a vow to act a vow at all? the Perisha’s התפסה and the Shakh’s ידות; the phrase בארץ ישראל in the braita that the Mehaber did not reproduce; the Mabit against the Rashdam on a fixed term; the Mahari’t’s distinction between a matter of mitzva and a matter of option; and the great debate of seif 3 — the Ran, the Hagahot Mordechai, the Darkei Moshe’s doubt, the Taz’s proof and the Nekudot HaKesef’s critique.
📖 StudyLEVEL 03
Revision: the single rule and its two opposite applications in a table, the three seifim in the order of the book, the positions on a fixed term and on an oath, the vocabulary — קביעות זמן, הראוי לו, התפסה, ידות, סתם נזירות ל׳ יום — and four classic pitfalls.
📖 StudyLEVEL 04
Halakha lema‘asse: five propositions of ruling, what remains open (the fixed term, deferral in a matter of option), and three cases of today reported by the commentaries — the synagogue one forbade oneself, the haskama with no duration, and the shochet a community may take back. With the constant referral: actual conduct belongs to the Rav.
📖 StudyNo — this is exactly seif 1: one is not obliged to buy before finding what is fitting.
« ולא קבע זמן אין מחייבין אותו לישא או לקנות עד שימצא הראוי לו » (שו״ע יו״ד רי״ט:א)But two reservations: the Pit’hei Teshuva reports that in a matter of mitzva one is bound as soon as the fitting appears, and notes that the braita spoke of a house in the Land of Israel. Ask your Rav.
No. Seif 3 is categorical, and deliberately short:
« מי שאסר דבר אחד עליו בלא זמן אסור בו לעולם » (שו״ע יו״ד רי״ט:ג)The Taz and the Shakh extend the rule to an oath. A perpetual vow is lifted by a התרה before a sage or three men: it is to a Rav one must turn, not to the passage of time.
That is the question of the commentaries. The Taz gives two reasons, and the first is the Ran’s:
« שאני בנדר שכולל בו נדרי הקדש ונדרי איסור וכשם שהמקדיש בהמה למזבח קדושה עולמית ה״נ בנדרי איסור » (ט״ז יו״ד רי״ט ס״ק א)The second, of the Hagahot Mordechai, sets object against person. It is that one which reopens the question of an oath, which the Darkei Moshe raises and the Rosh resolves.
The Ba’er Hetev says so expressly, in the Rashach’s name, at ס״ק ב:
« וכן הסכמת הקהל כל שלא קצבו זמן הוא לעולם » (באר היטב יו״ד רי״ט ס״ק ב)But the Pit’hei Teshuva at ס״ק ב shows the limit: what was voted as an act to be done is exhausted by its doing. Everything turns on the wording. Have the text read by a Rav before the vote.